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Abstract
My basic premise in  this study is, if abjection is a psychosocial phenomenon, even 
a kind of waste category and mechanism, it should be discernible and analysable as 
an underlying structure in the form, iconography and purpose of works of art. Cer­
tain modes of art will manifest or express it more lucidly and abundantly than 
others. Satire and the Grotesque, which Goya adopts in his graphic Work, are espe­
cially fruitful in this regard. In both, one can find processes and states of degrada­
tion and vitiation that accord with the two facets of abjection Hal Foster (1996) so 
pragmatically terms the operation to abject and the condition to be abject. Satire, with 
its inclination to criticise political, social and ecclesiastical figures, can chiefly be 
interpreted in terms of the operation to abject (to lower, cast down, depose, sideline), 
while the Grotesque, displaying the distorted, monstrous, 'freakish', hybrid, impos­
sible, relates more to tire condition to be abject.
This conjunction between satire/the Grotesque and abjection guides my inter­
pretation of Los Caprichos and Los Disparates. Los Caprichos, in which Goya took it 
upon himself to "censure" and "ridicule" "human errors and vices", are marked by 
a quite strict use of satire to criticise, mock and marginalise certain social groups 
(prostitutes, nobles and corrupt clerics, in particular). Since society, or the Symbolic 
that undergirds it, cannot do without the abject, either in its role as midden or as 
oppositional determinant or defining other, the satirical project cannot banish or 
destroy the abject; it can, however, bid and lobby for some degree of social recla­
mation and rejuvenation. The satirist depicts the grotesque, sordid, obscene, deviant, 
abandoned and licentious to indicate to the viewer/reader what s/he  must laugh 
off to live a decent, obedient, constructive and law-fearing life. Goya takes this ap­
proach in Los Caprichos. After all, in at least one letter to his friend Martin Zapater he 
hinted that he feared the "witches, goblins, phantoms, arrogant giants, knaves" 
and "scoundrels" of his society, and evidently felt a need to part from them. How 
deep this need ran one cannot say; many of his images suggest a degree of equivo­
cation (he vacillates between being on the side of the law and on the side of Ms 
own more incorruptible conscience, from which he upbraids the law) and ambiva­
lence (on the one hand, he scolds his objects of attack and appears to be repelled by 
them; on the other, he seems to relish depicting them in grotesque and blighted 
shapes, as if the satirical purpose is secondary to the opportunity his art provides to 
invent forms and get close to the forbidden, the anti-social, the rotten, the abject).
In Los Disparates equivocation and ambivalence come more to the fore. Goya 
often appears most aggressively satirical in the Disparates when he questions cor­
ruption in social institutions such as tire Church and the law. Some images, notably 
Folhj of the Mass, juxtapose a wrathful figure with a mass of social ills, foibles and 
depravities, and seem characteristically satirical, but the majority of the etchings 
are striking in their lack of closure, as if a "state of unresolved tension", to quote 
Michael Steig, adequately rewarded Goya for the labour of production. Man xoander- 
ing among Phantoms, for example, is ambiguous and seems to sum up Goya's relation- 
sMp to the abject toward the end of his life: through the surrogate of an old man, 
Goya appears to have struck a deal with the abject; submerged in it, corrupted by it, 
impure, but nevertheless sufficiently single-minded to find an identity separate from 
it. Complicit, but differentiated: all subjects stand in this way to the abject.
In Los Desastres, especially given that I do not deal with the Caprichos Enfdticos 
section of the series, my interpretation is determined less by satire than by the
A b s t r a c t P a g e  II
question of how an antagonistic nation uses war as a mechanism of conclusive ab­
jection to extend military, political and, ultimately. Symbolic influence -  by means 
of sanctioned murder, execution, even rape -  over another nation, with the aim of 
making that nation succumb to the abjection of surrender and the imposition of a 
foreign Symbolic. War also produces heaps of corpses and, in the occupied cities, ill 
and starving destitutes: those reduced to conditions of permanent or near-perma­
nent abjection by war's ballistic exacerbation of the operation to abject.
Contact with abjection through art strengthens, weakens and expands the self. 
It carries the threat of immersion in the repressed and the promise of risque plea­
sure -  both from the diminution of unpleasure through the making or viewing of 
art, and the more positive pleasure of jouissance. Contact with abjection allows, 
further, for the complicated experience of being liminal, grotesque and abject one­
self while caught between the poles of the Symbolic and tire abject. Whether we, as 
makers and/or viewers, criticise or joy in it, abjection holds out the alluring pros­
pect of catharsis and temporary relief both from its own hazards and the rigours 
and inhibitions of social life. Goya, it would appear, found this intervenient condi­
tion compelling enough to return to it -  if he ever truly left it -  over a period of 
almost three decades through the medium of the three graphic series I explore in 
this dissertation.
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aquatint. 21.8x15.2 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:58)
76. Capricho 21, How They pluck Her! (jCudl la descanonan!). 1797-98. Etching and 
aquatint. 21.8x14.9 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:21)
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77. Capricho 22, Poor Little Things! (iPobrecitas!). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint. 
21.8x15.3 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:46)
78. Capricho 51, They spruce Each Other up (Se repulen). 1797-98, Etching and aqua­
tint. 21.4x14.9 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:51)
79. Capricho 56, To Rise and Fall (Subir y Bajar). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint 
21.7x15.2 cm. (SSnchez and G&Uego, 1995:66)
80. Capricho 77, Some to Others (Unos a Otros). 1797-98. Etching, drypoint and 
aquatint. 21.8x15.2 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:77)
81. Preparatory drawing for To Rise and Fall. 1797-98. Red chalk. 20.3x14.3 cm. 
Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 1975:150)
82. Capricho 10, Love and Death {El Amor y La Muerte). 1797-98. Etching and aqua­
tint. 21.9x15.2 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:10)
83. Capricho 62, Who would believe it! QQuien la creyera!). 1797-98. Etching and 
aquatint. 20.9x15.3 cm. (Sanchez and Gdllego, 1995:70)
84. Capricho 23, That Dust (Aquellos Polvos). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint. 21.9x15 
cm. (Sanchez and G&llego, 1995:47)
85. Capricho 24, There xuas no Remedy (No hubo Remedio). 1797-98. Etching and aqua­
tint. 21.9x15.2 cm. (S&nchez and Gillego, 1995:48)
86. Capricho 38, Bravo! (jBravisimo!). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint. 21.9x15.2 cm. 
(SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:55)
87. Capricho 34, Sleep overcomes Them (Las rinde el Sueno), 1797-98, Etching and 
aquatint. 21.8x15.3 cm, (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:53)
88. Capricho 32, Because She xuas Vulnerable (Porque fue Sensible). 1797-98. Aquatint. 
21.9x15.3 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:52)
89. Capricho 54, The Shamefaced One (El Vergonzoso). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint. 
21.7x15.2 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:54)
90. Capricho 26, They already have a Seat (Ya tienen Asiento). 1797-98. Etching and 
aquatint. 21.7x15.2 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:26)
91. Capricho 59, And still They do not go! (/Y am  no se van!). 1797-98. Etching and 
aquatint. 21.9x15.2 cm, (Sanchez and G&llego, 1995:68)
92. The Second of May 1808, in Madrid: The Attack on the Mamelukes. 1814, Oil on 
canvas. 266x345 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gudiol, 1986, plate 102)
93. The Third of May 1808, in Madrid: The Shootings on Principe Pto Hill. 1814. Oil on 
canvas. 266x345 cm. Madrid, Prado, (Gudiol, 1986, plate 104)
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94. Desastre 44,1 saw It (Yo lo vi). ca. 1810-12. Etching and drypoint. 16.1x23.9 cm. 
(Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:119)
95. Desastre 7, What Courage! (jQue Valor!), ca. 1810-15. Etching, drypoint and 
aquatint. 15.8x20.9 cm. (Sdnchez and Gallego, 1995:95)
96. Desastre 69, Nothing. (Time will Tell) (Nada. [Elio dim]), ca. 1812-20. Etching, dry- 
point, lavis and aquatint. 15.5x20.1 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:154)
97. Desastre 1, Sad Presentiments of zuhat is to come (Tristes Presentimientos de lo qiie ha 
tie acontecer). ca. 1814-20. Etching and drypoint. 17.8x22 cm, (Sdnchez and 
Gallego, 1995:91)
98. Desastre 11, Nor for "These (Ni por Esas). ca. 1810-15. Etching, drypoint and lavis. 
16.2x21.3 cm. (Sinchez and Gdllego, 1995:98)
99. Desastre 13, Bitter Presence (Amarga Presencia). ca. 1810-11. Etching and lavis. 
14.3x16.9 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:98)
100. Desastre 23, The Same in Other Areas (Lo Mismo en Otras Partes), ca. 1810-12. 
Etching, lavis and drypoint. 16.2x24 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:106)
101. Infamous Gain (Injunie Provecho). ca. 1810. Etching. 16x22 cm. (Sanchez and Ga­
llego, 1995:143)
102. Desastre 17, The]/ do not agree (No se convienen). ca. 1810-12. Etching and dry- 
point. 14.8x21.2 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:103)
103. Desastre 20, Cure Them and on to the Next (Curarlos y a Otra). 1810. Etching and 
lavis. 16.2x23.7 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:104)
104. Desastre 46, This is Bad (Esto es Malo). ca. 1812-15. Etching, aquatint, lavis and 
drypoint. 15.6x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:120)
105. Desastre 25, These too (Tambien Estos). ca. 1810-12. Etching and drypoint. 16.5x
23.6 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:110)
106. Desastre 30, Ravages of War (Estragos de la Guerra), ca. 1810-11. Etching and 
drypoint. 14.1x17 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:111)
107. Desastre 47, It happened this Way (Asi sucedio). ca. 1812-15. Etching, lavis and 
drypoint. 15.6x20.9 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:120)
108. Desastre 21, It will he the Same (Sera lo Mismo). ca. 1810-12. Etching and lavis. 
14.8x2.1.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:105)
109. Bandits shooting Their Prisoners, ca. 1798-1800. Oil on canvas. 41,4x31.6 cm. 
Madrid, Marques de la Romana Collection. (Wilson-Bareau and Mena Mar- 
qu6s, 1993:279)
110. Bandits undressing a Woman, ca. 1798-1800. Oil on canvas. 41.5x31.8 cm.
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Madrid, Marques de la Romana Collection. (Wilson-Bareau and Mena Mar- 
qu6s, 1993:280)
111. Bandit murdering a Woman, ca. 1798-1800. Oil on canvas. 41.5x31.8 cm. Madrid, 
Marques de la Romana Collection. (Wilson-Bareau and Mena Marques, 1993: 
281)
112. Desastre 9, They do not ivant to (No quiereri). ca. 1810-15. Etching, aquatint and 
drypoint. 156x209 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:94)
113. Capricho 28, Hush (Chiton). 1797-98. Etching and aquatint. 21.9x15.9 cm. (Fer­
rari, 1963:28)
114. Desastre 28, Mob (Populacho). ca. 1814-20. Etching, lavis and drypoint. 17.7x22 
cm. (Ferrari, 1963:113)
115. Desastre 29, He deserved It (Lo meretia). ca. 1814-20. Etching and drypoint. 18x 
22 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:110)
116. Desastre 38, Barbarians! (jBdrbaros!). ca. 1812-15. Etching, aquatint and dry- 
point. 155x208 cm. (Sdnchez and Gallego, 1995:116)
117. Desastre 31, It is a Strong Thing! ([Fuerte Cosa es!). ca. 1812-15. Etching, aqua­
tint and drypoint. 15.5x20.8 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:116)
118. Desastre 32, Why? (iPor que?). ca. 1812-15. Etching and lavis. 15.7x20.9 cm. 
(Ferrari, 1963:117)
119. Desastre 14, Hard is the Way (jDuro es el Paso!), ca. 1810-11. Etching, lavis and 
drypoint. 14.3x16.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gdllego, 1995:100)
120. Desastre 34, For a Knife (Por una Navaja). ca. 1812-15. Etching and drypoint. 
15.7x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gdlicgo, 1995:113)
121. Desastre 35, One cannot understand Why (No se puede saber por que). ca. 1812-15. 
Etching, lavis and drypoint. 15.4x25.6 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:120)
122. Desastre 2, With Reason or Without (Con Razon o sin Ella), ca. 1812-15. Etching, 
lavis and drypoint. 15x20.9 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:92)
123. Desastre 36, Neither (Tampoco). ca. 1812-15. Etching, aquatint and drypoint. 
15.7x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:114)
124. Desastre 15, And there is no Remedy (Y no hay Remedio). ca. 1810-11. Etching 
and drypoint. 14.2x16.8 cm. (S&nchez and Gallego, 1995:101)
125. Detail of The Third of May (Fig.93).
126. Execution in a Military Camp. ca. 1798-1800. Oil on canvas. 32.6x57 cm. Madrid, 
Marques de la Romana Collection. (Wilson-Bareau and Mena Marquis, 1993: 
286-87)
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127. Fight with Clubs. 1820-23. Oil transferred to canvas. 123x266 cm. Madrid, 
Prado. (Gudiol, 1986, plate 121)
128. Dog. 1820-23. Oil transferred to canvas. 134x80 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 
Wilson, Lachenal, 1994:319)
129. Desastre 26, One cannot look (No se puede mirar). ca. 1810-12, Etching, la vis and 
drypoint. 14.5x21 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:108)
130. Desastre 33, What more is there to do? (iQue haxj qtte hnier mas?), ca. 1812-15. 
Etching and lavis. 15.7x20.7 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:113)
131. Desastre 39, Great Feats! With the Dead! (\Grande Hazana! jCon Muertosl). ca. 
1812-15. Etching, lavis and drypoint. 15.6x20.8 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:124)
132. Desastre 37, This is Worse (Esto es Peor). ca. 1812-15. Etching, lavis and dry- 
point. 15.7x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:115)
133. Desastre 12, For This You were Bom (Para Eso habeis Nacido). ca. 1810-12. Etch­
ing, lavis and drypoint. 16.3x23.7 cm. (SAnchez and Gallego, 1995:99)
134. Desastre 18, To Bury and be quiet (Enterrar y collar), ca. 1810-12. Etching, lavis 
and drypoint. 16.3x23.7 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:103)
135. John Flaxman The Pit of Disease (Engraved by Thomas Piroli). Illustration to 
Dante, Inferno, Canto 29.1807 ed., plate 31. (Symmons, 1971:510)
136. Desastre 27, Charity (Caridad). 1810. Etching, lavis and drypoint. 16.3x23.6 cm. 
(Ferrari, 1963:112)
137. Desashe 54, Clamours in Vain (Clamores en vano). ca. 1812-15. Etching and 
lavis. 15.7x20.8 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:139)
138. Desastre 57, The Healthy and the Sick (Sams y  Enjermos). ca. 1812-15. Etching 
and aquatint. 15.7x20.9 cm, (Ferrari, 1963:142)
139. Desastre 61, As if They are of Another Race (Si son de Otro Linaje). ca. 1812-15. 
Etching, lavis and drypoint. 15,6x20.8 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:146)
140. Desastre 55, The Worst is to beg (Lo Peor es pedir). 1812-15. Etching and lavis. 
15.6x20,8 cm. (SAnchez and Gallego, 1995:125)
141. Preparatory drawing for The Worst is to beg. ca. 1812-15. Red chalk. 17x21.8 
cm, Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 1975:272-73)
142. Desastre 58, One must not cry out (No hay que dar voces), ca. 1812-15. Etching 
and aquatint. 15.7x21.1 cm. (SSnchez and GAllego, 1995:126)
143. Desastre 52, They do not arrive in Time (No llegan a Tiempo). ca. 1812-15. Etch­
ing, lavis and drypoint. 15.7x20.7 cm. (SSnchez and GSllego, 1995:123)
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144. Desastre 53, He died Without Aid (Espiro sin Remedio). ca. 1812-15. Etching, 
aquatint and lavis. 15.6x20.9 cm. (Ferrari., 1963:138)
145. Desastre 64, Cartloads to the Cernetenj (Carreiadas al Cementerio). ca. 1812-15. 
Etching and aquatint. 15.6x20.9 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:130)
146. Desastre 62, The Beds of the Dead (Las Camas de la Muerte). ca. 1812-15. Etching, 
lavis and drypoint. 17.7x22.1 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:147)
147. Desastre 63, Harvested Corpses (Muertos Recogidos). ca. 1812-15. Etching and 
aquatint. 15.5x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and G&llego, 1995:129)
148. Fierce Monster (Fiero Monstruo). ca. 1815-20. Etching and drypoint. 17.5x22 cm. 
(Ferrari, 1963:166)
149. Desastre 40, He gets Something out of It (Algun partido saca). ca. 1814-20. Etching 
and drypoint. 17.7x20.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:117)
150. Saturn devouring His Sons. 1820-23. Oil transferred to canvas. 146x83 cm. 
Madrid, Prado. (Gudiol, 1986, plate 120)
151. Disparate 12, Folly of Merriness (Disparate Alegre), ca. 1815-24. Etching, aqua­
tint and drypoint. 24.6x35.8 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:187)
152. Disparate 9, Folly of the Mass (Disparate General), ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint 
and drypoint. 24,8x35.9 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:184)
153. Disparate 5, Flying Folly (Disparate Volante). ca. 1815-24. Etching and aquatint 
24.8x36 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:181)
154. Disparate 10, The Abducting Horse, ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint and drypoint. 
25.3x35.9 cm. (Sdnchez and Gdllego, 1995:185)
155. Preparatory drawing for The Abducting Horse, ca. 1815-24. Red chalk and san­
guine wash. 24.7x34.6 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 1975:444-45)
156. Disparate 6, Folly of Cruelty (Disparate Cruel), ca. 1815-24. Etching and aqua­
tint. 24.7x35.9 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:181)
157. Preparatory drawing for Folly of Cruelty ,^ ca. 1815-24. Red chalk and sanguine 
wash. 24.4x35.4 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 1975:440-41)
158. Disparate 17, Loyalty, ca. 1815-24. Etching and aquatint. 24.6x35.8 cm. (San­
chez and Gallego, 1995:192)
159. Preparatory drawing for Loyalty, ca. 1815-24. Red chalk and sanguine wash. 
22x32.2 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gassier, 1975:456-57)
160. Disparate 2, Folly of Fear. ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint and drypoint. 24.5x
35.7 cm. (Sdnchez and Gallego, 1995:178)
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161. Capricho 3, The Boogeyman comes (Que viene el Coco). 1797-98. Etching and 
aquatint. 21.9x15.4 cm. (S&nchez and Gallego, 1995:35)
162. Disparate 19, Familiar Folly (Disparate Conocido). ca. 1815-24. Etching and 
aquatint. 24.5x35 cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:194)
163. Disparate 7, Disorderly Folly (Disparate Desordenado). ca. 1815-24. Etching, 
aquatint and drypoint. 24.7x35.9 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:182)
164. Capricho 75, Is there None Who can untie Us? QNo hay Quien Nos desate?). 1797-
98. Etching and aquatint. 21.8x15.2 cm. (SSnchez and Gallego, 1995:79)
165. Disparate 4, Bdbalicon. ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint and drypoint. 24.7x35.9 
cm. (Sanchez and Gallego, 1995:180)
166. Tlte Burial oftite Sardine. 1812-19. Oil on panel. 83x62 cm. Madrid, Royal Acad­
emy of Fine Arts of San Fernando. (Gudiol, 1986, plate 90)
167. Earlier state of Bdbalicon. (SSnchez and Sayre, 1989:311)
168. Disparate 21, Bestial Folly (Disparate de Bestia). ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint 
and drypoint. 24.5x35 cm. (SSnchez and GSIlego, 1995:196)
169. Emblem of elephant as people, Dulcedine et Vi (from Nunes de Cepeda's Idea 
de el Buen Pastor, 1682-1741). (Levitine, 1961:147)
170. Disparate 11, Folly of Poverty (Disparate Pobre). ca. 1815-24. Etching, aquatint 
and drypoint. 24.7x35.8 cm. (SSnchez and GSIlego, 1995:186)
171. Disparate 16, Exhortations, ca. 1815-24. Etching and aquatint. 24.6x35.9 cm. 
(SSnchez and GSIlego, 1995:191)
172. Disparate 14, Polly of Carnival (Disparate de Camaval). ca. 1815-24. Etching and 
aquatint. 24.6x35.7 cm. (SSnchez and GSIlego, 1995:189)
173. Detail of Maja at i the Muffled Maps (Tapestry Cartoon). 1777. Oil on canvas. 
275x190 cm. Madrid, Prado. (Gudiol, 1986, plate 6)
174. Self Portrait in the Studio, ca. 1794-5. Oil on canvas. 42x28 cm. Madrid, Royal 
Academy of Fine Arts of San Fernando. (Schickel, 1973:81)
175. Detail of Bruegel's The Battle betxoeen Carnival and Lent. 1559. Oil on panel. 
163.8x118 cm. Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum (Foote, 1971:130-31)
176. Disparate 18, Man wandering among Phantoms, ca. 1815-24. Etching and aqua­
tint. 24.4x35.8 cm. (SSnchez and GSIlego, 1995:193)
177. Capricho 1, Francisco de. Goya y Lucientes, Pintor. 1797-98. Etching, aquatint 
and drypoint. 22x15.3 cm. (Ferrari, 1963:1)
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Note on Translations
Unless otherwise specified in the thesis, all translations from original Spanish and 
French texts are my own. Although I cannot make any claims for fluency in these 
languages, either in the spoken or written form, owing to my general discontent 
with available translations of, for example, the titles to Goya's etchings and the 
commentaries to Los Caprichos, I have translated all such material to my own sa tis­
faction. I have also adopted a policy of adapting the original titles and commentaries 
into Modem Spanish. By and large, I have avoided altering the original punctuation. 
I try as far as possible to translate directly, to avoid the trappings of colonising the 
text.
Is luhat is in the cellar always truer than ivlni is in the attic? 
(Jacques Lacan, Seminar 1,1988(7:267)
FAUST. Mothers?
Mephstopheles. Stand you daunted?
Faust.
The Mothers! Mothers -  sound with wonder haunted. 
Mephistopheles.
True, goddesses unknown to mortal mind.
And named indeed with dread among our kind.
To reach them, delve below earth's deepest floors;
And that we need them, all the blame is yours.
FAUST. Where lips the way?
Mephistopheles.
There is none. Way to the Unreachable,
Never for treading, to those Unbeseechable,
Never besought! Is your soul then ready?
Not locks or bolts are there, no barrier crude.
But lonely drift, far, lone estrangement's eddy.
What sense have you of waste and solitude?
[• . •I
Mephistopheles.
[ . . . ]
But blank is that eternal void afar:
There eyes avail not, even your step is dumb.
No substance there, whe your rest you come.
Faust.
[ • • • ]
Well, let us on! We'll plumb your deepest ground.
For in your Nothing may the All be found.
[ . ; . ]
Faust (shuddering).
The Mothers -  still I feel the shock of fear. ,
What is this Word, that I must dread to hear?
[ . . . ]
Mephistopheles. ,
Then to the deep! - 1 could as well say height:
All's o n e . . .
(Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust, Fart Tiuo 




1 f~ ^  R/iNCISCO DE GOYA Y LUCffiNTES (1746-1828) is among a small number of ait- 
ists -  the so-called 'great masters' -  whose work, personality, and historical 
situation, have constituted rich subjects for myriad forms of subsequent re­
search and analysis1. His work invites a breadth of possibilities both challenging 
and intimidating: if they are to make serious contributions to the field, those who 
approach this much-explored artist must dredge a deep channel, in which the 
scholarship lies metres deep. In this thesis I attempt such a contribution, and because 
my dredging turned up very little precedent for my study, I must establish the 
nature of my methodology at the outset. Simply put, I use psychoanalysis to com­
ment on the graphic work of Goya. The choice of such a methodology instantly 
poses questions, and I will now address those I consider important since they will 
clarify my position and thereby help my readers to find theirs.
2. The question of intention
The intentionality debate has raged for some time now, and it continues to divide 
opinion. Some argue that the intentions of a producer of cultural objects are irrele­
vant since all interpretation is a (re) fabrication from the interpreter's perspective, 
Otliers argue that the producer cannot be removed from the equation, and that 
research should be anchored in historical reconstructions of the time in which the 
producer lived. Still others are flexible enough to allow for both views or to try 
meld them in a way that, instead of sacrificing the merits of either approach, bene­
1 Much of this research and analysis, crossing frameworks from the Romantic to the 
psychological, can be found summed up in Nigel Glendinning's classic Gova and His Critics
(1977).
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fits and enhances both.
As early as 1946 William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley claimed that an artist's 
intentions were, according to Gene Blocker, ‘not relevant to aitical judgments about 
works of art (1978:246. Emphasis in original). They argued that what the artist in­
tends to elucidate in an artwork is extraneous to the work, which, they claimed, it­
self contains the information required for its comprehension (246-7). Less dogmati­
cally, Richard Wellheim, in his 1968 book Art and Its Objects, writes: 'the value of 
ar t . . .  does not exist exclusively, or even primarily, for the artist. It is shared equal­
ly between the artist and his audience' (1992:86). He quotes Paul Valery, who defines 
a creator, i.e., a producer of cultural objects, as "'one who makes others create'" 
(87). The "others" in  this instance being the artist's audience, which "creates" narra­
tives, readings and interpretations. In the same year thatWoFheim's book appeared, 
Roland Barthes published his article 'La mort de 1'auteur' ('The Death of the 
Author'), in which he suggested that in interpreting a text emphasis should be placed 
on the site of consumption (the reader), not production (the author):
a text is made of multiple -writings, drawn from many cultures and entering into 
mutual relations of dialogue, parody, contestation, but there is one place where 
this multiplicity is focused and that place is the reader, not, as was hitherto said, 
the author . . . the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the 
Author. (1977:148)
Barthes believed, further, that '[t]o give a text an Author is to impose a limit on 
that text . . .  to close, the writing' (147). Now, while Barthes had writing, not image- 
making in  mind, similarities between the reading of texts and the 'reading' of im­
ages allow one to consider his concerns in relation to the interpretation of art, One 
of the biggest problems with Barthes' essay on hermeneutic authority is that it offers 
no strategy to the reader (or viewer) who interprets texts (or images) made hundreds 
of years before, when different historical and cultural circumstances to those of the 
reader/viewer pertained. What of a viewer like myself, who lacks that historico- 
cultural access to the work (Goya's in this instance) Barthes takes for granted? Do I, 
(1) treat the intentions of the maker as sovereign because they are so remote1), r (2)
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dismiss the intentions because, being remote, they are irrelevant to the interpreta­
tive act, and so expose the maker's work to any reading I can conceive?
Neither option is useful, the first because to privilege the maker's intentions 
when they cannot be recovered in anything but an extremely partial and reconstruc­
tive sense, seems a futile exercise; and the second because, as Woliheim rightly 
states, 'art is an intentional activity' (1992:90) -  it is teleological; its object is produced 
for some purpose, be it moral, cathartic, aesthetic, narrative, mythologising, mimetic, 
anti-mimetic, or even unknown to the artist. This means that, at least initially, the 
producer delimits meaning, making it impossible for certain interpretations to eluci­
date certain works. It does not then follow that an interpretation can only be taken 
seriously if it adheres to tire producer's initial meanings, but it does mean that, 
since the humanities are, in my view, suspicious of potentially anachronistic inter­
pretations (e.g., any psychoanalytic reading of an artwork made prior to Freud), the 
scholar who works with such material needs to strike a balance in Iris or her ac­
count between the producer's intentions, as far as these are known, and the ana­
chronistic framework, demonstrating how the latter can, not explain, but cast new 
light on, the former.
To establish my position, let me say that I agree with Barthes: the reader is vital 
in unravelling texts, and an attitude that only the Author is important does, indeed, 
foreclose the act of interpretation; but at the same time every text is 'a tissue of quo­
tations drawn from innumerable centres of culture' (Barthes;, 1977:146) within a his­
torical moment, and I will admit that to altogether ignore that moment, and the 
combinations of influences that shaped the artist ’within that moment, is to open the 
act of interpretation out so far that the activity of those who read it is likely to be­
come a rootless, anxious one.
In my thesis I use an admittedly anachronistic methodology not to draw a causal 
connection between the methodology and the maker's (Goya's) intentions, which 
would make his work an expression of the methodology -  a nexus I recognise as
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impossible -  but to demonstrate ways in which the theory can enrich our compre­
hension of Goya's graphic production.
In looking at Goya I feel I have chosen wisely, for even during tire artist's life­
time at least one critic, Gregorio Gonzalez Azaola, proposed that his etchings (Azao- 
la was referring to Los Capricltos) could be interpreted in a variety of ways in the 
light of tire interpreter's personal perspective. As viewers divine 'the subtle concepts 
concealed in each satire/ claimed Azaola, they make 'in  tireir own way and accord­
ing to tireir sphere of knowledge, more-or-less successful interpretations'2. What 
matters here is tire licence Azaola grants viewers to interpret Goya's etchings "hr 
their own way" and, in a phrase reminiscent of Bar tires, "according to tireir sphere 
of knowledge". My chosen "sphere of knowledge" is psychoanalysis, of which it 
behoves me to make some comment.
2. Psychoanalysis as a methodology
'[Ojne cannot learn tire secrets of, nor psychoanalyze, a great artist dead nearly a cen­
tury and a half.' (Hofer, 1967:3) Nevertheless, in the words of another scholar, Ron­
ald Paulson:' [t]htoe is no inconsistency in arguing that a scientifically valid tireory 
of modern behaviour might (even should) be applied historically as a hypothesis to 
respect the otherness of historical events and works created in the past (1983:9).
Hofer is correct: one cannot "psychoanalyze" an artist no longer among the liv­
ing, Nor, indeed, can one psychoarralyse the man through his art work -  at least, 
not if we treat him as a patient. But we should avoid reducing psychoanalysis to a 
clinical practice involving patient, analyst and an interindividual plenum of com­
plex transference; it is also a theory of the subject, and even if only challengingly 
and controversially, this theory can help us to perceive in tire cultural objects of long-
los finos conceptos envueltas en cada satira . . .  cada cual a su modo y segun la esfera de 
sus conacimientos, mds o menos felices aplicaciones, (Adapted from Enriqueta Harris, 
1964:42; also see Glendinning, 1977:60)
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dead producers the presence of more-oi-less timeless and universal psychosocial 
structures of human behaviour and organisation. More; to perceive the maimer in 
which these structures played out at the level of both the idiosyncratic producer 
and, more broadly, the historically-particular social formation of which the pro­
ducer was a member. Such is my preface and premise.
Psychoanalytic investigations of Goya's art are rare; those we have are weakened 
by their treatment of Goya as a patient recoverable through his work3. However, a 
number of scholars have suggested that psychoanalysis might hold a key to the 
mysteries of many of Goya's works, most notably Los Disparates. In 1957 Hans Sedl- 
mayr claimed that 'Psychoanalysis will one day attempt to write [the] "iconography" 
[of Los Disparates]' (in Glendirming, 1977:163). History has not fulfilled his expecta­
tion. As recently as 1995, in their Goya: The Complete Etchings and Lithographs, 
Perez Sdnchez and Gallego muse: 'Perhaps a psychoanalytic approach could, as has 
often been suggested, explain the strange subject matter of the etchings' (176).
I firmly believe that, in their diversity and scope, psychoanalytic methods have 
much to offer the analysis of visual art; but their greatest danger lies in their 
application: to be informative to viewers, they cannot be applied in ways that 
unreflexively ape clinical practice. In psychoanalytically-grounded writing, the line 
between psychoanalysis as cultural model of interpretation and psychoanalysis as 
clinical practice is hard to assert, define or remain perpetually cognisant of4,
3 Goya has been diagnosed for more than psychological illness; there are also more 
physiologically-based arguments, one of the more interesting being John Moffitt's 'Painters 
"Bom under Saturn": The Physiological Explanation' (1988). Developing a suggestion of 
William G. Niederland's (see Glendirming, 1977:173), Moffitt proposes that many of the 
attributes of Goya's 1792-93 illness could have been due to lead poisoning.
4 Both psychologists and cultural theorists are prey to this problem. As an example of the 
former, see Reitman's Psychotic Art (1950:143-52), which offers a superb illustration of how 
not to interpret an artist psychologically. As an example of the latter, see Ronald Paulson's 
treatment of Goya's art in Representations of Revolution (1983). Paulson's approach is far 
subtler than Reitman's, but he errs in assuming uncritically that revolutionary art can be 
distinctly divided according to whether the work displays affinities with an 'Oedipal' or an 
'oral-anal' subject position. Such a division has merits, to be sure, but Paulson treats the cate­
gories as given in his analyses, thereby both eliminating other potential -  less clinical -  divi­
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primarily because psychoanalysis is a science of the subject; therefore a psycho­
analytic model without a subject is a contradiction in terms. When used to examine 
works of culture, a psychoanalytic model will always delineate a subject, and, given 
that this subject is the maker of the works under study, the reader will understand­
ably conflate this subject with the maker. In the process a theory of the subject gets 
mapped onto a historical individual, creating a tension that many scholars are 
unprepared to accept. I believe, however, that tire method must be granted leeway, 
for its concerns are intentionally speculative and interpretative; like quantum 
physics, it operates on informed assumptions; its purpose is not to unearth 
previously concealed data5, but to propose new perspectives based on admittedly 
ideal hypotheses. Furthermore, while psychoanalysis must often concern itself 
with individuals, its purpose, especially in cultural studies, is often broader: it 
seeks to demonstrate how objects of culture reveal a subject mediated by power 
relations, social limitations, socially-determined psychic formations, and uncon­
scious factors.
Scholars who use psychoanalysis to investigate dead artists have no patients, 
only works of art; therefore, they cannot draw direct links between their interpreta­
tions and the intentions of the dead artists they are studying. They cannot claim 
that their interpretations reveal., or speak for, the unique subjectivities of the dead. I
sions permissible within the psychoanalytic model, and creating the impression that psycho­
analytical insights dominate all others, i.e., he essentialises his categories.
5 That is, not physical data -  the leavingsrof history -  although historical material can 
play a role in the interpretative process. One of the assumptions of clinical psychoanalysis 
is, nevertheless, that human beings possess an unconscious mind which can be accessed by- 
means of certain techniques (e.g., hypnosis) and used to 'recall' the raw data of past experi­
ences that may be contributing to the current psychological illness of the patient. One 
should recognise that the 'recall' of this data can never be complete or even entirely factual 
and reliable. Moreover, there is no question that the analyst further distorts the material 
when s/he sets about interpreting it in accordance with the general theories of the system. 
Such vagaries do not, in my opinion, undermine the entire worth of the system, however.
In the domain of psychoanalysis as a cultural model, the uncovering of concealed infor­
mation is limited to revisitations of previous texts (e.g., Kristeva's re-reading of Freud's case 
of 'Little Hans' [1982:33-44]), and this application of the model is even more conjectural.
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believe they can, however, (1) interpret their selected works in a way that illuminates 
psychoanalytic theory, (2) use psychoanalysis to extend the iconographic under­
standing of these works, opening new angles on old themes by establishing connec­
tions between the images and the generalised subjects) of psychoanalysis, and (3) 
speculate, with recourse to conjectural evidence, on the possibility that the dead art­
ist's work reveals specific attributes of Iris or her subjectivity, and then relate these 
attributes to the subject(s) of psychoanalysis.
In the first and second instances the maker is more-or-less irrelevant, and the 
scholar utilises his or her works to comment more panoramically on the maker's 
historical and cultural period (or a feature of that period), or to reinterpret the works 
in a way that reframes their terms of reference and makes them active in a more a- 
historical, more decontextualised and discursive space. In the third instance the 
maker is relevant, but the scholar's motivation is not to draw a psychological pro­
file of the dead artist but to argue for the potential of images to encapsulate and pre­
serve certain relatively constant tenets of subjectivity as proposed by the psychoana­
lytic discipline6. My thesis combines die above approaches. As a result I open my­
self to questioning on two counts: (1) my assumption that a work of art can be en­
riched by a theory not in  place during the lifetime of its maker; (2) my assumption 
that it is possible to associate a historical figure with the generalised subject of psy­
choanalysis. No justifications I could offer in support of these two assumptions will 
please or satisfy every reader, but I need nonetheless to make my position clear.
6 An example of such a "relatively constant tenet" is the Oedipus complex, which Freud 
seemed to believe held true for Western society in general, regardless of historical para­
meters. Another would be the alienated or divided subject as postulated in Lacan's theory 
of the mirror phase. It is not my intention to debate the validity of such universalising ten­
dencies. Anyone who uses a psychoanalytic method must to some extent believe that sub­
jectivity can be determined by patterns of psychic development that exceed the limits of 
society, economy, race, gender, history -  patterns which, in fact, play a role in shaping such 
limits (thus while some feminisms, to take one example, will leave their explanation of 
« patriarchy at the evident socio-historic level, a psychoanalytically-cognisant feminism will 
look deeper, to the primary relationships between subjects and the part these may play in 
producing patriarchal power relations).
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Where the issue of using anachronistic theory is concerned, my justification is 
simple enough: artworks remain for centuries, even millennia, after the passing of 
their makers; later generations become the custodians of these works, which alone 
makes them prone to constantly-renewing interpretations. Objects move through 
history and become connotational in new contexts. In assessing such objects there is 
room to consider their origins, the significations they have acquired over time, and 
their potential relevance and meanings for us at present.
What of the maker? Can one associate him or her with a subjectivity generated 
by a miiversalising theory? I think one can, but theories come in various forms, some 
of which, if not worthless, are nonetheless untenable (e.g., Freud's psychosexual 
study of Leonardo da Vinci). The.se tend to be untenable because they try to apply 
general theory too particularly. To my mind, the tenable theories are those that 
show how the general is manifested in the particular. In my thesis, for instance, I 
look at the way Goya used and/or portrayed processes of degradation, ridicule and 
i division, to comment on his society; and argue that this kind of procedure (not just 
in the case of Goya, mind) can be placed in a larger project, spanning the centuries 
of human existence, that of abjection. In other words, I claim that there is this 
(non)thing/process we might call abjection, which, even though it has only been 
psychoanalytically defined recently (19807), has been around, in one form or an­
other, as a psychosocial function since the beginning of civilisation, and can be 
discerned in  the historical texts and objects of almost every epoch and society that 
has ever existed. When we take on Goya's work in such a framework, we do so to 
uncover some of the ways in which abjection manifested in  his time, place and 
society. In the debasing project of satire, for example, I find a principle of abjection 
at work, and this guides my approach to Los Capriclws. Goya's depictions of the sick 
and dying in Desastres de la Guerra, to take another example, easily allow for re­
7 By Julia Kristeva in Pouvoirs de Vhorreur. The English translation by Leon Roudiez, 
Powers of Horror, was published in 1982. This is the edition I refer to in the thesis.
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interpretation from the perspective of abjection, since, as I will argue in due course, 
there is nothing more abject than the corpse, and from century to century the 
corpse, as the definitive symbol of mortality, has proven to be a supreme object of 
repulsion and attraction. In such work we find the procedures and objects, or the 
iconography, perhaps, of abjection as if in  a fossilised condition.
Language, cumbersome as it is, and requiring so many circumlocutions, qualifi­
cations, justifications, vindications, rationalisations, moderations, caveats, apologies, 
glosses, establishments of position and voice, etc. -  especially at the doctoral and 
post-doctoral level of discourse -  will inevitably prove inadequate to the task of ex­
trapolation and conjecture. At points in  my argument it will no doubt seem as if I 
am using Goya as a mouthpiece for my interpretations; it might also seem that I am 
claiming Goya worked deliberately and consciously with processes of abjection. He 
did not. He worked with satire, the Grotesque, masquerade, the corpse, the diseased, 
and other subjects and themes that interested him. I  am the one drawing links be­
tween his work and the larger terrain, of psychoanalytic abjection theory. This seems 
an obvious point to make, but I need to make it if I am to circumvent the conclu­
sions some readers might jump to. At the same time, I apologise beforehand for 
any overlooked instances in which the manner of my writing so attenuates the line 
between Goya's works and my interpretations that I appear to be psychobiogra- 
pkying Goya; but I also encourage the reader to read with due cautio' and toler­
ance, allowing that the perception of where that thin line lies, or of how thin it 
truly is, will sometimes be in his or her own eyes, not in the text itself.
In my thesis I adopt a specific facet of psychoanalytic investigation, namely, 
Julia Kristeva's abjection theory3, and use it to interpret certain psychosocial cur­
8 I must point out that, as a field, psychoanalysis is not'unidirectional. While all forms of 
psychoanalysis and all psychoanalysts must ultimately pay due homage to Freud, the dis­
cipline has given rise to various bifurcations, branches and lineages, many of which are at 
loggerheads with each other. The lineage I draw on in the thesis has Freud as its root, Lacan 
as its trunk, and Kristeva as its branches. However, since psychoanalytic lines of investiga­
tion intermingle it means, as one would expect, that I do at times refer to analysts from, dif­
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rents I infer from Goya's work9.1 do my best to avoid transposing my interpreta­
tions onto the artist's intentions, as I have stated. But a problem arises because, be­
yond relating Goya's work to the larger scheme of abjection, I also speculate in my 
thesis that Goya used his satirical art to gain a measure of release from his personal 
anxieties and concerns.
Here, any reader will agree, I cannot but, to some degree, psychobiographise 
Goya. I do not take this route easily, and, indeed, if I didn't think it essential to the 
completion of the dissertation I would not take it at all, I should add, however, that 
I do not view the etcher whose portrait emerges in the course of my speculation as 
Goya-the-historical-individual, but rather as an incomplete and provisional figure 
pieced together by processes of interpretation and inference: a fraction, or set of 
fractions, rather than an integer. Unfortunately, the analytic procedure is suscep­
tible to creating what appears to be an entity (name alone is a powerful factor), and 
some readers will struggle to discern any difference between a suggestive psychical 
impression and a biographical profile. I must insist on the speculatory nature of the 
reading process that gives rise to this impression, and ask the reader to treat it as a 
proposition. Again, if I did not feel it was a proposition that rounds off the picture 
of abjection I develop in the analyses of individual works, I would not pose it.
3. Different series, different approach 
The three etching series differ significantly in their satellite material -  both original
ferent lineages -  Melanie Klein, for example. Incidentally, for a synopsis of the interpenetra­
tion of the various psychoanalytic concepts borrowed from Freud, Lacan and Kristeva see 
my mapping in Appendix One.
9 By 'work' I mean Goya's three etching series. These seem the obvious choice for such a 
dissertation, and. Indeed, I cannot deny that among the reasons I selected them was their 
popularity (near-sensationalism, frankly, in the case of the much-studied Caprichos). However, 
I should note that Goya's drawings provide an equally fruitful subject for a study of this 
nature -  in many cases they are even more propitious than the etchings. Suffice to say that I 
am reserving investigation of the drawings for future projects.
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material and material accumulated over the years under the auspices of scholarship
-  and I want to underscore that I have taken a different approach to each one. For 
Los Caprichos, the most studied of all Goya's graphic series, I draw on several sources 
to inform my reading, viz., the etching titles, composed by Goya; the many com­
mentaries to the etchi ngs (one of which, that in the Prado Museum, may have been 
written by Goya10); and the wealth of information, drawn chiefly from eighteenth- 
century Spanish literature, art historians have contributed to outline the historico- 
cultural context within which Goya worked.
Though this volume of reference exists, I must caution the reader against assum­
ing that it is available for each of the prints I discuss; sometimes there are emblem­
atic sources or sources in proverbial lore and in Spanish literature and art, that help 
to inform the iconography of the works; but not always. When such sources are at 
hand I generally make use of them; but one must bear in mind that the makers of 
art history have always preferred certain works above others, with the inevitable 
result that some (e.g., the Capricho The Sleep of Reason produces Monsters) have been 
buoyed up by a large volume of research, while others (e.g., the Disparate Loyally)
10 In my discussion of Los Caprichos I use the Prado manuscript as the standard source for 
commentary on the etchings. This is the only commentary that may have been written by 
Goya himself, and, although this fact does not necessarily carry weight, since Goya may 
have simply copied out in his own hand a set of comments made by others, the Prado's 
manuscript is the one I regard as closest in spirit to the etchings themselves. Whereas most 
of the other manuscripts are largely explanatory, the Prado commentary often manifests the 
same trend toward deepening mystification and extending ambiguity that we see in the 
prints themselves, In this sense die commentary adds kinks and knots to the 5breads of 
meaning used in weaving die images, so tiiat image and text, ratiier tiian die latter supple­
menting and elucidating the former, interact with each other to form what one might 
describe as a multimedia work.
The other important manuscripts are die one in die Biblioteca Nacional and die one 
originally owned by L6pez de Ayala, There are additional commentaries, most of which are 
closely modelled on die tiiree main ones. For discussion of die commentaries see Glendin- 
ning, 'Goya and England in the Nineteentii Century', 1964, Sayre in Sanchez and Sayre, 
1989:Cl-cm, and, especially, Rene Andioc, 'A1 Margen de los Caprichos: Las "Explicaciones" 
Manuscritas', 1984; also see Tomas Harris, 1964:95-97, for a discussion of die possibility tiiat 
die Prado manuscript was written by Goya's scribe.
It bears mentioning tiiat none of die commentaries should be treated as a manual per­
mitting die complete and incontrovertible decoding of die images, and even diough it has 
become standard practice for those who study Los Caprichos to draw on die commentaries 
for support, tiiey are better treated as guides tiian as Gospel.
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have been almost ignored.
In the case of Desastres de la Guerra, discounting books, texts and documents on 
the history of the war, all I had to work with were Goya's titles. No then-contem- 
porary commentaries attend this series. Moreover, art historians and other scholars 
have not interpreted the individual etchings to anywhere near the extent that they 
have interpreted Los Caprichos, with the result that, in the literature I consulted, many 
of the prints are scarcely even mentioned. This lack of discourse is partly due, I sus­
pect, to the fact that many of the etchings are repetitive and, in historical, descrip­
tive and iconographic approaches, can be lumped together and covered adequately 
in single sentences or paragraphs. Such handling of the material does, however, 
bypass important details that other readings, grounded in different methodologies, 
would make central. The result is that I ha\ „ been forced to interpret the etchings 
without the benefit of recourse to a comprehensive corpus of data. My focus on 
abjection further restricts the applicability of my sources and requires that I rely 
heavily on the images in making my arguments. Some readers might think that, in 
so doing, I am simply reading off the images; unfortunately, if I fail to convince them 
that the images bring abjection theory to life (and vice versa) -  embody it, so to speak
-  there is nothing more I can do at present to relieve their scepticism since this thesis 
is in many ways the plan for a second, larger, thesis, or at least the programme for 
several years of further study. Through such study I would seek further, more con­
crete, correspondences between abjection theory and eighteenth- to nineteenth- 
century Spanish understandings of those objects, things, states, and representations I 
include under the banner of abjection: death, the corpse, decay, the grave, earth and 
its substances (everything from marsh to lava), the body and its flows (urine, excre­
ment, etc.) the mother, and so on. Financially, physically, mentally, pragmatically, 
this extended compass for my research area was simply beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. In short, the reader should note that I consider this study provisional 
and incomplete; further s /h e  should note that its shortfalls are omissions and par-
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Hal developments due not to ignorance or indifference on my part, but to the real 
limitations -• space being one of them -  of this project.
Lastly, Los Disparates. This series, too, has no commentaries and suffers from a 
paucity of scholarly attention. Moreover, some of the etchings have no titles. On the 
positive side, many of the subjects Goya tackles in the Disparates appear to be trans­
lations of themes he dealt with earlier, particularly in Los Caprichos. h i this instance, 
then, Goya himself is often the only available reference and guide. For my treatment 
of this series I must make the same apologies as before, but will add that, given the 
current extent of available research -  still more shrunken in my case by the difficulty 
of accessing texts only attainable outside of the country -  I could not have inter­
preted the images any more inclusively within the aegis of my chosen model.
With each etching series, then, the degree of speculation and removal from his­
torical sources grows in my account, but I ask the reader to observe that this is due 
not to an increasing unconcern on my part for such sources, but the increasing 
deficit in the a vailable literature.
4. Issues of selection
I have considered it necessary to look at all three of Goya's main etching series be­
cause each one, methodologically, offers a different perspective on abjection, Los 
Caprichos are essential because they are satirical, and satire can be constructively re­
conceptualised in terms of the process of abjection. Los Dssastres de la Guerra are like­
wise important because, in their emphasis on death and illness, they offer an icono­
graphy, if you will, in  which one can perceive the kinds of bodies and situations 
that help construct the category of abjection. As for Los Disparates, while in the mam 
satirical like Los Caprichos, I look at the series for two reasons: (1) it has received little 
productive critical attention, and (2) it has led scholars (e.g., Sedlmayr and Shnchez 
and Gallego; see p.5 of the introduction) to call on psychoanalysis for 'answers', and I 
want to make some kind of reply to this call. Abjection theory gives one a model
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that, to my mind, is rewarding and helpful, and even if it can only tell us more 
about Goya's intentions at tire speculative level, it does help us, in a general sense, 
to understand societal functioning and the role norms and abnorms play in deter­
mining the form and limits of the subject.
Now, as regards my selection of works. -There are 182 etchings all told in Los 
Caprichos, Desastres de la Guerra and Los Disparates, without taking excluded plates, 
preparatory drawings, earlier etching states and other additional material into 
account. In the earlier stages of my dissertation I dealt with almost all of them, and 
tire result, as one might expect, was a text considerably longer than the current one 
in which I lost a lot of focus as works that illustrated my concepts less well than 
others, or which repeated the themes of otirers, competed for attention with more 
primary examples. My concern that tirese less productive works would undermine 
tire cohesion of the thesis, taken with my concern that the reader would tire of the 
volume of examples and pages, led me to cut the discussions of several images 
either completely or partially from the text. The Caprichos Enfdticos of Los Desastres 
de la Guerra, for example, I have omitted on the assumption that my treatment of 
satire in Los Caprichos will equip readers sufficiently to undertake their own analyses 
of these works, should they feel so inclined. Other works I have cut because their 
concerns reappear elsewhere in their parent series. Still others I have cut because, 
while they can be interpreted according to my model, they are not fruitful enough 
to warrant space in the confines of a doctoral thesis, The reader may safely assume 
that the works I have retained are those I consider best suited to a comprehension 
of my chosen area of psychoanalytically-motivated study.
With these proleptical concerns out the way, I will now introduce the reader to tire 
concerns of my dissertation. First, I lay out the concept of abjection and indicate 
how I will make use of it; second, I outline my parts and chapters in some detail, 
giving the reader a clear picture of the shape the thesis will take.
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II. Briefly, the Abject and its Intersection with Satire and
the Grotesque
Abject. . ,  Cast off, rejected -1614 ..  . Cast down, brought low in condition, low- 
lying 1520 . . .  Low in regard, mean-spirited, despicable 1548.
Abjection . . , The action of casting down -1653 . . . The condition of one cast 
down, degradation, low estate . . . The action of casting off; rejection -1655 . . . 
That which is cast off; refuse . . .  (The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 1964:4)
In the above quotations I have included the dates when different definitions of 
'abject' and 'abjection' came into currency; what they reveal is the advanced age of 
the term11. It is a word whose primary meaning has changed little in five centuries12.
Nor is it likely to alter dramatically in the future. Even Kristeva's complex the­
orisation of the term in Powers of Horror does not so much rewrite its familiar defi­
nition as develop its applicability. Degradation, as state and process, lies at the core 
of the tenn 'abject' and is a constant in human experience, which can be investi­
gated with the help of a variety of discourses, including psychoanalysis.
Albeit with reservations, we can relate Kristeva's theory of abjection to a simple 
understanding of society as a three-term complex consisting of two polarities with 
a threshold between them. The one polarity, the Symbolic13, is characterised by 
classificatory mechanisms that assert laws, prohibitions, regulations, etc., which 
the social majority considers right and proper. The second polarity, the abject -  an 
ocean of chaos and disorder where no classifications exist to halt and place the flux 
of material -  is considered wrong and improper. When the subject crosses the
11 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary includes a second definition of abject, now con­
sidered obsolete -  although its meaning does not differ from that of its present-day counter­
part- which dates back to 1475.
12 Five centuries, that is, in the English language. Since it derives from Latin (abjecttis 
[libido] -  to cast away), its full pedigree would have an even longer tail.
13 When I use the term "Symbolic", i.e., with an upp er-case S, I have Lacan's topology in 
mind. When I use it in discussing Kristeva I retain the i\pper-case S since Kristeva's work Is 
Lacanian, a t least in its origins, and when she talks of ti, e Symbolic it is generally the Sym­
bolic as defined by Lacan.
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threshold from the proper (that is, the Symbolic) to the improper, s /h e  becomes ab­
ject. Abjection is everything that lies on the other side of what society establishes as 
proper and acceptable under the rubric of law and order. Although these polarities 
form a classic dyad of good and bad, light and dark, clean and unclean, pure and 
impure, sinless and sinful, they are dependent on each other, and appear less as 
austere, divided and isolated binaries than as intermingled tendencies or imbricated 
sets, where the most diagnostic attributes of their relation appear at the point of over­
lap, in the threshold. The abject needs the Symbolic to manifest as a series of things, 
for it is only through the classificatory and nominative, taxonomic structures and 
operations of signification that it can take form. The Symbolic needs the abject to 
define its own limits, establish principles and to maintain its purify by using the 
abject as a dumping ground for everything in and out of signification that threatens 
the properness of the Symbolic order.
I must stress at the outset that abjection has two facets, which Hal Foster, in The 
Return of the Real, defines as 'the operation to abject and the condition to be abject? 
(1996:156). I use this coupled distinction to structure and direct my argument 
throughout the thesis. The process of abjectmg (operation to abject) is an active one 
in which one party rejects, banishes, degrades or in some other way denigrates an­
other party; the state of being abject (condition to be abject) is what follows an act of 
abjection: it is a disposition, a place of exclusion. There is, thus, a politics and a 
power play to abjection. Without exception, the party that does the abjecting is the 
one in a position of power -  even if that power resides purely in the rhetoric of the 
abjecting process and does not reflect society's formations of power -  while the one 
degraded is robbed of power and the right to societal inclusion.
In the field of the arts, few modes of expression work more emphatically with 
this politics than satire, although satire is not always the mouthpiece of dominant 
social units. Excluded, included; majority, minority; favoured, disfavoured, all can 
use satire as a politics. Satire, given its most recognisable form -  caricature in the
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case of the visual arts -  always establishes its target, leaving the viewer in little 
doubt as to who bears the brunt of the satirist's attack. The viewer then either sides 
with the satirist (supporting his or her cause) or the target (in which case the satire 
fails to influence public opinion).
In the germination of this thesis, I initially took the Grotesque to be the expres­
sive mode that most evidently degraded its subject by making it unfamiliar, un­
settling, possibly even monstrous; but in time I realised that, though the Grotesque 
is the most productive mode in any search for examples to back an argument that 
art has always expressed the concerns Kristeva groups under the term abjection, it 
was satire that offered a workable operational framework. To put it another way: 
satire emerged as the form of expression that best employed the abjecting function 
of abjection, while the Grotesque appeared, to me, as both an instrument of this 
function and a means of depicting its results. Thus there is nothing satirical about 
the war scenes in Desastres de la Guerra, but there is plenty that one might call gro­
tesque; here the abjecting principle comes into play only as a consequence of the 
depiction of abject states (such as death and mutilation), which encourages the 
viewer to abject, for example, the French invaders, or war in general.
Satire's mocking, discrediting and degrading function is simple to understand, 
so I do not spend much time explaining the mechanisms of satire. Goya's prints -  
especially in  the case of Los Caprichos -  adequately display satire in  action. The Gro­
tesque, however, is a more complex phenomenon; vague and elusive at times, it 
can also be garish and overt. It can leave viewers teetering on the brink of indeter­
minacy just as easily as it can lambaste them with an image as obvious as it is mon­
strous. Like satire, its function can shift from the playful to the demonic; it can 
induce laughter and disgust; but where satire so often aggravates extremes of 
response, the Grotesque is seldom only fascinating or only repulsive -  it confuses 
response, making one ever wary of one's interpretations. In this way, as I will flesh 
out, it teases desire and brings unconscious drives to the forefront of the interpreta­
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tive process, closing the 'space' between the viewer's observing function and his or 
her own repressed contents, his or her own domain of abject(ed) things and plea­
sures. Such links between the Grotesque and the abject I develop in the first Part of 
the thesis to demonstrate how the Grotesque, which has had long tenure in the his­
tory of art, can be seen anew as a mode capable of expressing and disclosing the 
kinds of issues Kristeva raises in her "essay on abjection".
III. Parts and Chapters
In Part One of the thesis I introduce satire and briefly indicate how it functions as a 
process of abjection -  how satire's ridiculing, mocking purpose accords with what I 
have already described as the "operation to abject". I bring in Goya's advertisement 
for Los Caprichas and, by drawing attention to its typically satirical emphasis on the 
censure and banishment of social ills, argue that its purpose can reinterpreted in 
terms of the operation to abject.
Next, I focus on the Grotesque, both on its general history -  its growth from the 
Renaissance decorative style grottesche to a category of expression devoted to more 
subjective realms of the mind -  and its specific history in Spaih. I argue that the Gro­
tesque was both sidelined by the dominant Neo-classical art mode and brought 
into being by it as an oppositional category that could represent what mimetically- 
orientated artists should avoid in their artmaking. In this way I point to the rela­
tionship in which the abject stands to the Symbolic in society, the abject being to 
tire social formation what the Grotesque is to Neo-classicism or mimesis in general.
In the subsequent stage of Chapter One I examine those writers who have 
done the most to define and characterise the Grotesque: John Ruskin, Wolfgang 
Kayser, Mikhail Bakhtin and Philip Thomson. I flesh out Ruskin's separation be­
tween the "sportive" and "terrible" Grotesque and emphasise his claim that the use 
value of the Grotesque depends on the nature of its maker; further, his claim that
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"masters of the noble or terrible grotesque" can use the mode ior transcendence. In 
discussing Kayser I highlight his point that the Grotesque works by surprise and 
only appears estranged so long as we do not recognise it, and I draw attention to 
his suggestion that the Grotesque both constitutes a psychological threat to the 
viewer and is the means to end that threat. Bakhtin I look at primarily for Ms prin­
ciple of grotesque excess and his conviction that the up-down circulation in what 
he calls "grotesque realism" leads to the kind of rejuvenation or transcendence im­
plicit in Buskin and Kayser. All three writers, tentatively in the case of Ruskin and 
Kayser, wholeheartedly in the case of Bakhtin, see laughter as instrumental to the 
function of the Grotesque; like the mode itself, laughter can enslave or liberate and 
contains within itself the means to effect liberation from concerns and fears.
Having brought the discussion to an intersection between the Grotesque and 
satire on the issue of the operation to abject -  executed through laughter, or mocking 
in general -  I then look at the Grotesque's cMef object the grotesque body, the su­
preme representation of the condition to be abject (to be excluded, marginalised, but 
by no means inert). The grotesque body is a hybrid confuser of categories that, as 
matter out of place, must be classified if society is to maintain the Symbolic order 
that best suits its collective ideals. Acts of classification, i.e., naming, tame what is 
otherwise a potentially limitless threat by associating it with dirt and refuse, and so 
repel the grotesque body into a category of exclusion, the abject. Though excluded, 
its exorbitancy, from the fringes, attracts and compels, inviting corruption.
Next I look at the second part of Goya's advertisement for Los Cnprichos, in 
■which he places a premium on acts of selection whereby the artist, instead of mere­
ly copying nature, combines separate elements from nature into imaginary forms 
and scenes. In tMs act of combination I find an equivalent for the dream process of 
condensation, and it is at this level that I make a more-or-less figurative leap from 
grotesque combination to the hybridising, amalgamating processes of the uncon­
scious. In the last section of Chapter One I strengthen this link between the Gro­
i
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tesque and the unconscious by arguing that the ambiguity and indeterminacy of 
the Grotesque open gaps in recognition that, if not closed by avoidance, classifica­
tion or imaginative leaps that make sense of the gaps in new patterns of reality -  
where closure is desired -  allow for the emergence of the repressed unconscious, 
and with it the abject.
I conclude Chapter One by stressing that satire and the Grotesque are complici- 
tous in maintaining the Symbolic order. Though they involve the viewer with works 
that, by depicting distortions, aberrations, monstrosities and horrors (both imagined 
and distorted from actual individuals and real environments), encourage the emerg­
ence of the repressed, they do so to justify the further repression of the abject.
Part One, Chapter Two, is devoted to the theory of abjection itself. I begin by 
linking the ambivalence and indeterminacy of the Grotesque to the psychoanalytic 
concept of the uncanny, which I read as a feeling of familiarity that arises in  that 
pre-expurgatory gap of indeterminacy which grants the unconscious access to con­
sciousness, and which becomes reversed or inverted into a feeling of unfamiliarity, 
even horror, should consciousness, with its arsenal 01 ,aws and repressions, again
seize control of'the (re)cognitive process. After some discussion of inversion and
/ ;
taboo, I lay out the theory of abjection. I first situate the emergence of abjection in 
relation to what Kristeva terms the Semiotic -  a pre-objectal environment in  which 
the child exists in an illimitable fusion with its mother -  which becomes the first 
and primary environment to be repressed (i.e„ made abject) in the process of the 
subject's concatenation to the Symbolic,
With this backgro und in place, I spend some time defining the abject in relation 
to at least four primary concerns: (1) its lack of an objective existence except through 
the objects that represent it (e.g., excrement), (2) its relation to the limits, margins or 
boundaries of the Symbolic order, which define it as a thing that must be excluded 
if the integrity of the Symbolic and the cohesion of the subject are to be maintained,
(3) its relation to the super-ego -  what one could describe as the Symbolic personal­
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ised in each individual -  which again distinguishes the included from the excluded,
(4) the abject's ability to both attract and repel, to pull desire and push it back. 
Having defined the term, in Section II of Chapter Two I examine three facets of the 
abject crucial to my analyses of Goya's images: (1) satirical degradation as an 
abjection of the subject, (2) the abjection of the mother, which helps us to interpret 
Goya's images of grotesque mothers and grotesque offspring, and (3) the non-differ- 
entiated, formless disposition that characterises subjectivity prior to the subject's 
entry into the excluding and classificatory imperatives of the Symbolic, which cast 
everything that preceded the Symbolic into abjection.
In the last section of Chapter Two I look at ways in which the abject can be sub­
dued. I preface this section by pointing out that the abject can be used profitably to 
satisfy the ego, and that pleasure can come through contact with abjection. I also 
note that Goya's ambiguous and ambivalent relationship with his grotesque, rhy- 
parographic and sometimes obscene subjects and themes may indicate that he took 
them up because, while the satirical imperative to banish vulgarities wap important 
to him, he was as rewarded by the Imaginary contact with abjection Urough art as 
he was by his efforts to classify, resolve and exclude what compelled and repulsed 
him. Kristeva assigns writing, and, I argue, art in general, a role in "purifying" ab­
jection by bringing the abject into being a second time, through representation. She, 
notes that thi. form of catharsis is inherently impure, which helps us to understand 
how one can, even while trying to exclude or gain release from the abject, be im­
mersed in it -  joying in it. For the viewer/reader, whose labour lies in  the field of 
interpretation, cathartic relief comes through exercising prohibition or classification, 
taking leaps of the imagination and, chiefly, through laughter.
Part Two is devoted to analyses of select works from Los Caprichos. I briefly chart 
the development of the etching series from a set of cabinet paintings Goya pro­
duced in 1794, through two albums of drawings (the Sanlucar and Cadiz-Madrid 
albums) and the Sneiio designs, to the series itself, emphasising the influence of sat­
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ire and caricature in this (terato) genesis. I make brief mention of the series' reception 
on publication, then move on to the analyses of separate works. I bracket my dis­
cussion between two central images. The Sleep of Reason produces Monsters and And 
still They do not go!, which for me sum up the play with conscious and unconscious 
(Symbolic and abject) forces that characterises much of the series. I analyse select 
images in chapters: Women of questionable morals. The Nobility, The Clergy, The 
Law, Struggles for Supremacy, and Ambivalence. Throughout, I lay emphasis on 
the way Goya sets up as satirical targets and scapegoats denizens from his private 
closet of objectionable social individuals to facilitate the viewer's dissociation from 
them by means of mocking laughter -  a dissociation in the name of reason, to 
influence society in the direction of reformation. There is ambivalence here, too, 
and I do allow that Goya may have used satire almost as an excuse to get close to 
what was otherwise forbidden or at least dubious in terrrts of social sanctions.
In Part Three I focus on Desastres de la Guerra. After briefly introducing the cir­
cumstances under which the Napoleonic war between Spain and France flared, I 
open the parenthesis Vvithin which 1 cradle my examination of the series with a dis­
cussion of Sad Presentiments of what is to come. I analyse select etchings within 
chapters dealing with rape, execution, mutilation, famished begging, death, and 
the removal corpses from the streets of Madrid, I close my parenthesis and my 
investigation of the etchings with an image that sums up the series. Fierce Monster. 
My interest in Los Desastres lies in Goya's treatment of conflict and the results of 
conflict (corpses, often gathered into indiscriminate mounds) and of famine, and its 
results (a partitioned society and more piled-up corpses), all of which can be 
interpreted in  terms of the condition to be abject, but also of the operation to abject, 
where the sanctioned murder of war is understood as the most decisive form of 
abjection. My interpretative strategy for lo,$ Desastres differs from the strategies I 
use for Los Caprichos and Los Disparates in that I analyse the war images not so 
much to reveal something about what war meant for Goya, but to make general
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connections between war and abjection. I do bring Goya into the discussion where 
he is essential to the argument, and I also at times take up the satirical issues that 
dominate the other two etching series, but otherwise, by and large, I interpret the 
images in  a certain isolation from their maker, concerned to flesh out the way in 
which the principles, procedures and dispositions of abjection underlie, or can be 
tracked in, the pictorial narrative.
As for Los Disparates, I again set my analyses between two crucial works. Folly 
of the Mass and Man wandering among Phantoms, which vacillate between a position 
of resolution -  the mass as a separate integrated phenomenon that can be broken 
apart by a single determined individual -  and irresolution: the mass as something 
in which one is engulfed, something inescapable that one can keep at arm's length 
but never quite dispel. This balance between conflict with and complicity with the 
abject runs throughout the Disparates. The series, which often treats Goya's historical 
Symbolic as a disfiguring, teratogenetic influence on pleasure, is indeed more about 
in-betweenness than closure. It marks a return to the satirical impetus of Los Capri- 
chos, but the rigour of the, former series has disappeared, and Goya seems content 
in the Disparates to censure and to indulge, to opt for individuality and for collect­
ivity, for purity and corruption, reason and unreason. Symbolic and abject.
In the epilogue I look at Goya's use of the Grotesque to promote the cause of 
reason -  a use of a mode otherwise subordinate or dissonant to the leading mimetic 
trends of Goya's day which resulted in Goya becoming grotesque himself: a hybrid 
caught in the liminal, corrupted interval between reason and unreason.
I also focus on the question of catharsis and what role this might have played in 
Goya's art production. Establishing with the help of two of his letters that Goya 
understood the idea of tension reduction and saw in art a means to effect this re­
duction, I proceed to discuss catharsis from an Imaginary and economic point of 




. , , horror more horrible from being vague, and terror more 
terrible from ambiguity,
(Edgar Allan Poe, Berenice, in The Works of Edgar Allan Poe, 
vol. 9 [New York: Standard Book Company, 1933] p.10)
Satire
'What's that rumbling sound, Sancho?'
'I don'tknow, sir/ he replied, [...]
[Sancho] tried his luck again, and succeeded so well that, 
without making more noise or hubbub than before, he found 
himself free of the load that had given him such grief. But as 
Don Quixote had a sense of smell as lively as his sense of 
hearing, and since Sancho was so close tp him that the vapours 
rose in almost a straight line, he could not be spared some of 
them reaching his nostrils; and hardly had they arrived than 
he went to the aid of his own nose by pressing it shut with two 
fingers. [.,.]
'Retire three or four steps over there, friend,' Don Quixote 
said (without taking his fingers away from' his nose all the 
while), 'and in future take more account of your person and of 
that which you owe mine; it is the amount of conversation I 
have with you that has engendered this contempt/
'I wager/ Sancho replied, 'that your honour thinks I have 
done, with my person. . .  something that should not be done,' 
'Stirring only makes it worse, Sancho my friend/ Don Qui­
xote responded.
—iQud rumor es ese, f  ' 1 _
—No sd, senor-respop, „ - " ,,]
[Sancho] [t]orn<5 otra) a p- , tr ventura, y sucedidle tan
bien, quo, sin mis midi , albi [to que el pasado, se halld
libre de la carga que tai W tadumbre le habia dado. Mas 
como Don Quijote tenia el Jdo del olfato tan vivo como el 
de los oidos, y Sancho estaba tan junto y cosido con 61, que casi 
por tinea recta subian los vapores hacia arriba, no se pudo 
excusar de que algimos no llegasen a sus narices; y apenas 
hubieron llegado, cuando 61 fue al socorro, apretandolas entre 
los dos dedos [...]
—Retirate toes o cuatoo alii, amigo—dijo Don Quijote (todo 
esto sin quitarse los dedos de los narices)—, y desde aqul en 
adelante ten mis cuenta con tu persona y con lo que debes a la 
mia, que la mucha conversation que tengo contigo ha engen- 
drado este menosprecio.
—Apostari—replied Sancho—que piensa vuestra merced 
que yo he hecho de mi persona, . .  alguna cosa que no deba.
—Peor es meneallo, amigo Sancho—respond# Don Quijote,
(Miguel de Cervantes, El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don Qilijote de la 
Mancha, Obras Completas. Tomo II [Madrid: Aguilar, 1970] 
[Parti, Chapter 20] pp.1294-95. El Ingenioso Hidalgo Don 
Qnijote de la Mancha was published between 1605 and 1615)
Chapter One
Satire, The Grotesque, and Other 
Precedents for Abjection
IN THIS CHAPTER I investigate those recognisable artistic modes that Goya em­ployed in  his graphic art which can be understood as visual precedents for the 
themes, convictions and observations that Julia Kristeva crowds around the 
notion of "abjection" and its 'object', the "abject". These include the Grotesque and 
satire. 1 establish connections between these historical forms of expression and 
moderfi abjection theory to demonstrate not only the fruitfulness of considering 
Goya's art within this framework but also the interconnectedness of longstanding 
modes, practices, tropes and recent rearticulations of the human individual as a 
subject within a regulated, partitioned, territorialised society.
I begin by looking briefly at satire. As I pointed out in the introduction, satire's 
function is largely a rejecting, excluding one, in which an individual or group of 
individuals -  normally of elevated socio-political status -  is ridiculed, mocked and 
denigrated with tire intention of casting him or her down in the eyes of his or her 
contemporaries. A rejecting function is one of the two core characteristics of abjec­
tion, what Foster defines as 'tire operation to abject' (1996:156), and I pose it to the 
reader tirat satire's function can be Understood and placed in  this context. There­
after I take an in-depth look at the Grotesque, its rise and development; its leading 
features, etc., to argue that the mode can be framed, among other things, in terms 
of tire second core characteristic of abjection, 'tire condition to be abject' (Foster, 1996: 
156). The pictorial aspects of the mode, its interest in the grotesque body, for in­
stance, as well as its ability to influence viewer response -  chiefly through its inde- 
temrinacy, which, I suggest, permits the emergence of the unconscious -  involve 
the viewer in a subject position that is abject in relation to tire norms and expecta­
tions of his or her society. I use the Grotesque as a discursive bridge to the tireory
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of abjection, which I advance in  Chapter Two. Owing to the amount of ground I 
cover, my procedure is somewhat convoluted, and I must ask the reader to bear 
with me as I lay it out, especially when I leave points dangling because they relate 
to other points not yet made. Rest assured, by the end of tire chapter I do draw all 
the strings together.
Now, a few words about satire.
I, The Operation to Abject; Satire
The characteristics of satire I would consider primary are:
1) A critical, often belligerent, stance. Satire is always used to attack. It always has an 
object, whether a single individual, a nation or humanity in general. This ob­
ject is more than a simple target: the satirist takes it to task for a purpose, to 
undermine and exclude it.
2) A degree of impunity in censuring society, permitting the satirist to invert and sub-
\y
vert existing structures and authority figures without immediate fear of retalia­
tions1. li
. I ' -
1 In this sense the satirist's function is simply a more formalized version of the role played 
by tire 'fool' in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century court society. The 'fool' was not con­
strained by the same rules as ordinary people; his role was deliberately subversive and 
disruptive, for, as Francisco MSrquez Villanueva notes in his article 'Literature Bufonesca o 
del "loco"',
The court needed the corporeal presence of folly to liberate itself from the truly madden­
ing tyranny of a life penetrated from top to bottom by reason, objectivised in the implac­
able cogs of politics. To his surroundings the court "fool" restored flexibility and the 
healing and most beneficent laws of nature, (in Echavarria, 1985-86:617n,ll) (La corte 
necesitaba de esta preseneia corporea de la Locura para liberarse de la tirania verdadera- 
mente enloquecedora de una vida penetrada de arriba a abajo por la razon, objetivada en 
el implacable engranaje de la politica. El "loco" de corte restaUra a su alrededor la flexi- 
bilidad y los derechos de la sana y mas benefica naturaleza.)
The following quote from Anton Zijderveld's Reality in the Looking Glass reveals that this 
function exceeded the bounds of the court's need for a little timely insanity:
Traditional fools played erratic games with the primary foundations of human existence, 
with the basic structures of the lifeworld, with the essential criteria by which human 
beings manage to experience meaning at all. Turning reality upside-down, they rendered 
it, for the duration of their performances, to chaos, to the forces of unstructured primeval 
energy, (in Echavarria:616)
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3) An intention to comct a world the satirist vieios as cancerous:
The purpose of satire is, through laughter and invective, to cure folly and to 
punish evil. . .  satire wishes to expose and criticise and shame human life . . .  it 
pretends to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth. (Highet, 1962:56,58)
The use of 'truth' as a weapon against vice is another feature of satire's re­
constructive role. As Mary Randolphs writes in her article 'The Structural 
Design, of the Formal Verse Satire':
this positive side of satire toward which the whole exegetical and rhetorical pro­
cedure is pointed is usually a dogma of a rationalistic philosophy since the essen­
tial function of satire is ever by Ridicule to recall Man from the by-ways of Unreason to 
the base line of Reason, that is, to present Rational Man as the norm or standard, (in 
Paulson, 1971b:175; emphases added.)
This emphasis on reason as the means to keep humanity from floundering 
in the grottoes of unreason introduces the fourth characteristic of satire:
4) A reliance on conceptions of morality. In 1693, in his Discourse Concerning Satire, the 
much-discussed early-English satirist John Dryden claimed that satirical verse 
obliged '[t]he poet . . .  to give his reader some one precept of moral virtue, and to 
caution him against some one particular vice or folly' (quoted by Spacks, in Paul- 
son:361). 'For effective attack/ Northrop Frye states, 'we must reach some kind of 
impersonal level, and that commits the attacker if only by implication, to a moral 
standard. The satirist commonly takes a high moral line/ (in Pauison:235)
The power the court invested in the fool gave him transcendence over ordinary restric­
tions of class and rank, and placed him in a virtually unpunishable position. As William 
Willeford so aptly puts it in The Fool and His Scepter.
Fools are characteristically unperturbed by the ignominy that comes from being irrespon­
sible. They have a magical affinity to chaos that might allow them to serve as scapegoats 
on behalf of order; yet they elude the sacrifice or the banishment that would affirm order 
at their expense, (in Echnvarria:617)
The fool's invulnerable position transformed him, as Arturo Echavarrla notes, 'into a fig­
ure particularly apt to criticise not only political and social, b u t . . . even intellectual nature' 
(617) fen personaje particularmente apto para la critica no solamente de ta.dcle polltica y so­
cial, sino . . .  tambten la de indole intelectual'). If we take this in c njunction with the following 
quote from Robert Klein -  'the fool humiliates the sages of this world, comprised, naturally, of 
doctors and theologians' (in Echavarria:618) ('le fou humilie Its sages de ce monde, y comprit 
naturellement les docteurs et les theologiens') -  it is not difficult to recognise the position the 
fool was able to assume as a satirical one. Goya, of course, often mocked doctors and, in parti­
cular, theologians in his satirical prints.
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What, one wonders, validates the satirist's assumption of this high moral 
lire; what gives him  or her the right to what Ken kUI (in Paulson, 1971:263-64) 
describes as a 'monolithic certainty'? It would appear to depend on communal 
morals, ethics and principles, some of which are regulated by state apparatuses 
such as the law, while others rely on self-surveillance and self-supervision to 
maintain the social body within reliable and 'upstanding' perimeters. Satire 
falls midway between state regulation and self-sui reillance. On the one hand, 
because it has to operate in public forums to have a voice, satire appears in the 
media in  one form or another and hence accrues the aura of a collective censur­
ing body -  the satirist's (frequently personal) attacks gain a shimmer of authority 
because they have been sanctioned by a social organ (a publishing house, a 
newspaper), and what the satirist says appears to be what the establishment in 
general says. This is where satire's power resides; speaking from a position asso­
ciated with authority, it has the ability to sway behaviour. The satirist may be the 
most ambivalent and incoherent of people, but the images s/he  creates will 
form a sovereign tissue of moralistic exhortations. Satirists can comment on the 
most corrupt of human propensities, become so immersed in them that they 
appear to take sadistic delight in denigrating their subject matter2, yet still rise 
above them and appear to be paragons of rectitude by virtue of the almost god­
like position from which they speak. On the other hand, however, satire can 
only effect change within the individual, and this can only occur through self­
surveillance as individuals correct their behaviour by making it conform to
2 There is something of a debate around this notion of the thin line satirists walk between 
censuring the objects of their attack and, in getting too close to the subject matter, plunging 
over the brink of reason into an abyss of sadistic relish. See, for instance, Keman (in Paul­
son, 1971:266-69). In Chapter Two I argue that this immersion in his or her subject matter is 
essential to the satirist's rectifying or purifying procedure. I should also draw attention to 
the possibility that this necessary contamination may account for much of the ambivalence 
in Goya's own satire, particularly in Los Disparates, where Goya often depicts situations that 
seem to involve his own confluence with, and at the same time desire to extract himself 
from, the maculating material of his satire.
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the image presented by the satirist3. This image, 'norm or standard', let me re­
mind the reader, is 'Rational Man' (Randolph in Paulson, 19716:175). Satire is thus 
a social mode of artistic production in  which the satirist adopts as rigid a moral 
position as possible -  even one that supersedes the social formation's primary 
regulatory body, the law, in the event of the satirist finding fault with it -  to in­
fluence the behaviour of society. Since it can only be effective at its site of con­
sumption, satire must take an exaggerated form and must utilise as its weapons 
those aspects of society most likely to meet with collective disapproval. In this 
sense every satirist is something of a rhyparographer4, a dealer in 'mean or sor­
did subjects' (Oxford English Dictionary, 1964:1733), but one who uses obscenity 
to correct by example, showing the viewer/reader those immoderat e pleasures 
of the flesh s/he must avoid to live a suitably and profitably moral, abstentious 
existence. I will return to satire's use of rhyparographic of obscene subject mat­
ter in my discussion of tire grotesque body in Section III of this chapter.
5) An adoption of fantasy as a framework for satirical comment. Hodgart writes, 'jajll 
good satire contains an element of aggressive attack and a fantastic vision of 
the world transformed . . . offering "imaginary gardens with real toads in 
them'" (1969:11--12)5. The security and impermeability of an artificial environ­
ment allows satirists to exercise irony, parody, allusion, allegory, wit, metaphor 
and symbol to degrade their object(s) of attack with virtual impunity.
3 Edward and Lillian Bloom, to Satire's Persuasive Voice, which aims to demonstrate how 
satire is an instrument of persuasion rather than direct alteration, put this point succinctly:
In censuring wrongdoing and foolishness, satire may set in motion the possibility of 
remedy. . .  the innocent, forewarned and innately scrupulous, are equipped to fc.ce their 
obligations; the guilty, if capable of repentance, are moved to self-redemption, (1979:33)
4 A term normally associated with still-life painting or genre painting, which was consi­
dered lowly in relation to allegorical or history painting (see Bryson, 1990:61,136-38), but 
which clearly has wider application, especially where satire is concerned.
5 Cf. Frye (in Paulson, 1971:234): 'Two things . . .  are essential to satire; one is wit or hu­
mour founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque or absurd, the other is an object of at­
tack'. The reader should note the connection Frye draws between fantasy and the grotesque.
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E. H. Gombrich, in his essay 'Imagery and Art in  the Romantic Period' 
(1994tr.l20~26), suggests that the Romantic era, in which satire blossomed in the 
visual arts, with such artists as James GUlray, Thomas Rowlandson and, of 
course, Goya, provided particularly fertile ground for this communion between 
satire and fantasy. The Romantic period saw a great interest in 'Gothic' literature 
(the stories of Edgar Allan Poe, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and parts of Emily 
Bronte's Wnthering Heights, for example), in 'phantasmagoria' and other imagery 
of nightmares, dreams and witchcraft. The element of fantasy -  especially hor­
rific fantasy -  was sought not only in popular prints but in high art as well (one 
thinks of Fuseli and, of course, of Goya). As Gombrich puts it:
the weirdest combination of symbols, the most grotesque conglomerations of 
images, were no longer merely tolerated as the pardonable licence of a low me­
dium of illustration. They could be attuned to the taste of tire time if they were 
presented as phantoms, nightmares, and apparitions. (123)
According to Gombrich, Goya saw the value in this vogue for nightmarish
fantasy as a means of obscuring his otherwise virulent satirical assaults on
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Spanish society:
Goya sought social justification for his fantastic visions by pouring them into tire 
pre-existing mould of satirical a r t . . . he was forced to exploit the twilight re­
gions of the grotesque for camouflaging his political comments in the guise of 
mere Caprichos and dreams of a fevered brain. (124)6
He also cloaked his Caprichos and Disparates in terms and traditions that un­
mistakably would have associated them, in the minds of his audience, with 
dreams, absurdities and the irrational, that is, with a world in which unreason, 
at first glance, had free play. I will return to this when I take my second look at 
Goya's advertisement for Los Caprichos, but for now I would like to claim that
6 Goya's access to the "twilight regions of the grotesque" was facilitated by an interest in 
witchcraft that circulated within the aristocratic circles in which he moved. The Duke and 
Duchess of Osuna, for example, commissioned him to paint a series of works for their 
library which expressly depicted witchcraft subjects (see, for example, Heckes, 1985:124-78). 
These paintings strongly prefigure Los Caprichos and tend to suggest that Goya took imagi­
native liberties in his etchings because he thought he had a receptive audience to count on. 
On publishing the series, of course, that audience turned out to be smaller than it seemed.
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Goya used such 'irrationalities' not for the sake of play or to forge a new (anti- 
mimetic) tradition, but to stress the need for 'Rational Man' to be upheld 'as the 
norm or standard' (Randolphe in Paulson, 1971M75). Following a satirical 
norm, he used fantasy to comment on his historical reality.
6) An interest in medical metaphors that ultimately underline satire's cathartic, role. 
'[M]edical metaphors,' Randolphe writes, '[represent] satire as having a cathar­
tic, that is, a sanative and finally a healing or curative effect on the person satir­
ised, as well as on the satirist M-nself' (in Paulson, 1971a:159). The Blooms sug­
gest that this healing comes through laughing at a scapegoat:
For many satirists . . .  laughter is analogous to propitiatory sacrifice: a form of dis­
covery and released emotion through which a scapegoat makes it possible for a 
community fragmented by shame and guilt to reintegrate itself. Society has always 
needed . . .  ceremonial victims, upon whom man's aggregate sins are publicly and 
symbolically discharged. The scapegoat becomes the agent in whom is concen­
trated whatever threatens totemic well-being. . .  His availability perhaps betokens 
man's sadistic instincts, but it also provides an illusory source of healing transfer­
ence . . .  the reader transfers his assumed inadequacy to a nearby satiric target. 
Then he feels better about himself. . .  in judging others guilty, he can pretend that 
virtue accrues to him. Instead of being whipped, he places liimself in the role of the 
superior, aggressive whipper . . . satiric laughter may become a source of both 
catharsis and redemption for satirist and reader alike. (1979:128-29)
Both Randolphe and the Blooms sketch a triangle of reception and 'cure' 
involving (1) the reader/viewer, (2) the person satirised (the object of the satiric 
attack, implicating, on occasion, the reader/viewer), (3) the satirist him/herself. 
In this triangle the apex occupied by the person satirised stands on its head, sup­
porting the apices above it -  it is a load-bearing site of exclusion, the place of the 
fool whose role is not to entertain but to be ribbed; while it gives release to 
others, it, the object of the satire, is not released. Those eased are the ones who 
are often, in the true scheme of things, subject to the one who is now mocked7.
7 This is not always the case. Many satirical scapegoats are marginals -  the poor, the 
diseased, the deformed -  who are not in any sense politically empowered and oppressive. 
Their threat to the social fabric exists by implication or as a fantasy of the classes in power; it 
lies in their difference and their uncertain public place, which is often cause enough for their 
further denigration by those 'higher' on the social ladder.
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By allying themselves with the "aggressive whipper", they shift from victims to 
aggressors, from passive to active, from slavery to mastery, asserting their 
selves by denigrating the threatening other and turning it into a sacrificial ob­
ject -  both an object of scorn and a receptacle for internal tensions released 
through projection onto die object. Of this, more later.
From the above six characteristics of satire -  viz., its critical, undermining stance; 
its relative immunity or sanctioned criticism; its reliance on Reason and Truth to act 
correctively on its receivers; its foregrounding of morality as a norm of behaviour 
to be mimicked; its use of fantasy as a camouflage; and its adoption of medical 
analogies to metaphorise its prospective action on society -  we can infer that satir­
ists are individuals who take a dim view of their society and, in accordance with a
high moral line that upholds "Rational Man" as its "norm or standard", desire to
! i
change it. They use hit to effect change, trusting that people will reform their lives 
to suit the model behaviour which the satire creates as its desirable opposite. To 
persuade people the satirist plays off two things: an explicit represented target, rotten 
to the core, and an implied unrepresented norm, morally correct to the core. The lat­
ter is created as the solution for the former; even if we do not see this moral cure, 
we develop it in our own perception and thinking, because the satire is specifically 
orchestrated to rouse and promote one's personal moral sense. If you don't want to 
be like what I show you, the satirist says, you've got to be like its opposite. If I show 
you depravity, you must be upright; if 1 show you promiscuity, you must be dis­
criminating; if I show you drunkenness, you must be sober. The target, then, is 
everything the satirist does not want you to be -  everything you must not be. It is 
the scapegoat, the object of supreme denigration, the thing to laugh and scoff at. 
You don't want to be that, do you? No. You want to be the one who laughs. The 
one who spurns and rejects; tire one who decides who is acceptable to society and
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who must be banished from it. It is an active, powerful, determining position -  
who wouldn't want it? Only a fool8.
At the root of the satirical function is this duality between what-you-don't- 
want-to-be and what-you-should-be, but since what-you-should-be is more im­
plied than represented (especially in visual satire), the chief feature of the satirical 
terrain ends up being what-you-don't-want-to-be: the rejected satirical target. Hence, 
even though it functions in the name of an assumed common good, satire ends up 
looking principally like a process of rejection and casting down, of placing what 
the satirist considers undesirable elsewhere, in short, of abjectmg.
At this point it seems essential for me to take the first of two looks (the second 
of which forms Section IV of Chapter One) at Goya's advertisement for Los Capri- 
chos, both to demonstrate how it frames the etching series satirically and to reveal 
that Goya himself associated the satirical function with an act of condemnation and 
banishment, i.e., in my terms, with an operation to abject. In this discussion of the 
advertisement I focus only on its satirical emphasis; in Section IV I will look at the 
issues it raises in terms of fantasy and selection -  issues that will prove essential to 
my linkage of the Grotesque to the unconscious and, thus, to abjection.
II. Goya's Advertisement for Los Caprichos
Collection of prints of capricious subjects, invented and etched by Francisco 
Goya. The author, persuaded that censure of human errors and vices (although 
it seems peculiar to oratory and poetry) can also be the object of painting, has 
chosen such subjects proportionate for his work, among the multitude of eccen­
tricities and errors that are common in every civil society, and among the preju­
8 Not to be confused with the historical fool mentioned in footnote 1. By Goya's time the 
role of the historical fool had been assumed by the satirist, whose connection to the impun­
ity of the fool and the fool's ability to disguise biting social comment in buffoonish behav­
iour remained in the satirist's use of fantasy to shift the parameters within which the satire 
would be received, The fool as object of the satirist's criticism is another matter entirely: 
such a fool is, in the opinion of the satirist, the supreme example of stupidity and depriva­
tion -  the kind of 'idiot' who would choose the margins of society over the morally-correct 
centre simply because the margins offer the pleasures and satisfactions of the flesh.
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dices and common falsehoods authorised by habit, ignorance or interest, those 
that he has thought most suitable matter for ridicule, and to exercise at the same 
time the fantasy of the artificer.
As most of the objects represented in this work are ideals, it will not be fool­
hardy to believe that their defects will find, perhaps, many pardons among the 
intelligent, considering that the author has neither followed the examples of an­
other, nor been able to copy much from nature. And if the imitation is as difficult 
as admirable when successful, he who has stood aside from, nature will not fail 
to merit some esteem, having had to expose to the eyes forms and attitudes that 
have only existed until now in the human mind, obscured and confused for the 
lack of illustration or excited with uncontrolled passions.
It would suppose too much ignorance in the fine arts to advertise to the 
public that in none of the compositions that form this collection has the author 
proposed to ridicule die particular defects of one or another individual: that 
would in truth restrict the limits of talent too much and mistake the -way in 
which one uses the arts of imitation to produce perfect works.
Painting (like poetry) selects from the universal that which it judges most 
appropriate for its ends: unites in a single fantastic personage circumstances and 
characters that nature presents distributed in many, and from this ingeniously ar­
ranged combination results that happy imitation by which a good artificer acquires 
the title of inventor and not of servile copyist (Diario de Madrid, 6 February 1799)9
9 The original Spanish text is as follows:
Colection de estampas de asuntos caprichosos, inventadas y  grabadas al agua fuerte, por 
Don Francisco Goya. Persuadido el autor de que la censura de los errores y  vicios hu- 
manos (aunque parece peculiar de la eloquencia y  la paesia) puede tambien set objeto de 
la pintura; ha escogido como asuntos proporcionados para su obra, entre la multitud de 
extravagancias y desaciertos que son communes en toda sociedad civil, y entre las 
preocupaciones y embustes vulgares, autorizados por la costumbre, la ignorancia 6 el 
interes, aquellos que ha creido mas aptos a subministrar materia para el ridiculo, y exer- 
citar al mismo tiempo la fantasia del artifice.
Como la mayor parte de los objetos que en esta obra se represen tan son ideales, no 
sera temeridad creer que sus defectos hallaran, tal vez, mucha disculpa entre los inteli- 
gentes; considerando que el autor, ni ha seguido los exemplos de otro, ni ha podido 
copiar tan poco de la naturaleza. Y si el imitarla es tan dificil, como admirable quando se 
logra; no dexara de merecer alguna estimation el que apartandose enteramente de ella, 
ha tenido que exponer a los ojos formas y  actitudes que solo han existido hasta ahora en 
la mente humana, obscurecida y confusa por la falta de ilustracion 6 acalorada con el 
desentreno de las pasiones.
Seria suponer demasiada ignorancia en las bellas artes 61 advertir al publico, que en 
ninguna de las composiciones que forman esta coleccion se ha propuesto el autor, para 
ridiculizar los defectos particulates a uno u  otro individuo: que seria en verdad, 
estrechar demasiadp los limites al talento y  equivocar los medics de que se  valen las 
artes de imitation para producir obras perfeclas.
La pintura (como la poesia) escoge en lo universal lo que juzga mas a proposito para 
sus fines: reune en un solo personage fantastico, circunstancias y caracteres que la natu­
raleza presenta repartidos en muchos, y de esta convinacion, ingeniosamente dispuesta, 
results aquella feliz imitacion, por la cual adquiere un buen artifice el titalo de inventor y  
no de copiante servil.
For reproductions of the advertisement, from which the above has been transcribed, see 
Gassier, Wilson, Lachenal, 1994:129, and Harris, 1964:103; Harris also reproduces the second, 
abridged, advertisement from the February 19 edition of the Gncetn de Madrid,
A most interesting exercise is to compare this advertisement with the dedication Henry
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In this advertisement, which Goya must have had editorial control over10, the 
artist advances two principal motivations for his collection of prints: (1) "censure of 
human errors", with which ninety percent of the second sentence of his advertise­
ment is concerned, and (2) the exercising of the artificer's, i.e., Goya's, "fantasy". 
As already stated, I deal only with the first point here, and take up the second in 
Section IV of this chapter.
As L6pez-Rey notes (1970:80), Goya's second sentence, in which he lays out his 
intention to censure society's errors, prejudices and falsehoods, is an elaboration of
Fielding wrote, in 1751, for his novel Amelia:
The following book is sincerely designed to promote the cause of virtue, and to expose 
some of the most glaring evils, as well public as private, which at present infest the 
country; though there is scarce, as I remember, a single stroke of satire aimed at any one 
person throughout the whole . . .  I will not trouble you with a preface concerning the 
work; nor endeavour to obviate any criticisms which can be made on it. The good- 
natured reader, if his heart should be here affected, will be inclined to pardon many 
faults for the pleasure he will receive from a tender sensation. . .  (1966:xv)
The similarities between Fielding's dedication and Goya's advertisement -  which he in 
three areas: purpose (exposing vices), assertion (the works do not ridicule anyone in particu­
lar), and appeal (to the reader/viewer to pardon inherent faults in the respective works) -  are 
striking enough to suggest that the artist had either seen Fielding's book (in translation, pre­
sumably), or that there was such a vogue in the eighteenth century for proclamations of this 
sort that by the time Goya came to write his own he had a commonplace means of address, 
imprinted in the mindset of authors and public alike, to draw from (on this matter see Askew, 
1988:453-54n.37; she also notes that Goya's disclaimer against specific satirical intent 'was in 
fact a rather conventional disclaimer necessary during an era of bitter polemics and constant 
libel charges' [453; also see 33-34]). Not only does this imply that Goya's Caprichos project was 
more firmly situated in a satirical tradition than some scholars might like to think, but it con­
firms the degree to which influences had been traded between England and the continent in 
the course of the eighteenth century (cf. Reva Wolf's Ph.D., Francisco Gova and the Interest in 
British Art and Aesthetics in Late Eighteenth-Century Spain, 1987).
10 For decades scholars have questioned whether Goya wrote the advertisement himself 
(Klingender, 1968:101, Ferrari, 1963:X, Gassier, Wilson and Lachenal, 1994:129, Sanchez and 
Gallego, 1995:32, Sayre in Sanchez and Sayre, 1989:XCIX, L6pez-Rey, 1970:79-80, Wolf, 1987: 
99-100)1.16, etc.; see also Askew, 1988:453-54)1.37). It is possible that someone else wrote it 
under his supervision, or stood over his shoulder to guide him while he wrote it. Some 
scholars have claimed that the advertisement was written by Moratin, who is also argued to 
have been instrumental in introducing Goya to the English satirical print (see Xavier de 
Salas, 'Light on the Origin of the Caprichos', 1979, Wolf, 1987:102-5, Wilson-Bareau, 1996:25, 
Askew, 1988:317-18.1 briefly take up this point in Part Two). This may suggest -  if we accept 
Moratin as author -  a reason for the similarity between the advertisement and Fielding's dedi­
cation in Amelia. Whether the announcement flowed from Goya's hand or not is, however, 
immaterial to this thesis; it must have been reviewed and sanctioned by him, and I think it safe 
to assume that it is a fair indication of Goya's conception of Los Caprichos.
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the words he scribbled on the sueno drawing [Fig.l] for his etching T7ze Sleep of Rea­
son produces Monsters (El Sueno de la Razon produce Monstruos) [Fig.34]:
The author dreaming. His only intention is to banish harmful vulgarities, and to
perpetuate with this work of caprices the solid testimony of truth.11
Goya jotted these words down 
long before the appearance of the 
etchings for public sale, indicat­
ing that he always intended to 
use his 'caprices'12 to perpetuate 
truth -  indeed the word "only" 
implies that Goya's primary con­
cern was "to banish" "harmful 
vulgarities" in the quest for truth.
The Spanish plural noun vulgari- 
dades, which Goya uses, refers to 
something vulgar in the sense of 
ordinary or commonplace -  by 
extension, something unrefined 
and susceptible to coarse ideas, 
e.g., superstitious beliefs. Goya 
saw his task as an illuminatory 
one: by means of his truthful caprices he intended to refine the qualities and beliefs 
of his viewers, 'to recall Man from the by-ways of Unreason to the base line of 
Reason' (Randolph in  Paulson, 1971b.T75). Given that Goya wrote the above-quoted
11 The Spanish text is as follows: 'El autor schando. Su intento sdlo es desterrar vulgaridades 
perjudiriales y perpetuar con esta obra de caprichos el testimonio sdlido de la verdad'.
12 I have put this word in inverted commas because at the time of this drawing Goya still 
planned to call his envisaged etchings sueiios, that is, dreams. I will look at the concepts of 
capricho (caprice) and sueiio when I look at the second part of the advertisement.
‘ b  st ra.i ..h/j1 rfc, A
Fig.l Sueno drawing, Universal Language
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words on the drawing that immediately preceded The Sleep of Reason -produces Mon­
sters, it is no stretch of the imagination to assume that " truth" functions as a virtual 
synonym for reason. I need hardly draw attention to the word "banish" (desterrar) 
either, but I will nonetheless since it clearly reveals that Goya saw "vulgarities" as 
things that needed to be banished, i.e., in my terminology, objected. There can be no 
question that Goya viewed a "work of caprices" -  of imagination or fantasy -  as a 
suitable framework, for a truth-based satirical action geared to, let's use his word 
again, "banish" social i’ ;s, vulgarities, and irrational convictions.
In his advertisement, Goya uses the word "censure" (censura) not banish, but 
criticism, even when sympathetic and constructive, is always an act of permanent 
or provisional rejection, and censure is one degree up from criticism -  as states the 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, it is to 'criticize unfavourably' and to 'condemn' 
(1964:282). In brief, it is an act of rejection -  banishment -  in everything but name. 
And what is Goya censuring? He calls them "common" or "vulgar falsehoods" 
(embustes vulgares) -  a close synonym for the "harmful vulgarities" (vulgaridades per- 
judiciales) of the drawing -  and he mingles them with other epithets ("errors", 
"vices", "prejudices" and "eccentricities" [by which I understand him to mean ir­
regular or abnormal conduct]) to declare the direction of his censuring action. He is 
the typical satirist, adopting both a belligerent stance and a high moral line to 
awaken and, ideally, reform a society he views as wayward by letting it look at 
what-it-does-not-want-to-be.
Goya robs his censuring action of its specificity by claiming that such errors 
occur "in every civil society" and by stating, in a delicate and ambiguous fashion, 
that he has not in Los Caprichos sought to ridicule particular individuals. But here 
he complicates matters by shifting attention away from himself onto the public, 
making it seem that he would be justified in finding his public ignorant if they 
thought for one minute that he had ridiculed particular individuals. He upholds 
one of satire's most characteristic principles: that its attack is never particular. If it
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was, he implies, the artist would compromise his own talent (i.e., inventiveness) 
and give the public a false impression of the way imitation is used to produce "per­
fect" works -  works, no doubt, that express the artist's fancy.
hr all these respects, then, Goya's advertisement shows him to be a typical satir­
ist. Further, it establishes that Goya believed art could function to banish (abject) 
harmful beliefs and all manner of social ills, errors and vices. I must, however, 
short-circuit tire impulse to turn immediately to a visual analysis of his etchings to 
illuminate these points, since I still have to configure my methodology.
To continue the process of establishing a historical dimension for abjection, my 
next step is to introduce the Grotesque, I look at its development from paintings 
found during the Renaissance in the buried ruins of Rome, and its growth from a 
decorative style to a mode of intrapsychic expression. Then I briefly outline its evo- 
Ititibiv in  Spain, emphasising its relational position to the dominant art mode of 
iNeo-classicism, which permitted it to exist if only as an antithetical model through 
which Neo-classicism could strengthen its artistic hegemony. With this historical 
foundation in place, I turn to those writers (e.g., John Ruskin and Mikhail Bakhtin) 
who have investigated the mode both contextually and conceptually, I use Philip 
Thomson's work on the Grotesque to consolidate the discussion and to point out 
how the abjecting function of satire operates in the Grotesque. At this juncture satire 
and the Grotesque meet quite neatly, but since I have claimed that the Grotesque 
also usefully represents the "condition to be abject", I take my examination of the 
mode further by looking at the grotesque body, the primary abject(ed) object of 
satire and the Grotesque.
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TIT. The Grotesque: More about the Operation to Abject; 
also the Condition to be Abject
The Grotesque13 is a complex mode14 in artistic expression; it has endured for cen­
turies under a variety of guises, and, in the hands of twentieth-century artists, 
writers and theorists, continues to develop, transmute and diversify. It is a mode 
that has always been acknowledged in one way or another, although it has come a 
long way since the days when its range was restricted to the margins of manuscripts 
and maps, or the parapets of cathedrals15. History has shunted the Grotesque from
13 At the outset I must expand a little on this term "the Grotesque". Throughout this section I 
use an upper-case letter to at least exaggerate the visual form of the noun to express its prob­
lematic nature. Of course, I may only entrench its stability. I must, therefore, make the obvious 
point that there is no such thing as the Grotesque. At most there are grotesques. The multiva­
lency of the term cannot tolerate a linguistic construction that reeks of finality and authority. 
Language often fails to support and carry the subtleties of those complexes of impressions and 
feelings to which it affixes labels. Grammatical construction inhibits the freeplay the term 
requires, and some languages prohibit it more than others. English, with its invariable article -  
which sustains the totemism of the singular regardless of whether its subject is singular or 
plural-is a prime example. At the same time, this phallocentric article has its uses; still more 
clarity would be lost if one tried to form sentences on the topic without once referring to it in 
the singular. 'The Grotesque' specifies a quasi-tradition, a history and a concept in a way that 
no alternative can. For example, take the possible solution offered by the noun grotesqueness. 
Instead of saying, 'Goya's etchings demonstrate a distinct love of the Grotesque', one could 
say, ‘Goya's etchings demonstrate a distinct love of grotesqueness'. The problem with this 
modification is obvious: whereas 'the Grotesque' immediately calls to mind a body of history 
and criticism, 'grotesqueness' simply denotes the relatively undefined attributes of an unspeci­
fied object; stranded outside both historical and critical discourse because it has not been used 
often enough within these precincts, it seems closer to everyday speech than theory.
These are some of the complications. A term taken for granted loses even the little preci­
sion it might have possessed; when a writer introduces examples into a text to elaborate a point 
grafted from a never-defined concept (e.g., the Grotesque), readers can hardly be expected to 
benefit deeply from the subsequent argument.
14 I u s ' the word "mode" advisedly. There has been debate about what exactly the Gro­
tesque is -  a genre, a style, a movement, what? 1 understand it as a mode in the way Fredric 
Jameson describes the term in his essay 'Magical Narratives: Romance as genre':
when we speak of a mode, what can we mean but that this particular type of literary dis­
course is not bound to the conventions of a given age, nor indissolubly linked to a given 
type of verbal artifact, but rather persists as a temptation and a mode of expression 
across a whole range of historical periods, seeming to offer itself, if only intermittently, as 
a formal possibility which can be revived and renewed. (Quoted in Jackson, 1981:7)
15 Of course, one can question whether the placement of the Grotesque in the margins in 
medieval times constituted as marginal, i.e., peripheral, a location as modern writers might 
initially assume. In this regard see Michael Camille's Image on the Edee. in which he argues
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its peripheral locale into the centre of certain modem practices -  notably the "trauma 
art" of which Hal Foster writes in The Return of the Real (1996) -  where its relevance 
to our understanding of the darker, more arcane and symbolically backstage aspects 
of human thought and expression has emerged more fully. In Goya's day, how­
ever, the Grotesque was a marginal mode with a specific past and a questionable 
future. In its interstitiality one can already perceive its relevance for a methodology 
centred around a sociopsychological operation of exclusion serving the purpose of 
strengthening (or centralising) a society's system of order. I establish further nodes 
of relevance in the discussions below.
*  *  *
What is today recognised as the Grotesque first emerged as a style of embellish­
ment in the years of imperial Rome. According to Geoffrey Harpham, in On the 
Grotesque: Strategies of Contradiction in Art and Literature (1982), the style
appeared in Rome about 100 B.C. [It] consisted of graceful fantasies, symmetrical 
anatomical impossibilities, small beasts, human heads, and delicate, indetermi­
nate vegetables, all presented as ornament with a faintly mythological character 
imparted by representations of fauns, nymphs, satyrs, and centaurs. (25-26)
The style proved popular; it lingered till the reign of Nero, when Fabullus 
adopted it to decorate Nero's Golden Palace (Harpham, 1982:23-25). After the fall 
of the Roman empire, however, it receded into oblivion.
It was not until the fifteenth century that this form of decoration was rediscov­
ered, and since some of it was found in cavem-like spaces, it was given the name 
grotteselie (from grotto, i,e., cave)16. Vasari, in his Lives, explains:
Not long after, in digging near S. Pier ad Vincola among the ruins of the palace 
of Titus, they found some rooms roofed in, covered with grotesques, small fig­
that while one shouldn't view the margins of medieval art as necessarily subversive, they 
were more than decorative, for '[t]he centre is . . .  dependent upon the margins for its con­
tinued existence' (1992:10).
16 Most of these so-called grottoes were not truly grottoes, i.e., caves, of either natural or 
human manufacture, but buried ruins (see Harpham, 1982:27).
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ures and scenes in stucco . . . These grotesques, so called from being found in 
grottoes, [were] executed with design, variety and fancy. . .  (1980, vol. 4:9)17
What Vasari calls the "Titus Baths" was actually the Golden Palace of Nero18,
one of the most influential 'grottoes' uncovered during the early Renaissance.
Frances K. Barasch describes the Palace in her introduction to Thomas Wright's A
History of Caricature and Grotesque in Literature and Art:
The ceiling grotesques . . . were the fantastic designs which adorned compart­
ments arranged in a variety of geometrical shapes. Within the compartments 
were landscapes of pagan divinities in pastoral settings. Surrounding the entire 
surface of these compartments were intricately patterned decorations of fantastic 
invention -  satyrs, cupids, fruits, foliage, festoons, frets, knots, and bows. (1968: 
XXIII-XXIV)
Such elements as "satyrs, fruits, foliage, festoons, frets, knots and bows" soon 
became the stock-in-trade of Renaissance grottesclw. Whimsical entities such as mon­
sters, chimeras, masks, animals and allegorical figures were incorporated within 
designs that interwove sculptural forms with botanical elements. The nature of the 
style is manifest in the dense decorative panels the painter Pintoricchio used to 
embellish the borders and margins of the frescoes he produced in  1502 for the 
Pkcolomini library of the Siena Cathedral19.
17 In response to Vasari's statement that "grotesque" derives from "grotto", it is worth intro­
ducing Walter Benjamin's comment in his seminal The Origin of German Tragic Drama that 
the grotesque 'is not derived from grotta in the literal sense, but from the "burial" . . .  which 
the cave or grotto expresses' (1977:171). In Benjamin's view the origin of the word 'grotesque' 
is inextricably trussed with sinister and underground connotations. This connection between 
grottoes and the object Kristeva views as the supreme form of abjection, viz., the corpse, 
should be noted for later application (in my examination of the Desastres).
18 See Haipham (1982:23-25) for a brief explanation of how early explorers of the Roman 
'grottoes' mistook the of Nero's palace.
19 For an image of PJi wtK brio's grotesque pilasters se,.i Frederick Hartt, 1994:357, colour- 
plate 68. Incidentally, the word grottesche was used for the first time in Pintoricchio's con­
tract for the frescoes (see Barasch, 1971:20-21; and Murray &. Murray, 1984:181).
For a somewhat offbeat view of the artist Pintoricchio see Dan Simmons' novel Summer of 
Night (1991). Simmons, quoting unspecified writings by Benvenuto Cellini, describes Pintor­
icchio as a 'deaf and undersized little artist' (197) who found inspiration for his decorations -  
'grotesques' (199) -  in the Borgia apartments beneath the city of Rome, i.e., in the 'unholy sub­
terranean caverns, or grotte' (199). In Simmons' mind -  and this is the interesting part as far as 
this thesis is concerned -  there is a direct link between Pintoricchio's grotesques and the vilest
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The density, sophistication and volume of Pintoricchio's Siena groitesche informs 
us that, only a few years after its discovery, the decorative20 Roman style -  which 
offered a compelling and eccentric solution to the problems posed by the borders of 
frescoes and other wall spaces requiring adornment -  had gained popularity and was 
being pursued by notable artists, including Luca Signorelli, Perino del Vaga21 and, 
most notable of all, Raphael.
Raphael's adoption of grottesche for the Vatican marked a vertex in the evolu­
tion of "grotesque" ornament, triggering what Barasch, in The Grotesque: A Study 
in Meanings, characterises as 'a  chain reaction all over Europe among students and. 
patrons of Italian art' (1971:24). Elsewhere, Barasch describes the spread of the Gro­
tesque to the point where 'all Europe's wealthy men adorned their stately homes in 
grotesques, some based on the ancients, some on Raphael's style, others entirely 
unique' (in Wright, 1968:XXV). Wolfgang Kayser, in his The Grotesque in  Art and 
Literature, claims that grotesque decoration 'conquered all the artistic genres sus­
ceptible to the ornamental style' (1963:22).
Despite this evident interest in grotesque embellishment, there was a concur­
rent stream of opinion that frowned on the style and denounced it because it fell 
short of verisimilitude and depicted non-existent things. This view was braced and 
promoted with reference to the Roman architect, Vitruvius22, who in his De Archi-
evil, personified in his novel by the Borgia Bell. For the sake of the novel, Pintoricchio's gro­
tesques are seen as 'designs' that 'served to contain the Stele's p.e., the Bell's] evil while allow­
ing the [Borgia] family to benefit from [its] power' (263). Such a conception of grotesque orna­
ment may be fictional, hut it demonstrates that even a writer of this modem age can still fted 
something dark, subterranean, unholy and evil in the sty ie.
20 I use the term "decorative" primarily to signify the style's ornamental function, not to 
define the strih as light and frothy -  the jury is still out on the question of whether this art 
was merely s r.aellishment or did indeed have the sinister connotations Benjamin (footnote 
17) and Simmons (footnote 19) associate with it. The fact that we have this paradox in itself 
shifts the Grotesque mode out of the 'merely7 decorative and points to its ability to frustrate 
easy conclusions - .an ability I will in due course make significant
21 Vasari describes Perino del Vaga as a master of ornament, stucco and 'the arabesques in 
the caves' (1980, vol. 3:122; the life of Perino del Vaga cover: pages 120 to 140).
22 See Barasch (in Wright, 1968:XXVII-XXIX; also 1971:28-30) for a brief discussion of the
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tectum, of ca. 27 B.C., demonstrated nothing but scorn for such ornamentation:
On the stucco are monsters rather than definite representations taken from defi­
nite things. Instead of columns there rise up stalks; instead of gables, striped 
panels with curled leaves and volutes. Candelabra uphold pictured shrines and 
above the summits of these, clusters of thin stalks rise from then roots in tendrils 
with little figures seated upon them at random. Again, slender stalks with heads 
of men and animals attached to half tire body.
Such things neither are, nor can be, nor have been. On these lines the new 
fashions compel bad judges to condemn good craftsmanship for dullness. For 
how can a reed actually sustam a roof, or a candelabra the ornaments of a bagle, 
or a soft and slender stalk a seated statue, or how can flowers and half-statues 
rise alternatively from roots and stalks? Yet when people view these falsehoods, 
they approve rather than condemn. (Quoted in Harpham, 1982:26; also in Kay- 
ser, 1963:20)
To Vitruvius' mind, fanciful ornament detracted from nature by undoing such 
accepted laws of physical reality as weight, proportion and relationship. Yet there is 
more at work in the Vitruvian mind than first meets tire eye, and I will use this 
undertone to make the shift from grotesque ornament to the Grotesque as a struc­
ture (and, hence, open a route to abjection).
The above passage informs us that, for Vitruvius, things that are not "definite 
representations taken from definite things" are "monsters" by definition, Such mon­
sters -  if one now looks at the second-last line of the second paragraph -  are "false­
hoods". What is not a mimetically accurate depiction of a real object or relation 
between objects is both untrue and monstrous. Thus we arrive at a fundamental 
characteristic of the Grotesque: its inclination toward environments of the rampant 
imagination, which places it, at least while under the scrutiny of a 'rational' mind, 
on the other side of the threshold between reality and fantasy, and thus between 
reason and unreason23.
change in the appreciation of grottesche after Renaissance scholars had read Vitruvius and 
discovered his less than congenial attitude to the Roman decorative style.
23 It is worth noting that during the Renaissance the designs of grottesche were termed the 
sogiti dei pittori, the "dreams of painters" (Kayser, 1963:21-22). They were thus viewed as
dreams made visible. The style was firmly associated with an irrational or at least sublim­
inal, but nevertheless fertile, process of the mind. In time this rather playful elision of the 
difference between dream and imagination would become a more rigorous emphasis on the 
realm of the irrational in general.
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A second vital characteristic of the Grotesque, also established as a principle by 
grotesque ornament, which comes through descriptively in the passage from T)e 
Architectura, is that of impossible combination. Vitruvius bemoans what the style 
brings together; "candelabra uphold pictured shrines", "clusters of thin stalks rise 
from their roots in tendrils with little figures seated upon them at random". He 
also questions the relations between objects and their supports: "how can a reed 
actually sustain a roof?" Lastly, most significantly, he questions how two disparate 
things can share botanical origms: "how can flowers and half-statues rise alterna­
tively from roots and stalks?" What bothers Vitruvius is the way grotesque orna- 
mc Vi undoes recognised, rational and empirical relations between objects in the 
real world. He has no tolerance for a pictorial world that does not mimic visible 
realitv24.
I would infer from this that Vitruvius felt a little threatened by the ability of 
such ornament to establish an alternative world -  a world of fantasy depicted in a 
fantasy mode which played by different rules to that of the rational, mimetic set 
which Vitruvius championed. If it was outside this presumably dominant set, then 
the style can be seen to have flourished in a margin. From there it would have chal­
lenged the central area not only of paintings undertaken according to a different, 
more culturally favoured and promoted aesthetic, but of a particular dominant 
culture25. The grotesque, even as a Roman style without name, already offered a 
    _
24 For him, those who support the decorative style and "condemn good craftsmanship" 
(i.e., mimesis) for "dullness" are "bad judges". In this regard his stance is antithetical to 
Goya's: the reader will remember -  and this is a point I return to in Section IV of this chap­
ter -  that, in his advertisement for Los Caprichos, Goya upheld "artifice" and "fancy" (imagi­
nation) above the "servile" copying of nature. Vitruvius would undoubtedly have frowned 
on Goya for this reason, but I will remind the reader that I have already claimed, and will 
claim again, that Goya used imagination to champion reason.
25 FLrpham perceives such a threat within the spatial distribution of grottesche, that is, in 
the claim it makes from the embellishing margins on the centre occupied by mythological 
and history painting: 'The ambivalent presence of meaning within the. ostensibly meaning­
less form Constitutes the real threat, and the real revolution, of grottesche' (1982:31). More gen­
erally, this stance is supported by Ronald Paulson in Representations of Revolution: 'All the 
categories that transcend the beautiful -  tire picturesque, grotesque, even sublime -  tend to
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world of impossible intermixture, volatile combination and anarchic dissolution; it 
was already a hazardous muddler of categories, orders and systems, a force whose 
capacity to overturn known and accepted ways of understanding the world comes 
to the fore in the vitriolic tone Vitruvius had to assume to squash (abject) i t
This capacity of the grotesque to challenge norms and standard perceptions 
would in time become a primary characteristic of the mode. Between the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries the term already dilated considerably in both an adjec­
tival and a noun sense to describe subject and object, feelings in the apprehending 
subject, and configurations in the changing art object26. It took on the properties 
of a psychological, bodily formation that could be engaged by images; it became 
a category of response and feeling, and in the territory of the art object the Gro­
tesque element in the ornamental style came more to the fore, and what was once 
considered a mere support for more serious compositions or a light visual stimu­
lus to ease the mind and eye27, became a subject matter in  itself28, Before, it was
invoke energy as opposition, as something that breaks through rules or barriers' (1983:175).
26 For Barasch, this shift in the signifying boundaries of the Grotesque began with Vasari:
When "grotesque" was used by Vasari in connection with Michelangelo's new composite 
style, its meaning was extended from a specific designation for the architectural and 
ornamental paintings of the ancients and for the Renaissance imitations to a conceptual 
term for irrational or irregular inventions, (in Wright, 1968:XXVI-XXVII; emphases added; 
also see 1971:30)
There can be no question that the shift to viewing grotesques as "irrational or irregular 
inventions" charts a movement from stylistic concerns to psychological ones, extending the 
decoration from the wall to its maker and the maker's conception of a world in which 
reason and regularity are of minimal interest. The view is not, however, Vitruvian, for here 
anti-nature seems to be favoured - a view that history would moderate.
27 See Harpham (1982:30-43) for a discussion of the functions of ornament, where he argues 
that grottesche became so engaging to the eye that it threatened the centrality of the major 
compositions it was there merely to enhance. In this one can already foresee the future elev­
ation of such subject matter to a non-supporting role. Also revisit footnote 25 above.
- 28 Although it seems to me that it remained somewhat on the fringes, for example, in the 
graphic arts (e.g., the etchings of Callot and, later, Goya himself). In painting after Bruegel it 
is relatively rare; despite the outbreak of works dealing with the supernatural and the 
sublime among the Romantics -  and even supposedly Neo-classical painters such as Ingres
- images in the nature of Fuseli's Nightmare are not met with often, nor, of course, are paint­
ings like Goya's witchcraft scenes and the later "Black Paintings”. My reference here is, need­
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the visual matrix of the decoration that mattered -  its ability to fill marginal spaces
-  riot what it potentially connoted. Today, even in this era that so contorts ques­
tions of interpretative authority, connotation is essential and it is as much the idea 
of grotesqueness as the look of a visual image that will generate the Grotesque (in 
its modified ambivalent and disjunctive sense).
It is important to recognise that the teleological shift from decoration to expres­
sion marks a change in the Grotesque from a 'style' to a 'mode'.
The thesis has already reached some important terrain, and we can already fore­
see how the Grotesque's connection with the monstrous and the challenge it offers 
to a dominant (mimetic) tradition might relate positionally and interrelationally to 
the place of abjection in  society. Now, before discussing the theorists who have con­
tributed most to our understanding of this Grotesque terrain, I need -  given that 
Goya was a Spaniard -  to briefly outline the development of the Grotesque in Spain.
*  *  *
According to Andrew Schulz, in his doctoral thesis. Perception, Satire, and the
Grotesque Body in Goya's 'Caprichos', grottesche 'first appeared in Spain in the
1530s, in the decoration of the royal apartments in the Alhambra' (1996:145), and
was still favoured in  Goya's time, when Jos6 del Castillo was commissioned to
design tapestry panels for the Sola Pompeyana (Pompeian Room) in Carlos TV's
royal apartments (147). Nor was Castillo's task the only one of its kind executed
towards the end of the eighteenth century; Schulz informs us that grotesques
also were present in the decorations of the two casitas built on the Escorial grounds 
during these years, particularly in the ceilings by the Valendan artist Vincente 
G6mez, who described these works as "imitating the grotesque style of the cele­
brated Raphael of Urbino." (147)
In his article 'Concepts of the Grotesque before Goya', Paul Die adds a further
less to say, to 'high' art, not to that of popular culture, which more often than not has a 
decidedly different face, particularly since it endorses material that would never be admit 
ted (at least, not unchanged) into the domain of history painting or moral prints.
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dimension to the conception of the Grotesque in eighteenth-century Spain. Limit­
ing his framework for the Grotesque to the 'imagistic phenomenology of deforma­
tion' (1976zz:186), he finds elements of the trope in four specific categories of activity:
(1) 'the semi-folkloric creations of mass entertainment', involving camivalesque 
practices such as masked street parades; (2) moralistic caricature in literature; (3) 
lexical devices that concentrate the 'rationale of deformation'29 in words (e.g., 
"bufdn" [buffoon or fool]) or phrases (e.g., "hospital de locos" [insane asylum]); (4) 
literature that is not grotesque bu t nevertheless 'manifests a sensibility running 
counter to the neoclassical values of moderation and order' (188)30. Hie argues that 
while '[t]he retentive strength of neoclassical values held these grotesque impulses 
in check' (191), the Grotesque continued to exist and. -  primarily owing to the atten­
tion paid to it, even in Neo-classical treatises, where it was frequently used as the 
model against which to contrast 'collectively approved rules of taste and imitation' 
(198) -  found a place in a variety of discourses, from 'low' to 'high'. What is impor­
tant to note is Hie's contention that the Grotesque was in opposition to the orderly 
norms and standards of Neo-classicism, and that Neo-classicists used it in the 
sense of an antithesis -  as the thing to judge "collectively approved rules" against. I 
will pick up this point in  a moment,
The emergence of the grotesque in  discourse, Hie asserts, can be traced in the de­
velopment of the word 'grotesco' in the Spanish language: '[a]t the beginning of the 
century, lexicographers barely recognized that "grotesco" had currency' (192) be­
yond an association with the "extravagant" and "ridiculous"31, and by 1734 it was
29 I derive the phrase from Rudolph Arnheiiti's article in the special issue on caricature 
edited by Judith Wechsler and published in tire Winter 1983 edition of Art Journal.
30 Discussion of the four categories covers pages 187 to 189 of Hie's article.
31 Its repertory of forms was, however, clearly defined: so much is obvious in the following 
quote from Palomino's 1717 book £1 Museo Pktorico y Escala Optica, in which he refers to
grotesques [consisting] of various shoots, leaves, stems, and brackets, composed with 
artifice and wit, and other different adornments, with griffins, satyrs, fauns, sylphs, cen-
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only understood as a 'strictly limited category of visual elements compounded artifi­
cially but patterned on the natural world' (Eie, 1976a:192)32 -  a perspective on the 
mode's combinatory procedure that smacks of Vitruvius, without his strict division 
between ornament and the visible world. The 1787 Dictiomrio Castellano. . .  tie Cien- 
cias y  Artes extended the term, describing it as 'that which pertains to grottoes, and, in 
painting, engraving and sculpture, what is called grotesque is that which brings with it 
a type of fantasy and caprice . . .  Also . . .  that which is extravagant and ridiculous'33 
(quoted in Bie:193). The following year Rejdn de Silva provided this definition of the 
grotesque (under "Foliage" [foliage]) in his Dictiomrio de las Nobles Aries:
Adornment consisting of shoots, tattered leaves, satyrs, grubs and other insects. 
The style is called Grotesque because it was found in the grottoes and under­
ground passages of Rome; it is also called "Brutesco" because of the brutish ani­
mals that appear in if34, (quoted in Ilie:193).
The Spanish conception of the Grotesque had readied basically this point by 
the time Goya began work on Los Caprichos, but, as Hie points out (193-94), it was
tarns, grubs and other diverse and exquisite insects, whose reflection cannot be found in 
rerum Nature but only in the imagination of the artificer (los grotescos de varios cogollos, 
hojas, tallos, y  cartelas, artificiosa y  galanamente compuestas, y  otros diferentes adomos, 
con grifos, satiros, faunos, silvanos, centauros, bichas y  otras varias y exquisitas sabandi- 
jas, cuya semejanza no hay in rerum Nature sino solamente en la idea del artifice) (quoted 
inllie:195).
This repertory is conspicuously similar to the one I listed in my earlier discussion of the 
emergence of grotesque ornament in Renaissance Italy. One should also note the sovereignty 
Palomino grants to the imagination of the artist, and the word he uses to describe an artist who 
does not follow "Natura": "artificer". Goya, as we have seen and will see again in due course, 
uses the same term to describe the imaginative artist in his newspaper advertisement for Los 
Capriclios.
32 The entry in the 1734 Dictiomrio de Autoridades defines grotesco as the 'imitation of 
crude and uncultivated things, such as brambles and grottoes . . .  a type of ornament. . .  
comprised of various leaves, rocks, and other things, such as snails and other insects' ('imi- 
tacidn de cosas toscas, e incultas, como brenas y grutas . . .  especie de adomo . . .  compuesto 
de varias hojas, penascos y otras cosas, como caracoles y otros insectos') (quoted in Ilie:192).
33 The original Spanish text reads; To que pertenece a gruta, y en  la Pintura, Talladura, y 
Escultura se llama grotesco aquello que trae consigo una especie de fantasia y capricho . .  . 
Tambien. . .  lo que es extravagante y ridlculo'.
34 Adorno de cogollos, hojas harapadas, satiros, bichas y  otras sabandijas, Llamanse Gru- 
tescos, por haberse hallado esta moda en las grutas y subterraneas de Roma; como 
tambien Brutescos, por los animales brutos que en el se introducen.
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one term in a trio that included fantasia and capricho3*, all of which referred to 'the 
phenomenology of irrational expression' (194). For Hie, let me emphasise again, the 
Grotesque was a mode that 'ran counter to the neoclassical values of moderation 
and order' (188), and was therefore irrational in contrast to the dominant Neo-clas­
sical mode.
Irrationality is not innate to the Grotesque; it emerges in this light solely as a 
result of the mode's contrariness to the mimetic (Neo-classical and Rococo) values 
that held sway in Goya's time. These upheld the natural world (as the subject of 
still life and portraiture) and religious or mythologising narratives as primary, 
whereas the Grotesque found its stock-in-trade in the kinds of sources Hie lists, 
three of which I wiH repeat here: (1) "the semi-folkloric creations of mass entertain­
ment", involving carnivalesque practices such as masked street parades; (2) moral­
istic caricature in  literature; (3) lexical devices that concentrate the "rationale of de­
formation" in words (e.g., "bufdn" [buffoon]) or phrases (e.g., "hospital de locos" 
[insane asylum]). Goya uses all of these sources in his own satirical prints, but for 
the sake of bolstering reason, not whimsy. In the process he cuts against lingering 
Neo-classical "moderation and order", but only at the level of art. At the level of 
moral purpose, I would claim he presents himself as moderate and orderly.
To sum up: tire Spanish conception of the term 'grotesque' incorporated all 
aspects of the Grotesque that emerged in my dissection of the passage from Vitru­
vius: an emphasis on impossible combinations of animals, plants and fantasy crea­
tures -  satyrs, sylphs and griffins sharing leaves, shoots and rocks with snails, 
grubs and other insects -  and a stress on the irrational and irregular, evident in 
such adjectives as "uncultivated", "brutish" and "ridiculous". Other associations, 
incorporating caprice, fantasy, deformation and the monstrous, join this list, creat­
35 Terms that the 1787 Viccionario Castellano had used to describe the Grotesque, and 
which Goya would employ in the course of the 1790s; both appear, in one form or another, 
in the advertisement for Los Caprichos, I will examine the terms and the significance of 
Goya's use of them in Section IV of this chapter.
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ing the impression of an underground, subterranean form, of production that, by 
definition, exists below the high watermark of Reason> cultivation, rationality and 
all the other refinements of the Enlightenment. The Grotesque is a thing of grottoes 
and caves; it flourishes beneath the strata formed by ilustracidn (enlightenment) 
and Neo-classical values. It is the foil, the model of instruction, the example against 
which Neo-classicism defines itself. This (the Grotesque) is everything that Neo- 
classicism is not -  everything that it must exclude from its sources, formulations 
and aspirations. The Grotesque is necessary to the dominant artistic mode, but only 
to mark this mode's limits -  the point beyond which it must not pass if it is to 
remain true to itself. In this sense, as fonii, the Grotesque is used instructively, but 
as content it is shunted aside and repressed as a legitimate form of expression -  as Hie 
puts it: '[t]he retentive strength of neoclassical values h e ld . . .  grotesque impulses in 
check' (1976a:191). But a forfeited, underground existence of this sort is still an exist­
ence, and &e Grotesque continued to develop (for example, through the fashion­
able interest in witchcraft) in Goya's Spain, despite its passive, comparative status. 
As a possibly furtive, possibly rootless, possibly duplicitous artificer, it scurried in 
the walls of the larger structure of Neo-classicism36.
Goya, I would contend, understood that, as marginal and repressed, the Gro­
tesque appeared, in its radical alterity to the dominant mimetic mode, as a source 
of fascination, as a lure that could capture the viewer's attention long enough for 
him or her to penetrate the veil of fantasy and discern the moral beneath. As I have 
already suggested, Goya used the Grotesque's barrier-breaking energy to champion a 
cause of morality that, while not wholeheartedly enlightened or reactionary, was 
nevertheless in the pocket of Reason, and was thus not underground in relation to 
dominant thinking. This is a point I will stress throughout the visual analyses in
36 It is impossible for me to clarify this connection here, but I want the reader to note that 
the relationship in which the Grotesque stands to Neo-classicism is structurally the same as 
the relationship in which the abject stands to society, the latter needing the former to define 
and restrict its own form  and purpose, while at the same time denying and excluding it.
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the forthcoming parts, and which I consolidate in  the epilogue.
The brief history of the Grotesque I have offered over the last few pages is the 
best I can do for now as far as historiography is concerned, and all I believe to be 
required for this current project. It situates the trope and demonstrates that its form, 
and iconography were derived from what were considered to be irregular and irra­
tional, even unconscious (dream), sources. Thus I have already established, if only 
rhetorically, a connection between the form in which the Grotesque was expressed 
and the repressed, i.e., abject, areas of mental activity.
What I want to do now is look at a select group of critics -  Ruskin, Kayser, Bakhtin 
and others -  who have attempted to define the term 'grotesque' itself. By meanf/ of 
this examination I hope to clarify and develop those aspects of the Grotesque that 
have ah'eady emerged. In the process I will flush out more connections between the 
Grotesque and the abject and move the discussion closer to consolidation.
*■ *  *
No-one (other than Vitruvius, perhaps) has argued about the merits and demerits 
of the Grotesque with more fire than John Ruskin, the nineteenth-century English 
critic. His position on the matter gleams through the following quotes from his 
Lectures on Art (where he clearly uses the word "burlesque" as a synonym for 
grotesque):
there is one strange, but quite essential, character in us:. . .  a delight in the forms 
of burlesque which are connected in some degree with the foulness of evil. 
(1910:18)
in connection with our simplicily and good humour, and partly with that very 
love of the grotesque Which debases our ideal, we have a sympathy with the 
lower animals which is peculiarly our own. (21)
And yet you will find that whenever Englishmen are wholly without this instinct 
[of burlesque], their genius is comparatively weak and restricted. (18)
Ruskin is something of a curiosity: in the history of criticism one would be hard 
pressed to find a critic more prepared to use the principles of his religious belief 
system as the standard to judge the success or failure of works of art. Yet his name
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is synonymous with the Grotesque. He is constantly referred to. A s recently as 
1989, Bernard McElroy, author of Fiction of the Modem Grotesque, claimed Fus­
ion's .theories of the Grotesque to be more "valuable" than those of Kayser and Bakh­
tin (2). W hat is the reason for Fusion's enduring interest? The above quotations 
from his Lectures On Art point to an answer.
Despite the directives of his faith, Fuskin felt ambivalent about the Grotesque. 
Even when he mentioned it as briefly as he does in the Lectures, he could not ob­
fuscate that it pulled him in opposing directions. On the one hand, he saw it as an 
aberration that (mis)led artists to overly excite their imaginations, so denying his 
ideal of a good English Christian art; on the other hand, he freely admitted that it 
contributed to the "genius" of the artist?7. In The Stones of Venice he went as far as 
to write:
I believe that there is no test of greatness in periods, nations, or men, more sure 
than the development, among them or in them, of a noble grotesque; and no test 
of comparative smallness or limitation . . . more sure than the absence of gro­
tesque invention, or incapability of understanding it. (1886:158)
With this statement Fuskin claims the Grotesque as a r tans of measuring the 
"greatness" or "smallness" of an artistic age. But it is important to be clear on the 
issue: Fusion's appreciation of the Grotesque is not holistic; true to his dialectical 
approach to the subject, he demarcates it into "noble" and "ignoble" forms (1886:p«s- 
sim). In The Stones of Venice he reproduces drawings of two sculpted heads to 
demonstrate the difference between the two types, and adopts the same strategy in 
Modem Painters (1907:97-103) to compare two griffins. In  the latter instance, he 
employs the*terms "true" and "false" to discriminate between the noble and ignoble.
3// Harpham provides an interesting explanation for Raskin's ambivalence to the Gro­
tesque:
Grotesque is the name Ruskin gives to a "monotheistic" art that, although it takes many 
forms, issues from  a single source. Because of this comprehensive unity, it stands, even in 
its most debased forms, close to some originating creative power that might be called di­
vine. This proximity to a unified source compelled Ruskin always to be if not respectful 
at leasthumble before the awesome power of the grotesque, which was capable of bring­
ing mankind near to God or to bestial cretinism. (1982:185)
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This agonistic relation, with "genius" on the one hand and utter "debasement" on 
the other, discloses Ruskin's most important dialectic, that between the fearful (ter­
rible) and the ludicrous (sportive) grotesque. In The Stones of Venice he writes:
it seems to me that the grotesque is . . .  composed of two elements, one ludicrous, 
the other fearful: that, as one or other of these elements prevails, the grotesque 
falls into two branches, sportive grotesque and terrible grotesque; but that we cannot 
legitimately consider it under these two aspects, because there are hardly any ex­
amples which do not in some degree combine both elements: there are few gro­
tesques so utterly playful as to be overcast with no shade of fearfulness, and few so 
fearful as absolutely to exclude all ideas ot jest. But although we cannot separate 
the grotesque itself into two branches, we may easily examine separately the two 
conditions of mind which it seems to combine; and consider successively what are 
the kinds of jest, and what the kinds of fearfulness, which may be legitimately ex­
pressed in the various walks of a rt. . .  (1886:126; emphases added.)
This key paragraph contains perceptions that almost all subsequent writers on 
the Grotesque have taken up in one way or another. Ruskin himself went on to 
relate the ludicrous ("sportive") and fearful ("terrible") forms of the Grotesque to 
the types of play undertaken by four classes of "men": (1) "those who play wisely",
(2) those "who play necessarily", (3) those "who play inordinately", -nd (4) those 
"who do not play at all" (127-30). Of these classes, one and four were the only ones 
whom he believed capable of "noble" play (and, hence, capable of creating the "ter­
rible" grotesque); the other two classes were, in  his view, close to degenerate, since 
they played with their imaginations for the sake of financial survival or simply to 
gratify their own frivolous taste for the bizarre38. As McElroy states, Ruskin's dialec­
tic hereby ended in 'obscurpng] the original point by morally dividing the noble 
play of a mind at r e s t . . . from the ignominious play of tire hedonist indulging 
himself' (1989:12-13).
Despite the stranglehold Ruskin's faith had on his concept of the Grotesque, the 
above passage shows that he viewed the fearful and sportive grotesque as insepar­
ably combined; their individ jal appearance depended not on instability or bifurca­
38 Ruskin's most glamorous example of this last type of man -  the type who plays inordi­
nately -  is none other than Raphael. Ruskin describes Raphael's grotesques in the Vatican 
loggias as 'an elaborate and luscious form of nonsense' (1886:136).
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tion within the category itself but on the use to which the human mind put the cate­
gory. The integrity of the creative producer determined the expressive character of 
Grotesque subject matter.
This much is apparent, for example, in Ruskin's investigation of the state of 
mind that produces the "terrible" grotesque (1886:136-58). At this point his theory 
tangles with a theological relation opposing the love of God to the fear of sin and 
death. This concept of fear informs his distinction between the "noble" play with 
terror M id  the "ignoble" play with terror. He associates the former with "men" 
who are so close to God that "noble" terror can enter their "play" even in moments 
oHcjv-te -  what he terms 'involuntary or pre-determined apathy' (140). By con­
trast, "uvV" whose minds are not directed by God, and who thus have littie per­
spective on sin, cannot produce anything but "ignoble" forms of the Grotesque 
since, in the absence of the correct relationship to God -  no matter how intensely 
they may exercise their faculties -  their goal is, in Ruskin's words, 'frivolous' (143)39.
This sermonistic interpretation of Grotesque forms is interesting for two rea­
sons: (1) it induces Ruskin to hold an appealing modem attitude that favours the 
coarsely expressive Grotesque over the over'-'-refined40, and (2) it establishes a rela­
tion in which those who cannot "play" to the glory of God are themselves debased
39 This affects the way different "men" play with terror and the grotesque in the following 
maimer:
the master of the noble grotesque knows the depth of all at which he ceeins to mock, and 
would feel it at another time, or feel it in a certain undercurrent of thought even while he 
jests with it; hut the workman of the ignoble grotesque can feel and understand nothing, 
and mocks at all things with the laughter of the idiot and the cretin. (1886:140)
What Ruskin opposes here are two types of mockery. That of the "master of the noble 
grotesque" does not appear to involve laughter; it is mockery in the name of an understand- 
irsg of his subject and a definite "noble" goal. That of the "workman of the ignoble gro­
tesque" is mockery for the sake of laughter -  a laughter not subversive or uplifting, but which 
merely degrades its maker, turning him into a "cretin".
40 Ruskin's analysis of two griffins in Modern Painters (1907:97-103) is wonderfully subtle, 
and utterly persuasive as he argues for the merits of the more crudely carved griffin over 
those of the more polished, but ultimately stylised, version. While one cannot agree with the 
terms behind Ruskin's distinctions ("true" and "false"), the manner in which he promotes 
conviction over style is truly impressive.
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to a sinful, grotesque position. In a curious way Ruskin uses the Grotesque -  itself a 
marginal product of the human imagination -  as a means to determine the value of 
the artistic products of "men". Those who use the Grotesque properly come under 
the favour not only of Ruskin but, in his opinion, of God; those who abuse and 
manipulate it to ends that do not instil fear of the Almighty are no better than 
Adam: sinners in need of the swiftest possible ejection from paradise.
This ability of the Grotesque to both uplift and degrade, which no-one stresses 
as much as Ruskin, is important for an understanding of Goya's use of the Gro­
tesque. Some writers (e.g., Rosen, 1988, and Schulz, 1996) suggest that Goya's willing­
ness to embrace the Grotesque positioned him on the other side of mimesis and the 
Enlightenment. In doing so they, to a variable extent, display a certain unwitting 
allegiance with Ruskin, whose opinion of Goya needs to be interjected now. Ruskin 
evidently considered Goya's grotesque "ignoble" -  so much so that in a (in)famous 
move he burnt a whole edition of Los Caprichos. Cook and Wedderburn, editors of 
the definitive Works of Tohn Ruskin, elaborate:
Ruskin saw in Mr. Ellis's possession [- Mr Ellis was Ruskin's bookseller -] a fine 
copy of Capriccios de Goya, and commented on its hideousness, adding that "it 
was only fit to be burnt." Mr. Ellis agreed with him; and putting the volume into 
the empty grate . . .  he and Ruskin set light to it, and the book was burned to 
ashes. (1909:53n.3)
Ruskin overlooked the obvious moral purpose behind Goya's satirical prints, 
reading them simply as the overly-productive nonsense of a frivolous imagination. 
He saw in Goya's mockery not the laughter of a "master of the noble .grotesque", 
but that of a "cretin" and an "idiot" -  a fool, in short: one better suited to being 
mocked than to mocking (cf. my footnote 39). This represents an extraordinary over­
sight on Ruskin's part, no doubt made possible by Goya's apparent atheism and his 
ability to create a fictional demonic world so convincing in  its own right that it 
smothered -  at least for Ruskin -  all evidence of an underlying moral purpose -  the 
kind of purpose Ruskin saw as essential to the production of a genuinely pure 
'noble' and 'terrible' grotesque. For Ruskin Goya's satire was so unredeemed it
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could only be purged by fire. This view notwithstanding, however, if we peel away 
the layers of Christian belief and extract Ruskin's dialectic between the noble and 
ignoble Grotesque, we have the makings of an interpretation that, for the purposes 
of opposition, comparison and divarication, would pair Goya's satirical Grotesque 
with the ideal of reformulative Reason.
Before leaving Ruskin, I will take another quote from him, this time from Mo­
dern Painters, and request, since I cannot deal with the passage now, that the 
reader make a note of it, for it provides an impressionistic sketch of the terms in 
which a bridge may be built from the Grotesque to the concept of abjection:
A fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols thrown 
together in bold and fearless connection, of truths which it would have taken a 
long time to express in any verbal! way, and of which the connection is left for 
the beholder to work out for himself; the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of 
the imagination, forming the grotesque character. (1907:91)
Possibly the only other writers to have had as much influence as Ruskin on 
modern theorisation of the Grotesque are Wolfgang Kayser and Mikhail Bakhtin. 
In Ms book on the Grotesque, Harpham writes: 'A fledgling grotesquer unaccus­
tomed to ambivalence might be given pause by the juxtaposition of Kayser's study 
and Mikhail Bakhtin's Rabelais and His World' (1982:71). The reason for this is 
simple: Kayser and Bakhtin approach the Grotesque from different points of view. 
In brief, where Kayser finds ominous powers arising from an alienated world, 
Bakhtin finds corporeal, all-devouring laughter.
Bakhtin and Kayser, with no apparent recognition of the fact, slot into the two 
categories of Grotesque propounded by Ruskin: Bakhtin's grotesque is "sportive", 
Kayser's "terrible". The difference is orientation: Bakhtin passes no value judge­
ments on the moral integrity of the "sportive" grotesque, while Kayser's "terrible" 
grotesque is more of a battlefield between good and evil than a site at which, from 
Ruskin's perspective, 'noble souls' might aspire to the sublime.
I will commence my survey of Kayser with the following instructive passage
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from the preface to his The Grotesque in  Art and Literature:
Fifteen years ago, during my first visit to the Prado, my curiosity was aroused, 
although I did not as yet foresee where my future explorations would lead me. 
The same confusing and irritating features appeared over and over again in the 
pictures of Velasquez and Goya as well as in those of Bosch and Bruegel, which 
were collected as early as the sixteenth century [. . .] With that mixed feeling in 
which the pleasure of seeing one's own observations confirmed is mingled with 
regret caused by the realization that one's discovery has been anticipated, I sub­
sequently came upon the passage in the Vorschule der Asthetik . . .  in which Jean 
Paul, without using the word, ascribes a special gift for the grotesque to the 
Spaniards and the English. (1963:9-10)
This reveals that certain works of art in the Prado -  including Goya's -  were the 
starting point for Kayser's investigation of the Grotesque. Furthermore, Kayser con­
cludes his introductory chapter ("The Problem") with a 'mini-tour' of the Prado Mu­
seum, where, as he claims, 'the phenomenon of the grotesque can be experienced . . .  
far more strikingly than in Keller's novellas or Sterne's Tristram Slmndy' (17). Al­
though he ends his 'tour' on the work of Bosch and Bruegel, it is in reference to Goya 
that he offers his decisive comments on the "problem" of the Grotesque:
Much in Goya's etchings is caricatural, satiric, or topical, but none of these cate­
gories provides a fully satisfactory explanation. These etchings contain distinctly 
ominous, nocturnal, and abysmal features that frighten and puzzle us and make 
us feel as if the ground beneath our feet were about to give way. (1963:18)41
Significant as the words "ominous", "nocturnal" and "abysmal" are, what 
strikes me as tire most distinctive feature of this passage is the comment that, while 
viewing a Goya etching, one feels that the ground might give way beneath one's 
feet. The notion of removing stability, solidity -  the lenown -  is vital not only to any 
understanding of the Grotesque but specifically to the one I am developing, and 
readers would do well to keep Kayser's image of shifting ground in mind.
Kayser sees tire Grotesque as a 'comprehensive structural principle of works of 
art' (180) and offers the following comments and definitions:
The grotesque is a structure. Its nature could be summed up in a phrase . , . THE
Kayser is indeed correct that Goya's etellings exceed the satirical or caricatural, but one 
should not overlook the point that Goya introduces this (grotesque) excess to enhance the 
impact of his satire. It is satire that leads him to excess, hence the Grotesque.
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GROTESQUE IS THE ESTRANGED WORLD . . . Suddenness and surprise are essential 
elements of the grotesque. . .  We are so strongly affected and terrified because it is 
our world which ceases to be reliable, and we feel that we would be unable to live 
in this changed world. The grotesque instils fear of life rather than fear of death. . .  
Apocalyptic beasts emerge from the abyss; demons intrude upon us. If we were 
able to name these powers and relate them to the cosmic order, the grotesque 
would lose its essential quality . . . THE GROTESQUE is A PLAY WITH THE ABSURD. It 
may begin in a gay and carefree manner -  as Raphael wanted to play in his gro­
tesques. But it may also carry the player away, deprive him of his freedom, and 
make him afraid of the ghosts which he so frivolously invoked . .  , The darkness 
has been sighted, the ominous powers discovered, the incomprehensible forces 
challenged. And thus we arrive at a final interpretation of the grotesque: AN AT­
TEMPT TO INVOKE AND SUBDUE THE DEMONIC ASPECTS OF THE WORLD. (184-88. 
Emphases in the original.)42
The Grotesque, Kayser believes, springs from unknown and not freely admitted 
areas of experience43 which, when expressed in  art and literature, generate the pic­
ture of an estranged world profoundly alienating to humanity. Precisely because 
these areas of experience are obscured, surprise and suddenness are needed to access 
them. The viewing subject needs to be caught unawares, so that s /h e  does not have 
time to prevent the (visual or textual) stimulus touching her or his subjectivity.
The Grotesque thus requires some degree of indeterminacy -  as soon as it is 
clearly revealed and defined it ceases to be estranged and can no longer be consi­
42 Cf. Paulson:
[the grotesque deals with] a normal world under the influence of demonic forces, with 
familiar elements suddenly transformed into the strange and ominous. But both gothic 
and grotesque focus on the moment of estrangement, the transition between this world 
and that, when plant and human are in metamorphosis and in the process of growing in­
distinguishable. (1983:237)
While most of this passage is heavily influenced by Kayser, the emphasis on metamor­
phosis is Paulson's personal interjection. It is a point that needs to be bom in mind; the early 
writers on the Grotesque by and large did not make much of it, but, in the sense of flux, 
combination, admixture and ambiguity, it will emerge as significant in this thesis.
43 Michael Steig believes much the same tiling of Ruskin: ‘what emerges from his discus­
sion is that the grotesque is an imaginative playing with the forbidden or the inexpressible 
(and perhaps that which is inexpressible is so because it is forbidden?)' (1970:255). I agree 
that Ruskin's examination of the Grotesque hinges around a play between two aspects (the 
"Iudicrous"/"ignoble" and the "fearful"/"noble"), but did not in my reading discern a play 
with tire "forbidden" and "inexpressible" -  two extremely suggestive terms, not only for 
Steig's interest in the interface between the Grotesque and the uncanny (which unquestion­
ably motivates his perception of these terms in Ruskin's "discussion"), but also for my 
interest in the confluence of the Grotesque and abjection.
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dered Grotesque, Naming tames, defuses and determines it. The reader/viewer must 
be taken from behind, robbed of the information s/he  needs to develop a cognitive 
map to domesticate the image or text by naming. Thus in Goya's Folly of Fear [Fig. 
160], for example, to understand, the image it is not enough simply to identify its 
elements: large anthropomorphic figure in a loose-fitting habit-like tunic, fleeing 
army, tree, etc.; one also needs to define the relationships between the objects, but 
such things as distortion of scale and the equivocal nature of the cloaked figure -  is 
it a real ghost or a manufactured sham? -  makes interpretation difficult and uncer­
tain: there is a discrepancy between what the image shows and what it potentially 
connotes, creating a zone of obscurity and ambiguity. I will revisit this issue deeper 
into the chapter when I establish the continuity between the Grotesque and abjec­
tion. Also, in Chapter Two I will define Kayser's "estrangement" in terms of the 
uncanny, and the uncanny in terms of abjection.
A final aspect of the above passage worth highlighting is Kayser's notion that
one can use the Grotesque to invoke 'the demonic aspects of the world' to subdue
them (1963:188). Kayser views the comic and the absurd in  the Grotesque as bitter
and mocking, not a mirthful but 'satanic' (187) laughter. Yet even he could not
deny that it might serve another, more uplifting purpose:
In many grotesques, liftie is felt of — freedom and gaiety. But where the artistic 
creation has succeeded, a faint smile seems to pass rapidly across the scene or 
picture, and slight traces of the playful frivolity of the capriccio appear to be 
present. And there, but only there, another kind of feeling arises within us. In spite 
of all the helplessness and horror inspired by the dark forces Which lurk in and 
behind our world and have power to estrange it, the truly artistic portrayal 
effects a secret liberation. (188)
The passage is confusing because it is difficult to decide whether "frivolity" or 
the "truly artistic portrayal" is what functions to liberate. Manifestly, the two are 
closely aligned and have equal power, and perhaps that is sufficient in itself. In com­
bination, in the service of the Grotesque, they act to subdue "demonic forces". The
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Grotesque, then, is both threat and the means to control that threat44. It can be 
used, in the creative process, to tame those forces of alienation and darkness Kay- 
ser locates in the human psyche. Regrettably, Kayser does not elaborate on hoio the 
Grotesque can be a "secret" liberator. But one should not dismiss his point too 
hastily; in fact, I ask the reader to keep it in mind, for its importance will emerge in 
due time, and when it does I will be better equipped to argue that it is in naming 
and repetition that the Grotesque can be "subdued" and domesticated.
Kayser's apparent alter ego, Mikhail Bakhtin, has been the focus of much atten­
tion in recent years45, ever since the publication of his seminal work, Rabelais and 
His World (1968). Among other things, Bakhtin used this book to 'correct' what he 
clearly saw as, a mistake in the then-current literature on medieval and Renaissance 
expression -  particularly as it related to folk culture. This mistake, as he perceived 
it, lay in the way other critics had interpreted laughter. Carnival and what he terms 
"grotesque realism" in the cultural activity of the aforementioned periods; and he 
took it upon himself to use Rabelais, that singular literary figure of the sixteenth 
century, as the pillar around which to construct his own perspective on Renais­
sance folk humour.
I will concern myself solely with Bakhtin's understanding of the Grotesque,
which can be deduced from the following quote:
It is usually pointed out that in Rabelais' work the material bodily principle, that 
is, images of the human body with its food, drink, defecation, and sexual life, 
plays a predominant role [. . .] [T]he images of the material bodily principle in 
the work of Rabelais . . .  are the heritage, only somewhat modified by the Renais­
sance, of the culture of folk humor [.. .] In grotesque realism . . .  the bodily ele­
ment is deeply positive . . .  The material bodily principle is contained not in the 
biological individual, not in the bourgeois ego, but in the people, a people who 
are continually growing and renewed [..,]  The leading themes of these images
44 In Ruskin's conviction that, in suitably noble hands, the Grotesque can service the glory 
of God, one finds a similar structural operation to the one Kayser notes here. The gross 
matter of the Grotesque is tricky to work with, but it is potentially rejuvenatory,
4i For an extensive bibliography of work that engages in one way or another with Bakh­
tin's wide range of ideas -  which extends beyond the carnivalesque focus I adopt here -  see 
Hirschkop and Shepherd, 1989:195-212.
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of bodily life are fertility, growth, and a brimming-over abundance . . , The 
material bodily principle is a triumphant, festive principle, it is a "banquet for all 
the world." [...] The essential principle of grotesque realism is degradation, that 
is, the lowering of all that is high, spiritual, ideal, abstract; it is a transfer to the 
material level, to the sphere of earth and body in their indissoluble unity. (18-20)
The focus of Bakhtin's writing is sixteenth-century popular culture, which, he 
claims, derived its character from the folk culture of the Middle Ages. In his view the 
Renaissance was not a rebirth in which the Middle Ages expired, but a culmination 
of trends that were already rooted in the popular culture of the previous epoch. From 
this perduring culture of The People (i.e., those of the servile classes) sprang several 
manifestations of folk culture, including a particular language that emphasised the 
body in all its material aspects. Bakhtin terms this focus on the material body "gro­
tesque realism". He asserts the positive character of the material body and argues 
that the people of Rabelais' time did not separate the individual body from the collec­
tive "ancestral" body constituted by communities. "Grotesque realism", he claims, 
degraded things of a -  to use a Ruskinian term -  "noble" nature by plunging them to 
the level of the material body. One needs to understand this act of casting down in 
Bakhtin's terms, because if one misinterprets it one is liable to overlook its centrality 
in Bakhtin's argument for the positivity of the material body, grotesque realism and 
laughter. Quoting further:
Degradation and debasement of the higher do not have a formal and relative char­
acter in grotesque realism. "Upward" and "downward" have here an absolute and 
strictly topographical meaning. "Downward" is earth, "upward" is heaven. Earth 
is an element that devours, swallows up (tire grave, the womb) and at the same 
time an element of birth, of renascence (the maternal breasts). . .  Degradation here 
means coming down to earth, the contact with earth as an element that swallows 
up and gives birth at the same time [...] To degrade also means to concern oneself 
with the lower stratum of the body, the life of the belly and the reproductive or­
gans; it therefore relates to acts of defecation and copulation, conception, preg­
nancy and birth. Degradation digs a bodily grave for a new birth; it has not only a 
destructive, negative aspect, but also a regenerating one. (1968:21)
I want to stress the last .line of the passage: that degradation has both a destruc­
tive and a regenerative aspect. This is not tire-first time a dialectic has reared its head 
in a deliberation on the Grotesque. In Bakhtin's case, this dialectic is the all-important 
one, since it 'corrects' those interpretations he takes to task in his text. For him, at
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least at the symbolic level, all forms of destruction, of casting down, of death, are 
merely a prelude to rebirth; the degradation afforded by the material bodily principle 
transforms the lofty, the spiritual, the dead into the tissues of a living communal 
body. And this process occurs not in a void, but in an abundance of -  in comparison 
to Ruskin -  unqualified laughter.
To develop a thesis that so celebrates the rejuvenatory power of laughter. Car­
nival and the material body, Bakhtin is forced to resolve into a conviction what is 
really an unstable, speculative and presumptive proposition, which Harpham has, 
I think correctly, criticised as arising (in the words of Derrida) from'"[a] Rousseau- 
i s t . .  . nostalgia for origins'" (1982:72-73). To overturn social hierarchies and pol­
itical domination, to tweak the nose of death and give the lie to God and the devil, 
the answer, for Bakhtin, is the feast, the Carnival, the uncrowning, tire "world- 
upside-down" -  killing the fatted calf in the name of regeneration through the body. 
The problem is, he believes Carnival to be a cate for rather than a symptom of the 
means people in the sixteenth century adopted to cope with their social, political, 
religious and physical difficulties. As will eventually be seen, Goya's treatment of 
the "world-upside-down", because of its ultimate complicity with the cause of Rea­
son, presents a more pessimistic interpretation of camivalesque excess, one that 
exposes such 'merriment' as a form -  to borrow loosely from Marx -  of false con­
sciousness serving the interests of the oppressors46.
46 The readiness of such critics as Bakhtin to treat camivalesque inversion as a means of 
vanquishing state controls has been criticised in the literature (for overviews of such criti­
cism, see Stallybrass and White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. 1986:13-16, Terry 
Castle, Masquerade and Civilization: The Camivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English 
Culture and Fiction. 1986:88-90, and Barbara Babcock, The Reversible World: Symbolic In­
version in Art and Society, 1978:22-24). Initially, critics (e.g., Terry Eagleton [see Stallybrass 
and White:13]) responded to the optimistic view of inversion by pointing out that such re­
versals of the social status quo could only be a temporary form of blowing off steam (the 
concept of inversion as ventilation was given exemplary treatment in the 1960s by the 
anthropologist Max Gluckman, who asserted that ritual practices were simply a means of 
strengthening the established order [see Stallybrass and Whita:13, Castle:88-89, Burke, 
1988:201-2, and, especially, Babcock;22-23]); in essence they had no power to alter political 
imbalances in society (Helen Grant, in her article 'The World Upside-Down', held the same 
view of Spanish world-upside-down prints known as alelmjas -  '[t]hey acted as a safety-valve
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From the foregoing it is no surprise that Bakhtin had a negative reaction to Kay-
ser's analysis of the Grotesque. Kayser does not appear to admit excess and joy -
the laughing body -  into his definitions. Yet Bakhtin reveres laughter as one of the
core principles of the Grotesque:
Kayser's theory cannot be applied to the thousand-year-long development of the 
pre-Romantic era: that is, the archaic and antique grotesque . . .  and the medieval 
and Renaissance grotesque, linked to the culture of folk humor [. . .] [Kayser] 
bases his deductions and generalizations on the analysis of Romantic and mod­
ernist forms [of the grotesque]. . . The true nature of the grotesque, which can­
not be separated from the culture of folk humor and the carnival spirit, remains 
unexplained. (1968:46-47)
In stressing his perception that Kayser's notion of the Grotesque can only be 
applied to 'clarify certain aspects of the Romantic grotesque' (51), Bakhtin over­
looked Kayser's abstruse reference to frivolity, to which I drew attention earlier. 
While only the original German text might specify whether it is "frivolity" or the 
"truly artistic portrayal" that Kayser related to liberation from the abysmal, the 
chance that it might be the former indicates that Kayser was not as distant from 
Bakhtin as Bakhtin himself thought47. In fact, one could view the Russian scholar's 
entire theory of grotesque realism as an extension of Kayser's unformulated sug­
gestion. The issue, ultimately, is tnat, like Ruskin, Kayser and Bakhtin grant a place 
in their comprehensions of the Grotesque for both laughter and the ominous, the
rather than as a stimulus to change' [1973:113]); even Freud, in Jokes and their Relation to 
the Unconscious, strikes a negative chord: 'A festival is a permitted, or rather obligatory, ex­
cess, a solemn breach of a prohibition' (19916:201). Later critics (e.g., Burke ir Jus Popular 
Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1988:203-4), while not openly embracing the Bakhtinian 
perspective, have opposed this view, arguing essentially that camivalesque practices are too 
complex and too historically specific to be treated in such clearcut terms as the oppression 
of the Tow' by the 'high', or as simply a means of letting off steam. Stallybrass and White 
sum things up in a way that all investigators of the subject would applaud: 'the politics of 
carnival cannot be resolved outside of a close historical examination of particular conjunc­
tures' (16). I need only add that my study of Goya's prints, particularly Los Disparates, indi­
cates that within his 'historical conjuncture' Carnival had become a tool which the ruling 
groups utilised to control the lower classes.
47 And not just on the matter of humour are they closer than one would initially suspect; 
as Andrew Schulz argues, 'the two writers are largely in agreement in viewing the Romantic 
grotesque as characterized by alienation' (1996:166; for corroboration, see Bakhtin, 1968:47- 
51, especially 48).
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"sportive" and the "terrible", and the fact that the entire structure of Bakhtin's ludic 
grotesque realism depends on descent to the abysmal and ascent to some heavenly 
rebirth -  thus on passage from top to bottom and back again -  demonstrates tha'c 
even though Bakhtin does not view below as a monster-spawning abyss (as Kayser 
does), he cannot do without it in his grand scheme. Of course, neither could Rtiskin, 
whose understanding of the Grotesque, once stripped of its theologism, is extreme­
ly close to Bakhtin's. Whether viewed in a chiefly positive (Bakhtin), chiefly nega­
tive (Kayser) or ambivalent (Ruskin) light, the Grotesque is understood by all three 
of these writers as a volatile mode of expression that can enslave or liberate, and 
which contains within itself the means to effect at least temporary liberation.
Philip Thomson, the last writer I look at here, holds the same view. In The 
Grotesque he suggests that the Grotesque raises the 'horrifying and disgusting as­
pects of existence to the surface' (1972:59) to destroy them in the crucible of laughter, 
or, alternatively, to control the "uncanny" by means of the comic (60-61)48, Thom­
son thus unites the positions of Bakhtin and Kayser, and, with his understanding 
that laughter can be both serious and joyful (50-56), has no trouble seeing them as 
a synthesis. Where he differs from his more illustrious precursors is in his view 
that disharmony is the Grotesque's chief feature:
The most covi.istently distinguishsd characteristic of the grotesque has been the 
fundamental element of disharmony, whether this is referred to as conflict, 
clash, mixture of the heterogeneous, or conflation of disparates. It is important 
that this disharmony has been seen, not merely in the work of art as such, but 
also in the reaction it produces and (speculatively) in the creative temperament 
and psychological make-up of the artist. (20)
Disharmony emerges here as something that can be located in three places: (1) 
the art work, (2) the reader/viewer, (3) the artist In short, the Grotesque manifests
48 Thomson bases this notion of using the comic to control the uncanny on Michael Steig's 
important article, 'Defining the Grotesque: An Attempt at Synthesis' (1970), in which Steig 
draws a close connection betwe^rvthe Grotesque and the uncanny. I will look at this connec­
tion, and at Steig's thought on the matter, in the next chapter, where I will also emphasise 
laughter's role in managing the menace of the abject.
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its split and asyndetic character in all areas of contention, and not merely as a vis­
ible lack of unity, but as the expression of psychological ambivalence. The art work 
conveys the oscillating perspective the artist holds of his or her subject, and the re­
ceiver responds to that uncertainty with personal anxiety. Thus, through the circuit 
opened by the art work, the reader/viewer receives similar conflicting emotions to 
those that guided the artist. In this way, via the agency of (re)cognitive dislocation, 
art gains the potential to lead the spectator toward some kind of liberation -  if, that 
is, tire cause or object of the anxiety can also function extricatively. To put it another 
way: if an artist creates an image, either partly or expressly, for the purpose of work­
ing through and resolving his or her tensions and fears, the image will probably con­
tain representations of the cause(s) of anxiety at the iconographic level or impres­
sions of disquiet in the artistic form itself; many viewers seeing such an image 
might be roused to similar levels of anguish (as that of the artist, which culminated 
in the image), and might then be able to use the image to attain relief from the very 
problems it has stirred up. They cannot do so in the same way as tire producer (un­
less they are motivated to make cathartic works of their own), but, depending on 
the nature of the work they are regarding, they can find other means. For example, 
satire, which encourages degradation of the object of attack, gives the viewer the 
capacity to use laughter to disengage for a short while from whatever anxiety the 
satire may have prompted. This is a point I will return to in Section III of Chapter 
Two, and again in the epilogue.
Thomson looks at the way the Grotesque balances precariously between the
familiar and the unfamiliar and, using the illustration of a child watching the facial
distortions of an adult, demonstrates that it is the viewer who determines in which
direction the balance shifts:
[take] the example of very small children . . .  to whom one makes grimaces 
which increasingly distort the face, The child will laugh at the face pulled only 
up to a certain point (presumably, while it is still sure of the face as a familiar 
thing); once this point is passed, once the face becomes so distorted that the child 
feels threatened, it cries in fear. (1972:25)
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In this example the child cries at the point where the distortion becomes too 
much -  where it perceives that the familiar face has become unfamiliar and sinister. 
What Thomson describes is a moment of inversion, where something initially amus­
ing (01 at least attractive because of its playfulness) turns into a repulsive and fear­
some hazard. Hie playful is stood on its head, and becomes terrible.
Needless to say, this is familiar territory, Ruskin laid foundations here almost a 
century before Thomson, and Kayser cut at least a path or two across it at the end 
of the 1950s. There are hints of this understanding in Bakhtin, and it is clearly stated 
again in the writings of Harpham (e.g., 1982:7-10). Thomson's articulation of the 
point is, however, the most lucid in demonstrating that the gap between the "spor­
tive" and "terrible" is collapsed by an inversion, a metamorphic reversal, or a de­
scent from top to bottom. Thomson helps us to see, possibly more clearly than 
Bakhtin or Ruskin, since he operates outside of their polemical frameworks, the 
manner in which the shift from one stool to another occurs through an internal 
relation dependent on the subject's ability to keep the object under scrutiny within 
the bounds of the familiar. It is when the divide is perforated and the unfamiliar 
sweeps in that laughter changes to fear, and the ominous intrudes. This, for Thom­
son and Kayser, is the point at which the Grotesque most clearly manifests itself.
What the reader needs to note, further, is that while it is familiar the Grotesque 
produces playful laughter; when it becomes unfamiliar the result is fear. Why 
should this happen? Because when the Grotesque is familiar we laugh at it; when it 
is unfamiliar w t reel it is laughing at -  mocking -  us. The reversal is one in  which 
we suddenly find we are no longer objecting, but being objected. This question of 
position is the one, to my mind, that determines the cathartic capacity of the Gro­
tesque (and, for that matter, of satire). When we laugh at the Grotesque, we lib­
erate ourselves from the tensions threaded out by confrontation with the ambivalent, 
slightly alien, slightly unfamiliar forms, fields and ramifications of the Grotesque. 
When we can no longer laugh at it because suddenly it seems that roe are the scape­
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goats, the grotesques, it becomes purely a source of anxiety.
In Goya's art it is often difficult to tell whether a subject is a caricature, thus a 
distortion from the real world, or a representative of a whole other world of the Gro­
tesque that tire artist has depicted for the eyes of his coevals. We can claim that all 
of his figures, even the most distorted or bestial, are caricatures serving the artist's 
satiric purpose, but this does not entirely rob them of their power to disturb -  it 
does not make them altogether familiar. Thus there are caricatures in Goya that a 
mere glance will situate as objects to be mocked, and others we will struggle to laugh 
at because they are so difficult to classify and detach from. In the latter case we 
might even feel that we have become the subject of the artist's laughter as he mocks 
our inability to comprehend his work. In short, where the viewer is concerned, the 
discomfort index of the Grotesque is measured in the degree to which, being famil­
iar (recognisable), it moves us to laughter and relief or liberation, or, being unfamiliar 
(unrecognisable in any known taxonomy), pulverises us.
Thomson has brought this discussion to the point where satire and the Grotesque 
intersect -  tire point at which at least one facet of the abject, its potential for deliver­
ance, could now be introduced. Unfortunately, I need to consider a few more mat­
ters before I can introduce tire abject in all its Gorgonian theoretical detail.
One such matter is the hybridity of the Grotesque, which Thomson, even though 
he views it as a disjunctive clash rather than an integrated combination, alludes to 
in his use of phrases such as "mixture of the heterogeneous" and "conflation of dis­
parates". He grasps that the Grotesque is polymorphous, an amalgam, by defini­
tion. It unsettles precisely because it combines qualities that one would normally ex­
pect to see in separation49. The impossible farrago of discrepant elements (foliage, 
ornamental structures, creatures themselves hybrid in nature) found in grottesche
49 Cf. Harpham in his article 'The Grotesque: First Principles': '[the Grotesque] opens into 
a realm of contradiction and ambiguity, frequently through the fiisioti of form? or realms we 
Imow to be separate' (1976:464; emphases added).
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becomes symptomatic of the category of the Grotesque as a whole. It therefore 
stands to reason that it is also symptomatic of the object Bakhtin places at the 
centre of his understanding of grotesque realism: the obscene, material, grotesque 
body. It is to this body that I now turn, because no understanding of this troubled 
landscape of cast-out things would be complete without a separate examination of 
its core wanderer, the one whose condition is abject.
*  *  *
[T]he grotesque body is not separated from the rest of the world. It is not a closed, 
completed unit; it is unfinished, outgrows itself, transgresses its own limits. The 
stress is laid on those parts of the body that are open to the outside world, that is, 
the parts through which the world enters the body or emerges from it, or through 
which the body itself goes out to meet the world. This means that the emphasis is 
on the apertures or the convexities, or on various ramifications and offshoots: the 
open mouth, the genital organs, the breasts, the phallus, the potbelly, the nose. The 
body discloses its essence as a principle of growth which exceeds its own limits 
only in copulation, pregnancy, child-birth, the throes of death, eating, drinking, or 
defecation . . . The unfinished and open body (dying, bringing forth and being 
born) is not separated from the world by clearly defined boundaries; it is blended 
with the world, With animals, with objects. It is cosmic, it represents the entire 
material bodily world in all its elements. (Bakhtin, 1968:26-27)
Stallybrass and White condense Bakhtin's description of the grotesque body 
into a set of "discursive norms" which, as will be seen, can all be found in Goya's 
etchings:
impurity (both in the sense of dirt and mixed categories), heterogeneity, masking, 
protuberant distension, disproportion, exorbitancy, clamour, decentred or eccen­
tric arrangements, a focus upon gaps, orifices and symbolic filth. . .  physical needs 
and pleasures of the "lower bodily stratum," materiality and parody7 (1986:23).
For Bakhtin, the mobility and flexibility of the grotesque body make it a posi­
tive regenerating force, the supreme symbol of medieval folk culture's obsession 
with procreation50. However, from a different perspective, notably that of modern 
western society, this body is anathema, an abomination whose abundance must be 
limited, a pollution that must be repelled, cast down.
50 Bakhtin treats the grotesque body in such positive terms that he has often been taken to 
task for his optimism; for a review of such criticism see Stallybrass and White, 1986:9-16.
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The grotesque body, because it has no "clearly defined boundaries", is intract­
ably associated with those external margins and boundaries that it interacts with 
and has the potential to reconfigure. It teeters on brinks and partakes of the quali­
ties of supposedly oppositional extremes (e.g., life and death, birth and decay, youth 
and age, health and disease). It is an amalgam by definition: it "is not separated 
from the world by clearly defined boundaries" but "is blended with the world", 
and is therefore a hybrid, a conglomerate. It is defined in relation to structures and 
limits operating in the world, and so bears out the principle that social boundaries 
should always be considered in, conjunction with the body itself, the primary unit 
of the social system (and vice versa). So writes Mary Douglas in Purity and Danger, 
a book that must be acknowledged as instrumental in Kristeva's development of 
abjection theory:
The body is a model which can stand for any bounded system. Its boundaries 
can represent any boundaries which are threatened or precarious . . . [One has] 
to see in the body a symbol of society, and to see the powers and dangers cred­
ited to social structure reproduced in small on the human body. (1984:115)51
This interconnection between individual body and social body has serious im­
plications for the individual body that does not accord with the limits society 
establishes as its ideals. What does not conform is often treated as filthy, as dirt, 
and therefore as a potentially sullying presence in the social formation. Dirt's ca­
pacity to spread and soil others gives the begrimed individual body its sense of 
threat. It should be recognised, however, that this threat is not necessarily con­
stituted on hygienic grounds. As Douglas claims:
If we abstract pathogenicity and hygiene from our notion of dirt, we are left with 
the old definition of dirt as matter out of place. This is a very suggestive approach. 
It implies two contradictions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that 
order. Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is a sys­
tem. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in
51 Cf. Stallybrass and White:
the body cannot be thought separately from the social formation, symbolic topography and 
tine constitution of the subject. . .  the body is actively produced by the junction and disjunc­
tion of symbolic domains and can never be legitimately evaluated "in itself". (1986:192)
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so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. (1984:35)
Thus, for Douglas, elements within society that (directly or indirectly) defy or 
challenge the organisation of that society -  elements that transgress the boundaries 
set up to regulate the behaviour of individuals and their social and private 
functions -  are precisely those that, in society's eyes, must be relegated to the 
realms of filth, i.e., (r)ejected from the socius. z[I]f uncleanness is matter out of 
place/ writes Douglas, 'we must approach it through order. Uncleanness or dirt is 
that which must not be included if a pattern is to be maintained/ (40) If we now 
reconsider the link between the individual body and the social body it is clear that 
the status society forces on the grotesque body is equivalent to processes of excre­
tion and their products. In other words, society places the grotesque body in the 
class of waste and refuse. This metaphorical relation suits society since, as Douglas 
points out,
Any structure of ideas is vulnerable at its margins. We should expect the orifices of 
the body to symbolise its specially vulnerable points. Matter issuing from them is 
marginal stuff of the most obvious kind. Spittle, blood, milk, urine, faeces or tears 
by simply issuing forth have traversed the boundary of the body. So also have 
bodily parings, skin, nail, hair clippings and sweat. (121)52
Just as excrement crosses the margin of the body's skin, so the grotesque body 
crosses the margin of the social body, becoming effluvium, faecal matter, by-product, 
unwanted foulness. As dirt, disorderly elements such as the grotesque body are 
classified, named and tamed. They remain grotesque, but at least those members of 
society who show more respect for, or who are more closely aligned with, consen­
sual ideals need no longer fear or feel intimidated by them. This is a cardinal point. 
If something cannot be classified because it exceeds those ideals and models so­
52 In her book On Longing. Susan Stewart closely echoes Douglas's view of the marginal 
status of disposable body matter:
The body presents the paradox of contained and container at once, Thus our attention is 
continually focused upon tire boundaries or limits of the body . . .  Those products which 
cross such boundaries thereby become products of great cultural attention. What is both 
inside and outside the body (feces, spittle, mine, menstrual blood, etc.) tends to become 
taboo because of its ambiguous and anomalous status. (1984:104)
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ciety has set up as its norms and standards, it becomes "matter out of place", i.e., 
matter without limits, an unbounded, potentially infinite substance. Such a sub­
stance, impure by definition because it has no evident taxonomic place, can easily 
cause anxiety in those members of society who fit the norm, because they will endow 
it with the ability to swamp and engulf matter that has a place. Placelessness here 
becomes synonymous with a mass oceanic and even apocalyptic in its lack of bar­
riers. Absence of identity generates the threat of the nameless thing, the out there, 
the faceless mob, the rising tide and cresting tidal wave. But if the one-who-meets- 
the-norm suddenly says, 'It isn't matter out of place, if  s dirf, then the endless, inex­
haustible thing shrinks in a trice within the circle of a cluster of clearly-understood 
terms -  dirt, filth, refuse, garbage, dross, scourings, scraps, pollution, effluent, excre­
ment, vomit -  all of which can be dealt with in a single activity: throwing out, 
Those in society who fail to make The Grade, all of whom are often treated as gro­
tesque in representation -  the smelly, toothless beggar rummaging through rubbish; 
the heavily-scarred, criminal; the ill-tempered dwarf ranting at the world; the drunk 
woman with dark rings around her eyes battering her child in a pokey apartment; 
the aged sitting indifferently before a television -  are cast out, and while they can­
not be scooped into a bin, flushed down a toilet or pumped into a river, they are 
clearly positioned, through representation, in places -  alleys, backwoods and back­
waters, niches, gutters, dark spaces, squatter camps, cardboard villages, mental 
hospitals, old-age homes -  that literally, as spaces that receive those who no longer 
match society's criteria for inclusion, are the sewers for the places where the nor­
mal and standardised live.
The representation of an abject condition cannot, however, be non-partisan; 
when represented, the grotesque, abject body will always function in  one way or 
another, sometimes to wring sympathy out of the viewer/reader, more often to af­
firm the identity of the one who fits society's mould. To return to the nexus between 
satire and the Grotesque: when it serves the interests of the emplaced, the grotesque
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body tends to be used satirically. It appears as the central object in a satirically- 
undermining portrayal of a world where obscenity has run riot.
In Satire's Persuasive Voice Edward and Lillian Bloom claim that 'for almost 
every major satirist the language of obscenity is inevitable' (1979:157). This is under­
standable if Alvin B. Kernan is correct in claiming that '[ejverywhere the satirist 
turns he finds idiocy, foolishness, depravity and dirt' (in Paulson, 1971:254). Satiri­
cal perception hones in on tire darker dirtier side of life; it  is receptive to all ioxms 
of human aberrance and delights in  using the body's socially-excluded properties 
to expose moral infirmity. As Keman writes,
The author of satire always portrays the grotesque and distorted, and concentrates 
to an obsessive degree on the flesh . . .  man is caught in his animal functions of eat­
ing, drinking, lusting, displaying his body, copulating, evacuating, scratching . . . 
Gross, sodden, rotting matter is the substance of the satiric scene and any trace of 
the beautiful or the spiritual is always in danger of being destroyed by the weight 
of this mere "stuff", (in Paulson:256)
One should note the consuming quality Keman associates with the "mere stuff" 
-  "gross, sodden, rotting matter" -  of satirical obscenity. He sees the "beautiful or 
the spiritual" -  humanity's standards and ideals, in short -  as threatened by the 
"substance of the satiric scene" -  the substance I have just associated with a limit­
lessness that arises since, tabulatively, it exceeds the established social order.
The satirist uses the corporeal and diseased aspects of the world to degrade all 
that is only human to something like Bakhtin's "bodily lower stratum". In the pro­
cess the objects of satirical attack are denuded and devalued. As the Blooms write.
The business of the satirist causes him to reveal human beings in their public 
roles, and this means that some people are stripped of jealously guarded priv­
acy, that they are exposed in actions generally withheld from polite observation. 
The satirist becomes a leveler with a prerogative to exploit even man's physio­
logical needs -  excretory or sexual -  until he is reduced "to a bodily democracy 
paralleling the democracy of death in the danse macabre,” Obscenity in this con­
text warns us that we often seem no better than our fellow naked apes, unclean, 
lecherous, brutal. (1979:157. The quote about "bodily democracy" is from Frye [in 
Paulson, 1971:244-45])
The satirist would, however, probably side with Bakhtin's claim (1968:19-2"!, 
passim) that degradation is not a negative but positive process -  a regenerative pro­
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cess. Mary Randolphe writes, 'paradoxically, in the very act of presenting the nega­
tive or destructive side of human behaviour the satirist is establishing a positive 
foundation on which he can base his specific recommendation to virtue' (in Paul­
son, 1971n:175). With this prime elucidation of the way satire encourages virtue 
through displaying vice, we return to the junction where satire and the Grotesque 
meet: the issue of deliverance. And what we can see is that satirists portray the con­
dition of being abject (in my terms) to abject those wallowing in abjection (vice), and 
so redeem those among their audience willing to tow the satire's high moral line by 
reaffirming their blameless, well-(em)placed ethical reason.
The grotesque, obscene, rhyparographic, ominous aspects of the world are both 
the cause of anxiety and the means to alleviate anxiety. It is a mudbath theory: to 
clean off, bathe in  liquid dirt. But only to affirm that dirt is precisely what you don't 
want. The satirist's receiver must look placeless matter in the face and personally 
decide whether to mode it into the repressed (abject it) or submit to it and become its 
fool (become abject). To encourage the desired response -  the abjecting one -  the 
satirist makes this matter as hideous ami undesirable as possible53. This dialectic, 
in which the Grotesque is both the threat and the means to control it, I will relate 
directly to abjection and laughter in the final section of Chapter Two.
I can now sum up what has emerged over the course of this chapter: the Gro­
tesque, in depicting the anti-social body whose condition is abject (cast down), 
gives those Well placed in society an object to abject (cast out) and thereby secure 
provisional release from the threat with which the cast-down sectors of society men­
53 In her impressive book on fantasy Rosemary Jackson uses Tolkein to demonstrate pre­
cisely the point I am making here: 'Tolkein's ores, the dark hairy creatures of The Lord of the 
Rings, are imaged as repulsively sensual, as embodiments of absolute evil, whereas for Blake 
they are instruments of revolution' (1981:156). The ores of satirists are always "embodi­
ments of evil", threats and monsters; their boundary-breaking energy is a force that must 
be, if not destroyed, at least contained and tamed. By making them as obscene and gro­
tesque -  therefore as repulsive and anti-social -  as possible, the satirist has a better chance of 
reaching this goal. In due course it will become apparent that Goya's approach to his subject 
matter in his graphic series is manifestly satirical in thi'i regard. His objects of attack are al­
most always ores, and his objective is almost always their pacification.
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ace them -  the threat of losing their identity in a limitless mass of placeless matter. 
This release is secured on the basis of classifying matter. Another way of under­
standing this is in terms of Thomson's familiar/unfamiliar dialectic: matter in  place, 
classified matter, is familiar, and even when one encounters it in  an excessive form 
(in a highly scatological novel or film, for example), it presents only a minor, slightly 
ambivalent, anxiety which one can laugh off. Unde ssified matter, however, is com­
pletely unfamiliar, lacking in points of reference, not tabulated, and is therefore illim­
itable. It causes terror. Again, it is up to the consumer -  the reader or viewer -  to 
classify the matter. It is his or her choice that will put the threatening grotesque 
body in a genus -  that of impurity and dirt -  and so bring it under control.
In the next section I recall Goya's Los Caprichos advertisement to link the Gro­
tesque to dreams and the unconscious, so as to explain more fully why matter out 
of place should be so threatening. Then, in the following, and final, section of this 
chapter, I lay the bridge that will take the discussion from the Grotesque to abjec­
tion theory.
IV. Goya's Advertisement for Los Caprichos, Continued
As most of the objects represented in this work are ideals, it will not be fool­
hardy to believe that their defects will find, perhaps, many pardons among the 
intelligent, considering that the author has neither followed the examples of an­
other, nor been able to copy much from nature. And if the imitation is as difficult 
as admirable when successful, he who has stood aside from nature will not fail 
to merit some esteem, having had to expose to the eyes forms and attitudes that 
have only existed until now in the human mind, obscured and confused for the 
lack of illustration or excited with uncontrolled passions.
It would suppose too much ignorance in the fine arts to advertise to the 
public that in none of the compositions that form this collection has the author 
proposed to ridicule the particular defects of one or another individual: that 
would in truth restrict the limits of talent too much and mistake the way in 
which one uses the arts of imitation to produce perfect works.
Painting (like poetry) selects from the universal that which it judges most 
appropriate for its ends: unites in a single fantastic personage circumstances and 
characters that nature presents distributed in many, and from this ingeniously ar­
ranged combination results that happy imitation by which a good artificer acquires 
the title of inventor and not of servile copyist.
I want to concentrate now on the second reason Goya offers for producing Los
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Capriclws: the exercise of fantasia. Like its English equivalent, the Spanish noun 
fantasia5i can be variously interpreted; but Goya evidently employs it in the sense 
of fancy -  the licence his subject matter grants him to exercise his imagination. He 
takes pride in  his possession of an imagination that can create images that have no 
counterparts in nature and which have not existed previously except "in the human 
mind", implying that this sets him apart from other artists who, as mere repro­
ducers of nature, cannot qualify as anything more than "servile copyists".
To protect his brazenly unnatural, invented forms from the ridicule of a public 
schooled in mimesis, Goya builds an apologia55 into his text -  the cunning sugges­
tion that the "intelligent" will not find his images defective because they ought to 
understand the problems he had to counteract, not being able to copy from nature 
or borrow from previous artists. In other words, only the unintelligent will fail to 
understand and excuse the "defects" in his prints, and they, after all, are not to be 
judged critical members of society.
But there, is more to this issue of invention than artistic licence, pride or capac­
ity. In the last paragraph of his advertisement, Goya describes painting as a selec- 
tii/e process subservient to tire ends envisioned by the painter: an important point 
since it is this that distinguishes the "inventor" from the "servile copyist"56. Goya's
54 I briefly elucidate this term as an aesthetic category below.
55 Satirists use apologias to demonstrate that they are not as high and mighty as their work 
would suggest, and to explain why they are writing what they are writing, thereby provid­
ing beforehand a justification for the invective to follow. See Bloom & Bloom, 1979:85-90; 
and Elliott, 1972:113-15, 230-31, 265-66. Goya's need to shift the locus of belief away from 
himself onto his viewers (so that they, not him, become responsible for the correct reception 
of the work) is a different matter, but it illustrates equally well the precariousness of tire satir­
ist -  while in danger of offending the object of attack, s/he must also guard against disbelief 
in his or her transports of "fantasy".
56 The separation between "inventor" and "servile copyist", although not unique to the 
period (see Kris and Gombrich, 1974:198-99, who argue that the quest to 'assert tire priority 
of imagination over slavish imitation' [199] began in the sixteenth century). Was nonetheless 
intensified in the Romantic era. According to Hugh Honour, in his book Romanticism, the 
imaginative came more to the fore
as the qualities of wild scenery came to be more sensitively appreciated and, especially,
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use of the words "invented" and "inventor" shows that he regarded the art of select­
ing from "the universal" (to assemble new inventions unique to the artist's produc­
tion) as more significant than that of merely copying nature. Now, in Goya's time 
there were five aesthetic categories within the ambit of which the artist was per­
mitted to exercise his imagination: capricho, siiefio, fantasia, disparate and grotesco57. 
Of grotesco, which I raised in my earlier tour through the development of the Gro­
tesque in Spain, nothing more need be said for now; and as for disparate, this I will 
treat in Part Four. That leaves three terms, which I will briefly consider.
Probably the least investigated of these terms is fantasia. Schulz, who derives
• his information from the Dicciomrio de la Lengiia Castellana, suggests that the term 
was synonymous with capricho (1996:140-41). Ilie, in his glossary of eighteenth- 
century uses of the word (1976b:241), firmly distinguishes the two terms, although 
in his article on the Grotesque he notes that both formed part of a 'countermode' 
that gained in prominence 'as concepts of imagination liberate[d] the artist and his 
subjective impulse to create without regard to rational precepts' (1976/7:194; cf, my 
footnote 57). I think if one conceives of fantasia as a utilisation of the imagination 
for predominantly -  or at least manifestly -  fanciful ends, one has a fair sense of
as the words wild, improbable, false and fanciful were opposed not to civilized, historical, true 
and logical so much as to constraineU, superficially apparent, dogmatic and unimaginative . . ,  
(1986:24)
The opposed sets ("wild, improbable, false and fanciful" vs "constrained, superficially 
apparent, dogmatic and unimaginative") are precisely oystallised in Goya's terms "inven­
tor" and "servile copyist".
57 These formed part of what Ilie calls the 'the phenomenology of irrational expression' 
(1976«:194) in eighteenth-century Spanish culture, and while they were not considered main­
stream, they were allowed, not persecuted, because their evident embracing of unreason 
would have made them almost decorative to the enlightened upper classes, therefore no 
threat to bourgeois values. On the other hand, their embracing of the m'ational and super­
natural may well have made them objects of anxiety for the lower classes, who were still 
superstitious, and in this sense they might have been tolerated as objects that the ruling 
class could use to keep the lower classes subservient to, for example, the Church, Whatever 
the politics, such forms of imaginative expression were allowed, chiefly because they did 
not, on the surface, pretend to be anything more than fantastical. They were also allowed, of 
course, because they helped to set the limits of mimetic painting, creating a category of 
excess against which Neo-classical painters could judge their own artmaking.
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what the word implied in Goya's time.
In contrast to fantasia, the term capricho has been the subject of quite extensive 
study, most notably by Paul Hie (' Capricho/Cnprichoso: A  Glossary of Eighteenth- 
Century Usages', 1976b) and John Dowling ('Capricho as Style in Life, Literature 
and Art from Zamora to Goya', 1977). Ilie's contribution is a compilation of several 
quotations from various eighteenth-century Spanish texts which mention the word. 
He lists these usages under six headings, in  which capricho is defined as (1) "an 
aspect of the psychology of creative activity", (2) "a concept governing design", (3) 
"an aesthetic quality of art", (4) "a synonym for general irrationality and extrava­
gance", (5) "whim, fancy, quirk", (6) "emotional tonality" (19766:242-43). Hie lists 
Goya's advertisement under the fifth category, linking Goya's use of the adjective 
"caprichosos" (capricious) to the 'irrational and extravagant' (252)58. The fact that 
this listing fails to exhaust the possible implications of Goya's usage brings out the 
problem in. Ilie's glossary as a whole: in  his effort to be overly precise, he restricts 
meaning. Most of his categories are too open to contain the word capricho with any 
rigour; each defining characteristic has the potential to fold .in on the other. What 
seem, to Hie, to be distinctions are, to my mind, no more than subtle shifts in the 
deployment of the word. Moreover, despite all the usages he gathers, one still has 
the sense that the full rp '  '°e of the term is broader and more ductile than a
glossary could allow59.
58 For the sake of throwing a ■ .nner in the works, it should be pointed out that the use of 
the word capricho, in its various forms, was not uncommon in newspaper advertisements 
generally. Edith Heiman notes in her article 'Caprichos and Monstruos of Cadalso and Goya' 
that advertisements for costumbrista prints sometimes made use of the word (1958:202-3re,6), 
In the light of this, one might even surmise that the adjective 'caprichosos' was added by the 
Gnceta de Madrid in a bid to help Madrid citizens understand what kind of prints were being 
offered for sale. Costumbrista prints were highly popular in Goya's day, since they were con­
cerned with everyday subjects and people, the majcs, tmjas, petimetres and petimctras that 
intoxicated even Queen Maria Luisa; some even toyed with world-upside-down subjects 
and invited purchasers to hybridise iorms (see Askew, 1988:82-92, for a useful discussion of 
costumbrista prints). Such prints can almost certainly be counted among the influences that- 
helped Goya to shape his Caprichos.
59 Ilie also impedes his own cause by trying too hard to distinguish capricho horn fantasia -
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For Dowling the matter is simpler and comes down to this: 'the capricho style . . .  
makes use of odd or antic elements which usurp a significant, sometimes even cen­
tral, place in a work of art' (1977:433). Thus it relates to a concept of supplementar- 
ity and marginal! ty such as we have already encountered in tire Grotesque, and 
refers to collateral elements in an image which have the power to withdraw the 
viewer's interest from those aspects that should be central. In thi: ■ -ivse it is sub­
versive, but in the same playful manner as grotesque ornament. It is a i ,  a pres­
ence that undermines while still existing within normative confines -  a licensed 
excess. Whether this helps us understand Goya's use of the term capricho is debat­
able, since the capricious in his etchings is central. Certainly one could say that the 
density and believability of his fantastical world draws attention away from his 
satirical purpose60, a displacement that probably comes from a mixture of design 
and accident61. To more fully understand Goya's use of capricho one has to look at
he is harsh in his treatment of Edith Hetman's efforts to link the two terms (1976b:24l) -  and 
by shrugging off possible connections between capricho and grotesque (240). Simply because 
the did not find precise evidence of such links in the literature he used to compile the glos­
sary cannot discount the possibility that these terms were closely related in the minds of 
eighteenth-century writers and artists.
60 Cf. Charles Baudelaire's famous comment on Goya's Caprichos:
The chief merit of Goya lies in his ability to create credible monstrosities. His monsters 
are viable, harmoniously proportioned. No one has dared to go further than he in the di­
rection of grotesque reality. All these contortions, bestial faces, and diabolical grimaces, 
are profoundly human. Even from tire technical point of view of natural history, it would 
be hard to fault them, every inch of them is so well-knit and so carefully integrated into 
the whole. In a word, it is difficult to say precisely at what point reality and fantasy are 
knitted! together and joined. (Cited arid translated in  Glendinning, 1977:295)
This point can be reconfigured thus: in many of Goya's prints his depiction of the condi­
tion to be abject overwhelms his satirical operation to abject. Instead of banishing his witches, 
for example, we stand and allow ourselves to be fascinated by them. Riveted more by what 
they are than by what Goya intended them to do, we do not act against them. Resubmitting 
claims I made earlier on the basis of my reading of Thomson, one might even feel that they 
banish us. Goya's text -  Iris satirical message -  is here jeopardised by the truth effect of the 
image: its ability to persuade, to take the viewer in and make him or her believe in the 
existence of monsters, witches and goblins, In tire process the image's power to disturb, the 
impact of its Grotesque language, must increase, with a concomitant increase of fascination 
or anxiety in the viewer.
61 Here I make deliberate reference to tire psychoanalytic concept of "displacement". Dis­
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Ms Caprichos. Suffice it to say that the category of the capricho gave Goya a frame­
work within wMch to develop an artistic project that combined social comment 
and imagination.
Snefio is similar to fantasia in  that it refers primarily to a state of mind: sueno 
means 'dream'. Dreams have long been used as allegorical devices, and Goya, as he 
worked on the preparatory studies for the etching series he originally intended to
placement is one among three functions of what Freud calls the "dream-work" -  the process 
whereby dreams transform latent dream-thoughts into the manifest content of the dream (for 
definitions of the terms "latent dream-thoughts" and "manifest dream-content" see Freud, 
1991a, chapter six and passim; also see Freud, 1976:143-56, 204-18) -  namely: (1) condensa­
tion, in which latent material is condensed into singular unified images and dream passages 
(see Freud, 1991rt:383-413; 1976:205-7); (2) representation, the process whereby mental activ­
ity such as thought is converted into dream images (see Freud, 1991<z:420-53; 1976:209-12); 
and (3) displacement, in which latent material is displaced to different and unexpected parts 
of the manifest dream (see Freud, 19910:414-19; 1976:208-9). Condensation is a principle of 
combination and fusion, representation one of conversion, displacement one of (de)centring 
and shifting. All these functions of the dream-work, understood outside the dream contex t as 
structures of mental functioning that have the potential to emerge even during conscious­
ness to influence the way one composes images, can be perceived in Goya's etchings. Here I 
will concern myself only with displacement, which the following quote from Freud's Intro­
ductory Lectures puts in perspective:
[Displacement] manifests itself in two ways: in the first, a latent element is replaced not by a 
Component part of itself but by something more remote -  that is, by an allusion; and in 
the second, the physical accent is shifted from an important element on to another which 
is unimportant, so that the dream appears differently centred and strange, (1976:208)
Displacement thus emerges as a means whereby latent elements of a dream are mani­
fested by association and allusion, i.e., not literally. It also emerges as a process of alienation: 
that which is displaced is removed further and further from its original content. Increasing 
alienation can lead to a detachment from the content, and it is therefore no surprise drat 
displacement is a term that has tilso been used in examinations of obsessional neurosis, 
where it appears as a form of defence. Defence against the material itself, but also against 
Censorship, that is, repression. In Fcrits, Lacan writes that displacement is 'the most appro­
priate means Used by the unconscious to foil censorship' (1977:160). By displacing manifest 
content onto a set of allusions that appear unrelated to the dream-thoughts, the unconscious 
can, so to speak, slip otherwise repressed material into the mind via a back door.
Displacements of various kinds can be found in Goya's etchings in three respects: (1) an 
unintentional displacement of the satirical message into the background by the blanketing 
cohesion of the image; (2) an intentional displacement of the satirical message into the 
register of connotation by setting the image in a fantasy setting, thereby foiling external 
forms of censorship: not necessarily the Inquisitional threat some scholars claim he had to 
be conscious of, but certainly that of libel (were some public figures to think he had ridi­
culed them), and also, to a lesser extent, the ever-present limitations enforced on his subject 
matter by society's category of right and proper, permissible and impermissible; (3) an un­
conscious use of satire and the Grotesque to displace tire latent content o| his repressed self 
onto images -  that is, bypassing the censoring conscious in the process, to relocate uncon­
scious tension from his psy che to outside objects. Of these three forms of displacement only 
tire third one is strictly psychoanalytic, and is therefore to be treated as speculative.
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call Suenos (and which subsequently became Los Caprichos), had both the recent Visi- 
ones y Visitas de Torres con Don Francisco de Quevedo par la Corte (1727-1728) by the 
satirist Torres Villarroel and the earlier Suenos of Francisco de Quevedo (reprinted in 
1791) to draw on62. The authors of these works used dreams to camouflage satirical 
enterprises. Dreams, being unreal nocturnal phenomena by definition, allowed such 
authors, as Sayre claims in her article on Goya's drawings, to 'indict with impunity 
various evils which had found indulgence or official protection in their society' (1964: 
23).
The categories I have discussed above all gave Goya a loophole in the facade 
of what was otherwise a close-bricked art establishment that upheld nature and the 
ancients as the supreme models for artists. Excess, fancy, imagination and caprice 
were not favoured, but, so long as they conformed to a classifiable category of 
production, they were permitted. Goya -  or the editors of the Diario de Madrid -  
used words like "caprichosos" and "fantasia" in the advertisement because these 
words clearly established the context within which the work was to be received. 
Viewers lacking a sense of irony and naive to cloaked messages would simply 
have taken the images to be dreams and irrationalities, meaningless baubles. Those 
in the know would have seen the use of fantasy for what it was: a means of 
displacing the actual satirical and censuring content of the etchings into the 
background,
In the remainder of this section I will show that a capricious context gave 
Goya licence to (re)hivent a traditional principle -  that of selection and combina­
tion.
62 For a useful discussion of the similarities and differences between Goya's Caprichos and 
Quevedo's Suenos, see L6pez-Rey, 1970:99-101.
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1. "A single fantastic personage "
In his advertisement Goya writes.
Painting (like poetry) selects from the universal that which it judges most ap­
propriate for its ends: unites in a single fantastic personage circumstances and 
characters that nature presents distributed in many, and from this ingeniously 
arranged combination results that happy imitation by which a good artificer ac­
quires the title of inventor and not of servile copyist.
The concept of selection in the fine arts was a common and highly valued one
in eighteenth-century Spain. In his Reflections on the Beauty and Taste in Painting,
Anton Raphael Mengs, the Neo-classical first painter to King Carlos III, writes:
In its productions. Nature is subject. . .  to many accidents. Art works freely, 
using entirely flexible materials that offer no resistance. Painting can select the 
most beautiful of all Nature's spectacles, gathering and joining parts from differ­
ent places and tire beauty of different people. On the contrary, in forming man 
Nature is forced to take materials solely from the parents, and to accommodate 
all accidents; for this reason it can easily happen that painted men are more 
beautiful than real ones63.
Here the artist uses selection to improve nature and install a vision of the world 
in which ideal beauty holds sway -  the familiar goal of Neo-classicism. Other theor­
ists (if the period expressed congenerous sentiments (see Schulz, 1996:126-36). Selec- 
tiorj. in this case was constrained by a mimetic project; when it was not, when it 
sirfiply combined disparate elements and created impossible "false" figures, it was 
spurned, d la Vitruvius, by most leading theorists64.
63 The original text, which I have borrowed from Schulz (1996:125-26), reads:
La Naturaleza en sus producciones esta sujeta . . .  a muchos accidentes. El Arte obra 
libremente sirviendose de materiales enteramente flexibies, y que no hacen resistencia 
alguna. La Pintura puede escoger lo mas hermoso de todo el espectaculo de la Natura­
leza, recogiendo y juntando las partes de diversos lugares, y las bellezas de distintas per­
sonas. La Naturaleza al contrario, para la formacion del hombre esta precisada a tomar la 
materia solamente de los padres, y a acoir adarse con todos los accidentes; y por esto con 
facilidad puede suceder que los hombres pintados sean mas belios que los verdaderos.
64 Capmany, for example, whose "complaint", according to Hie, 'was not against it'.agina­
tive activity altogether, only against the failure to distinguish between "la bell a imaginacidn 
siempre natural" [the fine imagination always true to nature] and "la falsa, la que amontona 
cosas incompatibles" [the false, which shelters incompatible things]' (1976n:l96), Like Vitru­
vius, Capmany simply cannot accept that "incompatible things" can be "sheltered" to­
gether. Unnatural combination is thus again seen as simply creating falsehoods.
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Now, although Goya's sentiments in the advertisement clearly follow the Neo­
classical dictum of Mengs, the selective process I j adopts in Los Caprichos is of a 
different order -  signposted by the adjective "fantastic". If we now recall Ruskin's 
claim ihat '[a] fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols 
thrown together in bold and fearless connection, of truths which it would have 
taken a long time to express in any verbal way' (1907:91) -  a description, one can 
now see, of a combinatory process -  and then turn to a crucial passage in Paulson's 
Representations of Revolution, a thread I have been running ever since I noted Vitru­
vius's discomfort with the Roman decorative style's principle of amalgamation, 
will finally form a workable pattern:
When [Goya] claims that "the majority of the objects represented in [Los Capri­
chos] are ideal," he is parodying *hc platonic "ideal" as perfection and a striving 
toward the "Idea." His prints are "ideal" in the sense that they have "so far 
existed only in the human mind, obscured and confused by lack of precedence." 
The traditional association of the "ideal" with the beautiful is no longer valid, 
whether politically, historically, or aesthetically.
Thus the Caprichos, as "invention" and not as the work of an "artist copier," 
are unbounded by the traditional provinces of poetry and painting. The gro­
tesque is therefore the appropriate mode into which he launches his art. The old 
meaning of grotesque, "visual elements compounded artificially but patterned 
on the natural world," remained. The French sense of the word, however, with 
the synonyms ridicule, bizarre, and extravagant, was also current,, and by the mid­
century Spanish writers were joining the idea of a strange hybrid with the aim to 
ridicule . . .  [Tjhe grotesque could function as satire. (1983:330-31)
In his brief delimitation of the Spanish grotesque Paulson incorporates all those 
aspects of it I listed earlier, presumably because his primary source, like mine, ap­
pears to have been Hie. This leads him to (1) associate Goya's act of selection with 
the hybridising and agglomerating principle of the Grotesque, (2) point out that by 
Goya's time the Grotesque had melded several meanings to become a "strange hy­
brid" itself, and (3) claim a satirical purpose for the Grotesque. Goya's "single fan­
tastic personage" is the quintessence of the satirical Grotesque: a hybrid, creature 
fashioned according to the artist's powers of selection. To reconfigure according to 
my terms, this polygener is, in fact, the mutation generated by the meeting of the ab- 
jocting principle of satire and the abject condition represented by the Grotesque: a
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familiar and unfamiliar figure that must be mocked and ridiculed if it is not, itself, 
to mock and ridicule. The selective principle that creates this unstable, yet-to-be-clas­
sified matter (because it is only classified in the site of its 'consumption', by the 
viewer) is no longer a principle of beauty or imitation, but one of caricature: the 
artist chooses those elements of natural deformation that will best convey his satiri­
cal design, then combines them into a single figure, which (1) condenses the full 
complexity of his comment and censure, and (2) calls on the viewer to define and 
so tame the hybrid and all that it represents.
I choose the word "condenses" advisedly: it leads me to the final point I want 
to make here, that the Grotesque as a mode of expression derives its modus operandi 
from the condensing processes of dreams, i.e., the metaphorical functioning of the 
unconscious65.
Kris and Gombrich, who believe that the growth of tire Grotesque reflects the 
increasing freedom of artists from the sixteenth century on, have noted the follow­
ing: '[t]he affinity of [grotesque] creations with the dream was recognized. "He 
who wants to create dreamwork," says Albrecht Durer, "must make a mixture of 
all things'" (1974:199). The two scholars, psychoanalyst and art historian -  a mar­
vellous hybrid combination in  its own right -  believe that dreams and tire creative 
play of grotesque ornament share a principle, that of mixture.
65 By the word "dreams" I am referring strictly to mental processes that occur during sleep 
(i.e., not day-dreams, fantasies, etc.; although these do, of course, display some of the char­
acteristics of unconscious dreams). Freud's work on dreams in Tire Interpretation of Dreams 
(1991s) and Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1976) remains the most important 
psychoanalytical examination of dreams, and it is from him, unless otherwise specified, that 
I draw the terminology for this discussion. Condensation, as noted earlier, is one of the 
functions of tire dream-work.
My phrase "the metaphorical functioning of the unconscious" is derived from Lacan's 
remodelling of Freud's dream-work terms. In his Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The 
Psychoses, 1993:221, Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 1994:XXVliI, 247, and 
Merits, 1977:160, Lacan conceives of displacement as the metonymic and condensation as the 
metaphoric function of the unconscious. Displacement is luxalive, fissile, mobile; it depends 
on a relation between two separate units. Condensation is unifying, combmatory and amal­
gamating: separate units come together to express their meaning, as opposed to creating 
meaning in relation to another, external unit.
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Schulz reaches the same conclusion:
the grotesque depiction of the human figure in Los Caprichos is analogous to dream 
imagery, a connection made plain in the Renaissance description of grotesque dec­
oration as sogni del pittori. Indeed, the strange and impossible combinations that 
occur in dreams provide a paradigm for the joining of disparate elements in the 
grotesque, suggesting how deeply rooted such imagery is in the human psyche. 
(1996:174-75)
What these writers do not pick up on is the fact that in Freudian dre un termi­
nology the word that covers the ability of the unconscious to combine, mix, agglom­
erate and reformulate objects and people into a "single fantastic personage" is con­
densation. In Lecture eleven of his Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis Freud 
describes the results of condensation in the following manner:
You will have iio difficulty in recalling instances from your own dreams of differ­
ent people being condensed into a single one. A composite figure of this kind may 
look like A perhaps, but may be dressed like B, may do something that we remem­
ber C doing, and at the same time we know that he is D. This composite structure 
is of course emphasizing something that the four people have in common. It is pos­
sible, naturally, to make a composite structure out of things or places in the same 
way as out of people. . .  The process is like constructing a new and transitory con­
cept which has this common element as its nucleus. (1976:205-6)
Not surprisingly, a little further on in the lecture Freud himself bridges the gap
between condensation and the workings of the imagination:
It is true that counterparts to the construction of these composite figures are to 
be found in some creations of our imagination, which is ready to combine into a 
unity components of things that do not belong together in our experience -  in the 
centaurs, for instance, and tire fabulous beasts which appear in ancient mythol­
ogy. . .  (206)
He adds, '[t]he "creative" imagination, indeed, is quite incapable of inventing 
anything; it can only combine components that are strange to one another' (206-7). 
Freud may not use the word grotesque, but his concept of combination is directly 
applicable to the intermixture that has emerged as a core characteristic of the Gro­
tesque66, and it adequately explains Goya's own synthetic process of invention.
66 Incidentally, there is nothing exactly radical .dout my connection between condensation 
and art, nor between combined figures and the Grotesque. John Walker, in his 1983 article 
'Dream-work and Art-work', takes a comprehensive look at the way art processes reflect 
dream processes. The following point about caricature is particularly apt: 'Pictorial equi­
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This is not to claim that the Grotesque is solely explicable within the bounds of 
unconscious processes, but it seems to me that our understanding of the roots of 
representational hybridity is extended and enriched by relating it to the psycho­
analytic concept of dream-work. If we shift our understanding in this direction it 
becomes easier to accept that the Grotesque as an  artistic mode is closely bound to 
both the operations and contents vf the unconscious. It uses similar processes of 
allusion, metaphor, metonymy and combination, and has the potential to image 
objects, non-objects, environments and situations not normally depicted in, i.e., re­
pressed from, hegemonic forms of representation.
Goya even allows, as far as his own grotesque is concerned, for such a connec­
tion between image and unconscious, for, as he claims in his advertisement, his 
Caprichos "expose to the eyes forms and attitudes that have only existed until now 
in the human mind, obscured and confused for the lack of illustration or excited 
with uncontrolled passions". Can we not find in  Ibis, even if only emblematically, 
a description of unconscious "forms and attitudes" and repressed "passions"?
In the course of this chapter I have argued that the Grotesque is (1) the mode 
that depicts the condition of being abject, and is used in satire to abject members of 
society whom the satirist considers to be undesirable; (2) characterised by a prin­
ciple of free selection and fanciful synthesis (often resulting in impossible conjunc­
tions of real flora and fauna and monstrous creatures) which finds its vertex in the 
"fantastic personage" of the grotesque body, a potentially unstable conglomerate of 
unclassifiable matter; (3) that it is mutable and can quickly invert from something 
familiar to something unfamiliar, even terrifying, depending on how the viewer re­
ceives and classifies it; (4) that it is capable of inducing satirical, mocking laughter, 
which functions to abject, and of making the viewer feel that s /h e  is being laughed
valents to collective figures are commonly found in caricatures . . . [they] are disturbing 
because the creatures produced by the work of condensation are grotesque hybrids in which 
the head is that of a human being while the body is that of an animal' (110).
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at, made abject, by either the protagonists in the image or by the artist; (5) that it is 
motile and capable of shifting between the extremes of low (configured as a place 
of degradation, alienation and filth) and high (configured as a place where classifi­
cation is complete, incontrovertible, and all anxiety is eschewed) in a curious rela­
tionship where to temporarily spare oneself from the terror of losing one's own 
identity one must confront, dip into, the place of degradation and unclassified, limit­
less matter; and (6) that it is irrational, irregular, anti-Reason, anti-mimesis, therefore 
subterranean and suppressed or at least marginal to a predominantly mimetic enter­
prise that allowed it a place in the establishment only so that it could serve as an 
example to mimetic artists of what not to do with the imagination, and only if it 
was couched in categories that were deliberately, even theatrically, artificial or other­
worldly (e.g., dreams -  themselves considered irrational and dependent on the ab­
sence of consciousness).
Now it is time to look more closely at Rusldn's conception of the Grotesque as 
something that emerges in the "gaps", for, as Lacan has claimed (1994), the uncon­
scious also emerges through gaps, and so, therefore, would unconscious material.
The abject, for example.
V. Grotesque to Abject
A fine grotesque is the expression, in a moment, by a series of symbols thrown 
together in bold and fearless connection, of truths which it would have taken a 
long time to express in any verbal way, and of Which the connection is left for 
the beholder to work out for himself; the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of 
the imagination, forming the grotesque character. (Ruskin, 1907:91)
Much in Goya's etchings is caricatural, satiric, or topical, but none of these cate­
gories provides a fully satisfactory explanation. These etchings contain distinctly 
ominous, nocturnal, and abysmal features that frighten and puzzle us and make us 
feel as if the ground beneath our feet were about to give way. (Kayser, 1963:18)
These quotes suggest that when a reader/viewer encounters the Grotesque, s /he  
feels that the ground weakens beneath his or her feet, creating if not a hermeneutic 
gap at least a zone of precariousness and uncertainty. The result, according to Harp-
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ham, is that 'Grotesqueries confront us as a corrupt or fragmented text in search of 
a master principle' (1982:43)67. He adds: 'Looking at ourselves looking at the gro­
tesque, we can observe our own projections, catching ourselves, as it were, in the 
act of perception' (43). Recalling Kayser's point that the Grotesque feels estranged 
because it takes us by surprise, I could sum up by proposing that the mode startles 
viewers out of their complacency and makes them aware of their own agency in 
making the perceived object(s) signify. McElroy, for one, is dissatisfied with this 
understanding of the Grotesque since, he claims, 'it has little to do with the immedi­
acy of our response to [for example] one of Bosch's hell-scapes' (1989:8). "Immedi­
acy" is a strong noun, but not strong enough to stand alone in this context -  one 
might easily argue that what accounts for this "immediacy" is precisely the lack of 
a "master principle" or a direct reference to physical reality. As I have already 
argued, the Grotesque offers images of matter out of place, and as such presents the 
viewer with something that has to be defined, named and put in a known category. 
In my hypothesis, then, the Grotesque is indeterminate by definition, and will re­
main so until the interpreting subject (re)cognises and classifies it.
Generally speaking, the Grotesque offers narratives of the unfamiliar, but always 
with a purpose, and never without a degree of familiarity. The Grotesque works by 
veiling a familiar message and familiar worlds beneath an artificially-compounded 
iconography and a particular range of forms. Only if the interpreting subject finds 
the familiar within the unfamiliar can s/he  overcome the Grotesque's indetermin­
acy and root back into the known. I have already argued that this re-rooting occurs 
through an act of classification, naming. But what happens when the interpreting 
subject faces something that s/he simply cannot recognise or classify, or something 
that, even after it has been named, continues to leave gaps in  his or her comprehen­
67 Thomson expresses much the same idea when he states: 'The shock-effect of tihe gro­
tesque may also be used to bewilder and disorient, to bring the reader up short, jolt him out 
of accustomed ways of perceiving the world and confront him with a radically different, 
disturbing perspective' (1972:58),
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sion (contemplation of dead bodies would be a classic example of such indetermin­
acy, since even though we know what death is, it is impossible for the living to 
understand it: there are no conclusive points of reference to relate it to)?
Ruskin writes: 'the connection is left for the beholder to work out for himself; 
the gaps, left or overleaped by the haste of the imagination, forming the grotesque 
character' (1907:91). Ruskin is clear: the beholder is the one who must work out the 
connections between the symbols the artist has condensed to form a Grotesque 
image, i.e., s/he is the one who must recognise, decipher, categorise; but after the 
symbols have been fathomed, gaps still remain which, for him, are the essence of 
the "grotesque character". To negotiate those gaps, the beholder must either leave 
them alone or "overleap" them with, help from the imagination.
Patricia Spacks, in her article 'Some Reflections on Satire', offers the same
choice in dealing with gaping satirical texts:
The satiric plo t. . .  does not provide the satisfaction of completion. The reader is 
left insecure, unanchored . . .  To resolve the insecurity, the revealed tension be­
tween is and ought, the reader must take -  or plan, imagine, speculate about -  
action. (In Paulson, 1971:364)
For Spacks it is the absence of closure that makes viewers feel unnnchored, and she 
understands this as an exhortation, addressed to the reader/viewer, to at least 
plan, speculate about or -  in direct echo of Ruskin -  imagine means of enforcing 
completion th ro u g h  action.
Mary Douglas recalls Ruskin's separations even more closely than Spacks. Dis­
cussing the ambiguous and the anomalous in cultural systems, Douglas states:
There are several ways of treating anomalies. Negatively, we can ignore, just not 
perceive them, or perceiving we can condemn. Positively we can deliberately 
confront tire anomaly and try to create a new pattern of reality in which it has a 
place. (1984:38)
In a confrontation with the anomalous (thus, by extension, the Grotesque68)
68 Susan Stewart indicates tire way in which anomalies and ambiguities can express the 
Grotesque when she claims: 'The anomalous stands between the categories of an existing 
classification system [while] [t]he ambiguous is that which cannot be defined in terms of any
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Douglas allows for three, not two, forms of action: (1) ignore the anomaly -  simply 
avoid confrontation, (2) condemn it (i.e., banish or abject it), or (3) tackle the anomaly 
head on and attempt to reconfigure it according to one's personal experience69. 
Choice one is the course of least resistance, but also the one least likely to be fruitful 
in the long term; choice two is the one the satirist expects his audience to make -  the 
one which classifies the anomalous matter and so places it, tames it, defuses it; choice 
three is the one that overlaps with Ruskin and Spacks. Although Douglas does not 
use the word imagination, it seems to me that a "new pattern of reality" could easily 
be an imaginative or fantastical one that does not accord with known reality, especi­
ally when one considers that of the five methods she claims 'primitive' cultures use 
to deal with anomalies (see footnote 69), only one of them (number five) is not avoid­
ing or condemning, and this one involves "ambiguous symbols" used in  much the 
same way as symbols are used in "poetry and mythology" -  both which cultural 
manifestations are dependent on the imagination -  to point to other "levels of exist­
ence" (i.e., "patterns of reality") that make sense of the anomaly in new, different, but 
nonetheless fantasised, contexts. In short, it is possible to argue that Douglas ..iso
given category' (in Harpham, 1982:4). The Grotesque likewise both straddles and evades 
classificatory paradigms.
69 Douglas (1984:39-40) lists at least five methods 'primitive' cultures adopt to deal with 
ambiguous and/or anomalous events: most are condemning and require the exercising of. 
some form of control:
(1) 'by settling for one or other interpretation, ambiguity is often reduced.' (39)
(2) 'the existence of anomaly can be physically controlled.' (39)
(3) 'a rule of avoiding anomalous things affirms and strengthens the definitions 
to which they do not conform.' (39)
(4) 'anomalous events may be labelled dangerous . . . Attributing danger is one 
way of putting a subject above dispute.' (1984:40)
(5) 'ambiguous symbols can be used in ritual for the same ends as they are used 
in poetry and mythology, to enrich meaning or to call attention to other levels of 
existence.' (40)
Although Douglas writes with "primitive" societies and ritual in mind, all of the above 
methods of displacing the anomalous are used by so-called 'civilised' or 'modern' cultures as 
well. While atavistic rituals may not be involved, exclusions and taboos most certainly are, and 
they conform to the above means of control, both oppressive (2,3,4) and sublimating (5).
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admits the imagination into processes aimed at placing things that have no imme­
diately recognisable place in visible reality.
An art depicting invented and fantastical forms and situations could provide 
exactly the kind of "overleap" Ruskin calls for, or the "new pattern of reality" 
Douglas suggests, When Goya uses fantasy, witches chiefly, to depict '"imaginary 
gardens with real toads in them'" (Hodgart, 1969:11-12), he is himself creating an un­
real place for those aspects of society that strike him as grotesque and anomalous. 
In doing this he turns something familiar into something sufficiently unfamiliar to 
place his audience in a precarious situation, one they must now deal with if they 
are to make ser^e of the anomaly he has presented. At the same time, one could 
argue, he finds a place for the things that make him anxious, and so achieves a 
measure of control over them. In other words, his imagination gives him the power 
to reconfigure his world, to overleap the grotesque gaps that he either cannot clas­
sify or which appear within the process of categorisation.
What Ruskin, Spacks and Douglas -  and Goya, for that matter -  offer are not 
means to explain the gaps or anomalies, but ways to deal with them. They offer 
displacement: a way of putting the anxieties of the gap elsewhere, in a whole new 
world of the imagination. This begs the question. Why must the gaps be dealt with, 
overleaped? Why can they not remain open doorways? Because the human mind 
cannot deal with a vacuum? Because '[t]here is nothing more dangerous than ap­
proaching a void' (Lacan, 1993:201)? Because '[ajpocalyptic beasts [will] emerge 
from, the abyss [and] demons intrude upon us' (Kayser, 1963:185)?
If the answer to these questions is yes, one returns to the prefatory question. 
Why? The answer I want to pose is this: just as there is no such thing as a vacuum 
in nature or any element of nature -  where one system fails, another takes over 
(where a depression forms, pressure exits from an area of high concentration to fill 
the area of low concentration; after blood clots on a wound a scab forms; at death 
the body decays) -  so there is no such thing as a vacuum in mental functioning.
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Hence: where the conscious fades the unconscious emerges.
The gaps are only gaps for so long. If the viewer/reader does not instate a con­
scious process (of avoidance, classification, or of the imagination) to reduce the in­
determinacy, the unconscious itself will fill the gap. And with it will come "non- 
things" -  non-objects -  that cannot be recognised or understood by the conscious, 
these creating the ambiguity, polymorphism, indeterminacy, limitlessness, unreason, 
irrationality, unease, anxiety, and even terror characteristic of the state of mind 
ushered in by the Grotesque.
Harpham -  even in  his apparently unrecognised link between gaps and the un­
conscious -  accords with this perspective in the following important passage:
The anthropologist Edmund Leach . . . argues that the physical and social envi­
ronment of a young child does not contain any intrinsically separate "things" 
but is perceived as a seamless fabric, a flow. With training the child develops 
and imposes on the world a discriminatory grid that isolates a large number of 
separate things, each with its own name. Inevitably, the grid fails to account for 
or identify a certain segment of reality, which therefore appears as a series of 
"non-things." Our suppression of the objects in the interstices of consciousness 
takes the form of taboo, so that the sacred flourishes only in the gaps, where we 
find incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural monsters that are half-man 
and half-beast [...] Primitives worship the taboo, but modem secular adults are 
so indebted to and dependent upon their discriminatory grids that they find the 
taboo mostly a source of anxiety, horror, astonishment, laughter, or revulsion. 
Witness, for example, our strong but ambivalent feelings toward those exuda­
tions of (he human body that mediate between self and non-self, the magical out­
cast ingredients of witch's brews such as feces, urine, semen, menstrual blood, 
nail parings, and spittle. (1982:4)
This is a particularly dense passage for close reading, as it encapsulates much 
of what my thesis has explored so far, and prefigures what is yet to come.
One can find parallels for Leach's concept of the child's initial inability to dis­
tinguish itself from the things in its environment in the psychoanalysis of Freud and 
several analysts that have followed him (including Melanie Klein and Julia Kristeva); 
furthermore, the idea of nameable categories that enable the infant to emerge from a 
"seamless" world of "flow" into one controlled by identifications and names (i.e., 
language) is mirrored and taken further in the psychoanalytic system of Jacques
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Lacan70, to which I want to pay some attention now.
Lacan gathers language, nomination and symbolism under the all-important con­
cept of the Symbolic -  a concept he arrived at via a combination of influences, includ­
ing Saussure and Levi-Strauss71. The Symbolic order is coterminous with, even 
synonymous for, the linguistic structures that regulate society, and for the law that 
underlies societal functioning, determining what is permissible and. impermissible 
for the subject. It is articulated and administered through symbolism, in its broadest 
sense: the fact that humanity orders the visible world through words. In Lacan's 
Seminar, Book III we read:
70 Leach makes no reference to psychoanalytic theory; his influences are primarily anthro­
pological: Levi-Strauss, Douglas and Radcliffe-Brown (see Leach in Lessa and Vogt, 1979: 
157). Anthropology has for many years, however, turned to psychoanalysis for fresh per­
spectives, and vice versa, so it is no surprise that similar conceptions of the human subject 
have arisen in either discourse.
71 Lacan was indebted to Saussure's linguistic theory that signifiers (words, symbols) have 
no intrinsic connection to their signifieds (in visible reality). While Saussure's influence was 
important for a range of ideas, including Lacan's complex theorisation of desire, Lacan's 
debt to Levi-Strauss was probably larger than his debt to Saussure. A reading of two semi­
nal essays in L6vi-Strausszs Structural Anthropology -  'Language and the Analysis of Social 
Laws' (1968:55-66) and 'The Effectiveness of Symbols' (1968:186-205) -  published at a for­
mative stage in Lacan's thinking, appear to have determined the psychoanalyst's conception 
of the unconscious as a language (see the introduction to Muller and Richardson, 1994:6-10, 
for a brief discussion of these two essays and how they may have influenced Lacan). Levi- 
Stiauss's impression of language as a process that occurs as if without the involvement of 
the subject is clearly present in the following passage from Lacan's Seminar, Book II:
There is a symbolic circuit external to the subject, tied to a certain group of supports, of 
human agents, in which the subject. . .  is indeterminately included . . .  A certain ex­
change of relations, both external and internal, takes place which has to be represented as 
a speech that is recited. With a recording machine, one could isolate it, preserve it. For 
the most part, it escapes the subject, who doesn't possess the recording machines in ques­
tion, and continues, comes back, always ready to re-enter the dance of the inner speech. 
(1988i>:98)
Beyond this, Levi-Strauss's extensive investigations of marriage rules, kinship structures, 
incest taboos and the interface between symbolic exchange and systems of order also had a 
marked influence on Lacan. As an example, the relationship in which subjects are argued by 
Lacan to stand to speech -  a relationship in which subjects are circulated with and as signifiers
-  is reminiscent of Levi-Strauss's work around the symbolic exchange of women. 'Now/ Lacan 
says in his Seminar (Book H), 'Levi-Strauss shows that, in the structure of alliance, the woman 
is the exchange object, just as speech, which is in effect the original object of exchange, is.' 
(19886:261; see also The Four Fundamental Concents of Psychoanalysis. 1994:150.1 should add 
that Lacan gives Levi-Strauss's ideas a fair amount of attention in book two of bis Seminar: 
19886:27-30,32-35,52,189; also see Seminar. Book VII. 1992:75-76. and Ecrits, 1977:73)
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it seems that the symbolic is what yields us the entire world system. IPs because 
man has words that he has knowledge of things. And the number of things he has 
knowledge of corresponds to the number of things he is able to name. (1993:177)
What is known is what is classified, and the Symbolic order is the sum total of
these lists and tables of named "things". The order, we learn elsewhere, is not
dependent on "man" for its existence; indeed, for Lacan, the opposite is true: 'the
symbolic is what is most elevated in  man and what isn't in man, but elsewhere'
(1988b:116), And in book one of the Seminar one finds the following:
All human beings share in the universe of symbols. They are included in it and 
submit to it, much more than they constitute it. They are much more its supports 
than its agents. (1988u:157)
Lacan grants subjects a stake in the constitution of the Symbolic, but views 
them essentially as its vassals -  the servants of a master who is "elsewhere"72.
To return to Leach and Harpham: the "discriminatory grid" of which they write 
can be understood as Lacan's Symbolic. But at this point of intersection, Leach 
drifts out of the picture; only Harpham and Lacan continue to share, at least in 
part, a joint perspective. Their commonality turns around the issue of what fails to 
fit the discriminatory grid and therefore appears as a "non-thing". Lacan does not 
use this Harphamian term73, but I briefly want to indicate how he suggests or ap­
proaches it in his discourse on lack and desire.
72 Virtually the same view is expressed by Staliybrass and White, neither of whom, I 
suspect, would claim to be disciples of Lacan:
Traversed by regulative forces quite beyond its conscious control, the body is territoiial- 
ised in accordance with hierarchies and topographical rules which it enacts automati­
cally, which come from elsewhere and which make it a point of intersection and flow 
within the elaborate symbolic systems of the socius. (1986:90)
73 In fact, it is a term borrowed from Leach (in Lessa and Vogt, 1979:157), Leach uses a 
diagram, to illustrate this relationship, which is worth reproducing here:
Named ''things"
j m w e w j  j r i f w f t i a n j  J n f e m a w j
JTabooedparts o f  ^  
the environment 
"Non-tilings"
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For Lacan sigiufiexs are primary, even though they are only signifiers of other 
signifiers (therefore of a meaning that always exists 'elsewhere'). Desire is, essen­
tially, the quest to re-find 'true' objecthood or 'the object', which, so the subject 
believes, was once an aspect of his or her existence (see Lacan, 1993:84-85, 150). 
The problem is 'he never does find i t . . . [t]he subject never refinds . . . anything 
but another object that answers more or less satisfactorily to the needs in question' 
(85)74. But sometimes, it would seem, the subject instead finds nothing but an ob­
ject of Real75 anxiety:
[Tjhere's an anxiety-provoking apparition of an image which summarises what 
we can call the revelation of that which is least penetrable in the real, of the real 
lacking any possible mediation, of the ultimate real, of the essential object which 
isn't an object any longer, but this something faced with which all words cease 
and all categories fail, the object of anxiety par excellence. (1988b:164)76
7i Lacan, I suspect, in part derives this concept of having to refind the object from Freud's
discussion of reality testing in his essay on 'Negation'. There Freud writes: '[t]he first and 
immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which
corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is 
still there' (19917:440). In essay three of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality Freud makes a 
similar observation: '[t]he finding of an object is in fact a refinding of if  (1991c:145) -  in this
case he expressly relates the object to the mother's breast, which is often cited in psychoana­
lytic literature as one of the original lost objects; e.g., Lacan: '[t]he breast. . .  certainly repre­
sents that part of himself that the individual loses at birth, and which may serve to symbol­
ize the most profound lost object' (1994:198).
75 Early in his thought Lacan primarily conceived of the Real as a principle of constancy - 
as 'something one always finds in the same place, whether or not one has been there' (Lacan, 
19886:297). He also understood it as that which 'resists symbolisation absolutely" (1988r?:66). 
In time this view of the Real as something resistant to symbolism led Lacan to what seems to 
be his ultimate, yet also most incomplete, comprehension of the term, which is well explained 
by Alan Sheridan, his translator:
The "real" . . .  stands for what is neither symbolic nor imaginary, and remains foreclosed 
from the analytic experience, which is an experience of speech. What is prior to the as­
sumption of the symbolic, the real in its "raw" state (in the case of the subject, for in­
stance, the organism and its biological needs), may only be supposed, it is an a’gebraic x. 
(in Lacan, 1994:280)
The Real is thus big enough to contain all "non-things", including Kristeva's abject (cf. 
my discussion of the Real and the abject in the introduction, where I look at convergences 
between Freudian, Lacanian and Kristevian psychoanalysis).
76 Incidentally, the "apparition" Lacan refers to in this passage is 'the abyss of the feminine 
organ . .  . this gulf of the mouth, in which everything is swallowed up' (19886:164). Is there 
anything more 'grotesque' than a corporeal abyss, especially one situated in a female body, the 
ultimate signifier, it would appear, of a devouring container? Not in the terrain of male fan-
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Now, Lacan never defined this object -  its nature, topography, locale, or its rela­
tion to the subject77 -  and I am. not certain that he would have agreed, but it seems to 
me that it can be understood in  the same sense as Harpham's "non-things". These 
"non-things" emerge when 'the [discriminatory] grid fails to account for or identify 
a certain segment of reality' (1982:4). What is this "segment of reality" which Harp- 
ham locates in the "interstices of consciousness" -  in the "gaps"?
Here Lacan can again be of assistance: '[the unconscious is situated] in the 
gaps that the distribution of the signifying investments sets up in the subject' (1994: 
181). These are the gaps formed by the metonymic relationship between signifiers -  
since there is no signified, there is no base, and the unconscious lurks in this abys­
mal locale in the subject's constitution. That Lacan thought of this unconscious 
space as a monstrous domain is clear in the following passage, in which he closely 
echoes Wolfgang Kayser:
Since Freud himself, the development of the analytic experience has shown no­
thing but disdain for what appears in the gap. We have no t . . .  fed with blood the 
shades that have emerged from it. (1994:32)
He, of course, also echoes Harpham -  so closely, in fact, that I feel comfortable in 
claiming that they have a congruent understanding of "the gap": 'the sacred flour­
ishes only in the gaps, where we find incarnate deities, virgin mothers, supernatural 
monsters that are half-man and half-beast' (Harpham, 1982:4). It is only fitting that 
the subterranean level of our minds should end up equated with a margin or gap 
filled with threatening hybrid creatures, gods and superhumans. The unconscious is 
our psychic grotto, and its products -  as we know only too well from our dreams, in
tasies and terfrr.'., '
77 Although I suspect that, since he relates the object of anxiety to an apparition that he 
associates with the female throat, he may have had in mind the radical Otherness of women 
within the phallocentric order, and might therefore ha ve viewed the object -  the woman -  as 
beyond all categorisation because he could not situate her, name her, in the Symbolic. This 
is just a thought, however, and not the one I follow in the text. Its result would be the same, 
however: woman as non-thing.
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which nothing is impossible and anthropomorphism is virtually inextricable from 
metamorphosis ind  combination -  are grotesque and fantastical.
But, as I indicated in the previous section, the link between the Grotesque and 
the unconscious is deeper. For one thing, I am not claiming that the unconscious is 
what creates the Grotesque; rather, I am suggesting that when artists make use of 
the Grotesque mode they take on a set of structures, repertoires and methods that 
are paralleled by processes in the unconscious (e.g., condensation), and which there­
fore may originate in the unconscious. For another, it is what is in the unconscious
-  the material it harbours -  that to some extent feeds the concerns, subjects and 
themes, or dictates the shape, of works of art and literature that adopt the Grotesque 
mode. As an example, the unclassifiable matter the social formation tames by giv­
ing it the names 'dirt' or 'refuse' is paralleled in the unconscious by the substance of 
the pre-objectal environment, which, having arisen prior to the formation of the 
Imaginary78 and all that entails for Symbolic collocation, also exceeds classification. 
The threat of this unconscious material has the potential to exaggerate the threat of 
inatter that fluctuates in the social sphere, creating nodes of psychosocial crisis and 
anxiety. Here, exclusion of worrying matter is equal to the civilising process of re­
pression; both processes are aimed at managing whatever ripples the Symbolic and 
the ego. j
Such management is not easy. As Freud claims (e.g., 1991g:191,19911:299), the 
unconscious knows no time. This lack of past and present means that infantile ex­
periences can be accessed -  amongst other things, through a regressive procedure 
such as hypnosis -  by an adult who has long since lost the capacity to recall such 
experiences consciously. Thus even the subject's earliest preverbal experiences re­
main ifi ftte unconscious. One of the consequences of repression, itself a consequence 
of the civilising process, is the inversion of the preSymbolic into something shady.
78 The reader should note that, throughout this thesis, when I use the term 'Imaginary' 
with an upper-case T 1 am referring to Lacan's Imaginary.
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abysmal and grotesque. Defined in this way, what precedes the signifying order 
thus becomes a danger to the Symbolic, and mental functioning acts to control its 
irruption into consciousness by continually abjecting it back into the domain of 
repression.
Satire and the Grotesque are complicit in this process, but in a complex way. To 
start with -  and this is a key point -  what satire and the Grotesque depict tends to 
be a world that plays according to different rules, where things normally abhorred, 
prohibited and feared by law-abiding society are put on display (adultery, drunken­
ness, prostitution, murder, disease, criminals, death). Confronted by things not 
normally encountered in daily life, or even things that cannot be encountered (the 
supernatural), the viewer is compelled into worlds too nightmarish or even too real 
for mainstream representation, and even worlds of fantasy that s/he  needs to make 
sense of. As I have argued, if s/he  fails to make sense of such worlds, the uncon­
scious will arise to make its own sense of them. Why? Because if what the Gro­
tesque depicts cannot be understood in terms of the Symbolic, it will appeal to 
other, less immediate, parts of the viewer's subjectivity, i.e., the unconscious.
In short, satire and the Grotesque create situations favourable to the emergence 
of the unconscious. The unease, ambivalence, even fear, that this emergence can 
potentially create in the subject is essential to the success of the Grotesque, for 
therein lies its power to persuade. Persuade against what? Against the things that 
society pushes into its collective unconscious -  against the horrors and aberrations of 
the humein world that threaten the integrity of the social formation. Since a collec­
tive unconscious can only be created if the majority of a society's members share 
the same discriminatory grids and the same gaps, thus the same precepts for deter­
mining what they permit into their egos and what they deny from them, such art­
istic modes as satire and the Grotesque help to forge collective grids; they exhibit 
what, for the good of their community, the individual should push into his or her 
unconscious, i.e., what s /he  should repress. Satire and the Grotesque, in word and
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image, affix labels like 'dirt' and 'shit' to things or 'freak' and 'scum' to individuals 
that, by not easily fitting society's discriminatory grids, open hazardous gaps in the 
fabric of the Symbolic, and in so doing -  in placing, for example, excrement with 
'shit' or the deformed with 'freaks of nature" -  classify what potentially represents a 
threat to those comfortably inserted in the social order, and so (by pushing these 
threats into the collective unconscious) plug the taxonomic gaps and block out the 
unconscious. When this is not possible a last resort is the imagination, which can 
be used to serve not unconscious but conscious processes by (allocating the matter 
out of place in a "new pattern of reality" where tire individual can use Imaginary 
f  ces to destroy what s/he cannot name.
The unconscious and what it contains -  the abject primarily, for my project -  is 
the ultimate boogeyman. It contains not only all the material the subject has re­
pressed since infancy, but all tire objects, forms of behaviour and types of environ­
ments that threaten the subject here and now. Its emergence, for the sake of the 
Symbolic order which protects the subject against dissolution, must be kept to a 
manageable minimum. Satire and the Grotesque act conservatively by building 
into their images and texts the imperative not to embrace the repressed world of 
disorder or to feel subject to its menace, but to react against it: avoid it, laugh it off 
or put it in another, fantastical pattern of reality. The way I understand it, then, 
satire and the Grotesque lure the viewer/reader into encounters with the forbidden 
and repressed to shock him or her into a self-preserving posture that will induce the 
operation to abject. Abjecting, the viewer/reader maintains the unconscious and all 
its contents in a subterranean, grdttoesque position.
Goya's images wou1d appear to function in the above ways; but they also -  and 
here I am speculating again -  act as images of Imaginary contest (both within the 
iftiage and synchronously at the level of fantasy -  the interpenetrative conjunction 
between art work and mental functioning). The artist uses his imagination to con­
struct fantasy woilds within which to contain and regulate the limitless, unclassi-
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liable anomalies of his unconscious, benefiting as much, perhaps, from the Imagin­
ary contact with these anomalies as from the staging of situations in which he 
masters them.
In the analyses of individual works I take the back that in Los Caprichos Goya's ise 
of satire and the Grotesque seems chiefly geared to cast out the undesirables of his 
society by -placing them (either through classification or through imagination) as 
objects to mock, not to be mocked by; in analysing Los Disparates I soften this stance 
since the works are marked by a vacillation between, on the one hand, an aggres­
sive desire to fragment masses of undesirables, and on the other, a non-committal 
depiction of people in states of in-betweenness, all of which indicates that Goya 
was as intrigued in later life by ambivalence itself as he was earlier by a greater re­
solution of ambivalence. In interpreting the Desastres I look at how Goya's conflict 
and execution images might describe war as a process of abjection aimed at streng­
thening one faction by obliterating the other, and at the way in which the famine 
images illustrate society's tendency to partition space to protect against the diseased 
and dying.
All that later; for now I must examine abjection theory in some detail.
And just as some creatures are the last witnesses to a form of life 
that nature has jettisoned, I asked myself whether music might 
not be the unique example of what might have been -  were it 
not for the invention of language, the formation of words, the 
analysis of ideas -  the form of communication between souls. It 
is like a possibility that has not been followed up; humanity has 
engaged itself with other pursuits, those of spoken and written 
language. But this return to the unanalysed was so intoxicating 
that, on emerging from this paradise, contact with more or less 
intelligent people seemed to me of extraordinary insignificance.
Then the phrases faded, save one that I saw reappear as much as 
five or six times, without being able to perceive its aspect, but so 
caressing, so different. . .  from what any woman had ever made 
me desire, that this phrase, which in a voice so sweet, offered me 
a happiness that would truly have been worth the trouble of ob­
taining, is perhaps -  this invisible creature whose language I did 
not know and who I understood so well -  the sole Unknown 
Woman* it has ever been given me to meet.
Et de meme que certains etres sont les demiers temoins d'une 
forme de vie que la nature a abandonnee, je me demandais si la 
Musique n'6tait pas I'exemple unique de ce qu'aurait pu etre -  
s'il n'y avail pas eu Tinvention du langage, la formation des 
mots, Tanalyse des id6es -  la communication des ames. Elle est 
comme ime possibility qui n'a pas eu de suites; I'humanite s'est 
engagee dans d'autres votes, celle du langage parte et ecrit. Mate 
ce retour k rinanalys6 6tait si enivrant, qu'au sortir de ce paradis 
le contact des Sties plus ou moins intelligents me semblait d'une 
insignifiance extraordinaire.
(Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du Temps Perdu [Belgium:
BibliothSque de la Pteiade, 1954] Tome 3 pp.258-59)
Puis [les phrases] s'SIoigiterent, sauf une que je vis repasser jus- 
qu'h cinq et six fois, sans que je pusse apercevoir son visage, 
mate si caressante, si diffSrente.. .  de ce qu'aucune femme n'avait 
jamais fait dSsirer, que cette phrase-M, qui m'ofrait d'une voix si 
douce un bonheur qu'il efit vraiment valu la peine d'obtenir, 
c'est peut-etre -  cette crSature invisible dont je ne connaissais 
pas le langage et que je comprenais si bien -  la seule Inconnue 
qu'il m'ait jamais StS dormS de rencontrer.
(Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du Temps Perdu [Belgium: 
BibliothSque de la Pteiade, 1954] Tome 3 p.260)
* Terence Kilmartin, in his 3-volume translation of the novel (London: Penguin, 
.1989, Vol. 3, p.262), translates Proust's original "Inconnue" as "Unknown 
Woman", a decision I follow here. The French noun "inconnue" identities an 
unknown quality, a stranger or unknown person, but since the noun is of the 
feminine gender and since Proust's alter ego is here comparing music with 




TO DEFINE AT THE outset the moment, let's say, of the abject, the best way for­ward is to place it in  relation to the well-known Freudian concept1 of the un­
canny -  that eerie feeling like diija vu with a twist of fear that can catch us 
unawares and give our entire understanding of the world new terms of reference.
Freud relates the uncanny to 'what is frightening -  to what arouses dread and 
horror' (199(M:339), and locates its source in two primary events: (1) the surmounting 
of certain tendencies in primitive thought, for example, animism and the efficacy of 
magic, and (2) the repression of the contents of infantile experience. To the first cate­
gory Freud assigns 'the omnipotence of thoughts . . .  the prompt fulfilment of wishes 
. . . secret injurious powers and . . . the return of the dead' (370). This category re­
volves around "reality testing": the uncanny arises when an event questions our 
concept of reality, creating the impression that what we thought we had surmounted 
and left in the obscure realms of our primitive forebears, reappears -  or seems to re­
appear -  within our material experience2. For example, if one wished somebody dead 
and, a few days later, the said person did indeed die, one might view this as due to 
magical powers that the progress of civilisation has rejected as the superstition of our 
naive forebears, and this would generate the impression of uncanniness.
The second category has little to do with reality testing, for w hat reappears in
1 I must interject as early as possible to point out that in this chapter, as with the previous 
one (to a lesser degree), I make use of a number of concepts from the different systems of 
Freud, Lacan, and Kristeva. To gain an impression of how they relate to each other, the 
reader is advised to consult Appendix One.
2 Cf. Wilhelm Wundt: 'It is . . .  a general law of mythology that a stage which has been 
passed, for the v ~~r reason that it has been overcome and driven under by a superior stage, 
persists in an inferior form alongside the later one, so that the objects of its veneration turn 
into objects of horror' (in Freud, 199Qc:79).
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the psyche in  this instance is largely forgotten and inaccessible infantile material 
derived from repressed realms of the unconscious. To this category Freud assigns: 
'repressed infantile complexes . . . the castration complex, womb phantasies, etc.' 
(1990d:371). The castration complex offers a quick and ubiquitous example: one can 
trace an event that triggers a sense of uncarminess back to the castration complex if 
its features demonstrate affinities with the act of castration3. But womb phantasies, 
which include feelings of homesickness and fears of being buried alive, are more 
promising for my endeavours.
According to Freud, homesickness is an uncanniness 'which leads back to what
is known of old and long familiar' (340), i.e., the oldest home of all: the womb:
It often happens that neurotic men declare that they feel there is something un­
canny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich place, however, is the 
entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where each 
one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. There is a joking saying 
that "Love is homesickness"; and whenever a man dreams of a place or a coun­
try and says to himself, while he is still dreaming: "this place is familiar to me. 
I've been here before", we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals 
or her body. In this case too, then, the unheimlich is what was once 1 timisch, 
familiar; the prefix "im" ["tin"] is the token of repression. (368)
This homesickness has its drawbacks, however:
To some people the idea of being buried alive by mistake is the most uncanny 
thing of all. And yet psychoanalysis has taught us that this terrifying phantasy is 
only a transformation of another phantasy which had originally nothing terrify­
ing about it at all, but was qualified by a certain lasciviousness -  the phantasy, I 
mean, of intra-uterine existence, (366-67)
It is here that Freud begins to shine a light down the path Kristeva would take 
several decades later. The crucial issue is how something "long familiar", "home­
ly"4 and lasciviously pleasant can become unfamiliar, unhomely and terrifying -  
how the safe environment of the womb can end up associated with the nightmare
3 Freud's example is E. T. A. Hoffmann's tale Tlie Sand-Mcin, in which he sees the Sand- 
Man's act of throwing sand into the eyes of children, causing the organs of sight to pop out, 
as an allusion to castration (1990<i:348-55).
4 See Freud, I990rf:339u.l, for a brief comment on the translation of the German word 
unheimlich, which, directly translated, means 'unhomely'.
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of being buried alive. Freud noted that one of the aspects of the dream-work was 
its potential for what has been translated as "reversal", but which I prefer to define 
as 'inversion': the ability of dreams to reverse signification so that what appears in 
the dream is actually the converse of what it ought to be (1991^:391-94,439-41, and 
525-26, where Freud relates reversal to dreams involving water, which he interprets 
as womb phantasies). That this concept of reversal has greater application than 
Freud allowed is clear from the following passage in Lecture 11 of his Introductory 
Lectures: 'we find in dreams reversals of situation, of the relation between two 
people -  a "topsy-turvy" world. Quite often in dreams it is the hare that shoots the 
sportsman' (1976:214-15). Here it is evident that inversion captures more precisely 
than reversal the ability of the dream-work to alter relations in the visible world and 
create a world-vpside-down that is an obvious unconscious precedent for the inver­
sions found in camivalesque literature and art, where hares indeed chase hunters, 
women in pants beat men, donkeys mount their riders, and kings polish the shoes 
of servants5. A similar principle of inversion upends the relationship in  which the 
subject originally stood to the intra-uterine environment, so that what was once a 
site of desire and pleasure becomes emblematic of all things unpleasurable.
In dreams, reversals or inversions frequently occur because the content of the 
dream is inadmissible to the precincts of consciousness; the pre-conscious and con­
scious systems impose a "censorship" that distorts the original dream6. The same 
censorship, which is carried out by the super-ego in accordance with the demands
5 See Grant, 1973, Kunzle, 1978, Zemon Davis, 1978, and Burke, 1988:88-89 for images 
and/or descriptions of the kinds of inversions one finds in world-upside-down broadsheets.
6 Such terms as "censorship" and "admissibility to consciousness" are derived from 
Freud's extensive investigations, in The Interpretation of Dreams and Introductory Lectures. 
of the relations between dreams, dream distortion and the three systems of consciousness: 
unconscious, preconscious and conscious. The term "censorship" dates from Freud's first 
topography. It was later superseded by the term super-ego, and later still by the ego (see 
Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988:66). Despite changes in topography, however, Freud never 
reformulated the essential concept that dreams were censored by a conscience-orientated 
psychological system.
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of civilisation7, operates more generally, but now under the name of repression, to 
muddle and reconfigure those contents of the unconscious that are inadmissible to 
consciousness. In the process all elements of the unconscious that are incompatible 
with the Symbolic are inverted from sites of pleasure into sites of anxiety8. These 
are the elements that create the feeling of tincannmess and give rise to the terrifying 
estrangement Wolfgang Kayser places at the core of his definition of the Grotesque. 
They are also the elements that constitute the abject or excluded component of sub­
jectivity. Thus, in  my argument, I define the uncanny as an emotional adjunct to 
the emergence into consciousness of repressed unconscious material. It is not a cate- 
gory of repressed material, but an often unsettling sense of familiarity that appears 
when repressed material manages to slip into consciousness.
The ambivalence between the familiar and the unfamiliar which came to light 
in my discussion of the Grotesque can thus be understood as this feeling of uncan­
niness. The Grotesque (re)presents an estranged, unfamiliar world that evades the 
immediate recognition effected by appellation. For a moment of varying length 
and intensity the viewing subject plunges into a recognitive gap, soon to be over­
leaped either by avoidance, classification or an act of the imagination; but while 
s/he is in  that gap s/he  might well experience the uncanny as the repressed uncon­
scious slips into the gap, both as part of a 'natural' psychological migration (from 
an area of high psychic energy concentration to one from which cathexis has sud­
denly been withdrawn) and in response to something in the Grotesque image that 
appeals to the repressed. This feeling may be like d6ja vu or it might give one 'the 
creeps', but it is always both familiar and unfamiliar. It lasts only as long as it takes
7 'Civilisation' is Freud's term, which I adopt with the kind of meanings I believe Freud 
ascribed to it. It is not to be understood in opposition to another term (e.g., primitive) -  al­
though it could be -  but as a word that designates the productive pursuits (e.g., economic, 
technological, medical, cultural) of a given society. The opposites of Freudian civilisation are 
the instinctual or drive-oriented pursuits of the psyche.
8 Note again the quote from Wundt in footnote 2 of this chapter.
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the conscious to process it. The degree of the uncarmy's familiarity probably deter­
mines its reception. If it is predominantly familiar, it will be classified, understood 
and utilised by the ego; predominantly unfamiliar, and it will be treated as a danger 
to the ego, which the super-ego will neutralise by means of censorship and repres­
sion. There is always that flickering moment, however, when familiarity and unfam­
iliarity coexist, producing an inexplicable sensation in which one is both attracted to 
some thing (now undefined) and indifferent to it, or even repulsed by it. Long be­
fore one can trace the object of the original familiar response, the gap has closed.
Equivocal response, involving attraction and repulsion, is not unique to the un­
canny. It emerged in the previous chapter, particularly in my discussion of Thom­
son's work on the Grotesque, where I introduced the following quote:
[take] the example of very small children . . .  to whom one makes grimaces 
which increasingly distort the face. The child will laugh at the face pulled only 
up to a certain point (presumably, while it is still sure of the face as a familiar 
tiling); once this point is passed, once the face becomes so distorted that the child 
feels threatened, it cries in fear. (1972:25)
A little distortion delights the comical side of the child, causing fascination. Too 
much distortion makes the face too unfamiliar for the child to cope with, causing 
fear. A familiar face becomes monstrous, illustrating an inversion that begins to 
look more and more like an integral feature of h r  man subjectivity. Thus, the same 
object can create two apparently opposed reactions in the viewer, depending on 
how the viewer feels s /h e  is situated in relation to it. For an adult, of course, a man 
pulling a face is simply funny, because such antics have long since become familiar 
and are instantly classifiable to the adult. To the child, however, distortion is still a 
scarcely-explored territory, and it has the power to create emotional ambivalence 
because, for the child, there are still many things to classify, and since the imagina­
tive faculty is at this stage less in service of the Symbolic, it is more likely to en­
hance Imaginary threats (hence the terror of dark spaces, boogeymen, and so on) 
than rationalise them by situating them in a separate realm of fantasy.
Harpham also had something to say about the ambivalence of attraction and
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repulsion in the quote I provided near the end of the last chapter:
modern secular adults are so indebted to and dependent upon their discrimina­
tory grids that they find the taboo mostly a source of anxiety, horror, astonish­
ment, laughter, or revulsion. Witness, for example, our strong but ambivalent 
feelings toward those exudations of the human body that mediate between self 
and non-self, the magical outcast ingredients of witch's brews such as feces, 
urine, semen, menstrual blood, nail parings, and spittle. (1982:4)
Harpham introduces another important term, taboo. I will come back to it -  
again briefly -  later in this chapter, but for now I offer this quote from Freud's Totem 
and Taboo:
To us [taboo] means, on the one hand, "sacred", "consecrated", and on the other 
"uncanny", "dangerous", "forbidden", "unclean" . . .  Thus "taboo" has about it 
a sense of something unapproachable, and it is principally expressed in prohibi­
tions and restrictions. (1990c:71)
Freud associates the taboo with the uncanny and the forbidden -  uncanny be­
cause forbidden. The taboo has a sacred dimension to it, but in modem Western so­
ciety it has become primarily a category of objects, exudations and things excluded 
in a  separate class either by actual or implied prohibitions. Most of what is forbid­
den is, in fact, only so as far as human subjects police themselves -  for example, it 
is generally considered taboo to play with corpses, and because for most of us the 
idea of doing so instantly causes disgust, even shame at finding such an idea in  our 
heads, we do not do it. The same is true of eating a dog's excrement or drinking 
human blood9. None of these things carries a death penalty; we do, not partake of 
them because, to a greater or lesser degree, they are consensually condemned. To 
put it another way, they are objects or forms of behaviour that the Law of the Sym­
bolic - that is, the codes of conduct entrenched in the social order by the Symbolic's 
symbols and languages -  prohibits. They exist in  signification and discourse, they 
have names, classifications, places; but they are not permitted in  the communal Law.
Now, back to Harpham's set of reactions to the taboo, which are four: fear
i /9 /  Certainly in modem Western society as I experience it, In other societies, other hi storical 
junctures, other cultural and class junctures, one can talk about different sets of taboos. I am 
simply taking a few examples from my juncture, again as I see it, to help make a point
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("anxiety", "horror"); awe and fascination ("astonishment"); mirth ("laughter"); and 
disgust ("repulsion"). Fear and disgust can be coupled under the general term repul­
sion-, laughter and astonishment can be coupled under the general term attraction 
(inasmuch as astonishment admits the possibility of wonder; and laughter, while 
potentially complicated -  if irony, parody or sarcasm happen to be at work -  
requires some vested interest or complicity on the part of the viewer/reader). In 
short, taboos cause emotional vacillation: repulsion and attraction10.
This couplet of reactions has also been found in satire. Highet writes: 'ultimate­
ly it is [flie] ferment of repulsion and attraction, disgust and delight, love and loath­
ing, which is the secret of [the satirist's] misery and his power' (1962:238). The 
Blooms locate this duality in satirical obscenity, its paradox being 'that it compels 
while i t  repels' (1979:157). What they claim next provides a useful bridge to Kris- 
teva's abjection theory:
Appealing to man's most submerged feelings, [obscenity] vicariously breaks 
through Ids inhibitions, and yet it fills him with detestation and shame toward 
what was hitherto unmentionable [...] In a discus -on of the concealed recesses 
of truth, goodness, and meaning, Jung acknowledges that sometimes they must 
be sought out even in filth. (1979:157)
The Blooms claim that obscenity -• which could serve as a taxonomic container 
for all of the "exudations" Harpham lists in his quote ("feces, urine, semen, men­
strual blood, nail parings, and spittle") -  appeals to deeply submerged aspects of 
the self, i.e., to the contents of the unconscious. The Blooms describe this submerged 
material as "unmentionable" and, for this reason, endow it with the capacity to cause 
embarrassment and "detestation". It is unmentionable because, within the Symbolic, 
it has an ambivalent status: neither fully classified11 nor altogether accepted; it will
10 It is worth noting that Freud found a great deal of emotional ambivalence in taboos; in­
deed, he devotes an entire section of his essay Totem and Taboo to this issue (1990c:71-131). 
It strikes me that F-yud, although he understood it primarily as a dialectic between affection 
and hostility, had already put his finger on the compulsion/repulsion complex that Kristeva 
would later find in abjection. Taboo is ambivalent because it is prohibited, yet appears as an 
unduly justified ban on pleasure.
11 This question of classification is a complex one. Few things are truly 'unnameable', al­
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cause shame in the subject because the subject's mention of it indicates complicity 
with it, and therefore a dissatisfaction with the nominative systems of the Symbolic. 
But, with reference to Jung, the Blooms claim that such ambivalent material, or 
"filth", may well hold what is most true and meaningful in the world. What we 
regard as obscene, in short, may well provide important clues to the constitution of 
our subjectivity. Why are excretions obscene? More importantly, why should the 
Blooms associate obscenity with our "most submerged feelings"? What is the link 
between the obscene -  a genus of things cast out of, made taboo in, many of society's 
discourses in the name of manners, breeding, civilisation -  and the unconscious? 
Ivristeva's theory of abjection offers a persuasive reply to such questions.
*  *  *
In Kristeva's theory, abjection arises in a specific context, as the result of a recog­
nisable confluence of factors, and, most importantly, in the juncture between two 
distinct registers of subjectivity, the Symbolic and the Semiotic12, where the former 
is the active, conscious, law-based, language-founded domain into which the subject 
is interpolated and the latter is an element of the repressed, preverbal unconscious.
, ; When the subject falls under the controls of civilisation, takes on language and 
a super-ego steered by a law-abiding consc .ce, the before -  everything associated 
with the pre-objectal relationship the subject used to enjoy freely and exclusively 
with his or her mother -  is negated13 and repressed. Kristeva identifies this before as a
though many are 'unmentionable' within certain situations, certain types of company, or 
even in relation to one's own moral system. Excrement, for example, is named and fully 
classified as disposable waste, but it is still in many social conjunctures 'unmentionable' 
because it refers to things considered foul, low, insignificant, degrading, irredeemable. An 
unclassified thing -  again a rarity, and more likely to be a temporarily unrecognised thing -  
is more ambivalent, hence more daunting, than a classified one, but classification in itself is 
no guarantee of purity. At best it is a system of ordering, but order only places -  even though 
this is often enough in itself to spark rejuvenation -  it does not obliterate or imname.
12 For clarity's sake, I should specify that the Symbolic is Lacan's term and the Semiotic is 
Kristeva's.
13 Negation is, essentially, a mechanism of repression which, ironically, is the most exact
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'receptacle' (1982:14) and terms it, after Plato, the chora or semiotic chorali . She de­
scribes it as follows:
We are dealing with imprecise boundaries in that place . ,  . Inside and outside 
are not precisely differentiated here, nor is language an active practice or the 
subject separated from the other. (1982:60) [. . .] There would be a "beginning" 
preceding the word . . .  In that anteriority to language, the outside is elaborated 
by means of a projection from within, of which the only experience we have is 
one of pleasure and pain . . . The non-distinctiveness of inside and outside 
would thus be urmamable, a border passable in both directions by pleasure and 
pan. Naming the latter, hence differentiating them, amounts to introducing 
language, which, just as it distinguishes pleasure from pain as it does all other 
oppositions, founds the separation inside/outside. (61)
In sum, the chora is an undifferentiated space where self and other, along with 
inside and outside, do not exist for the subject since his or her condition predates 
language. The only distinction Kristeva allows the subject is that between pleasure 
and pain. From the very beginning, incapable of naming them, the subject never­
theless can distinguish pleasure from unpleasure -  a duality that will become the 
pattern for the subject's discriminations between what it wants (and keeps) and 
what it does not want (and rejects, i.e., abjects). This ability to discriminate is not 
language, but it is a somatic articulation of sorts. Kristeva calls it semiotic. Now al­
though "semiotic" at first appears to be synonymous with "signification" -  a state 
after the introduction of language -  since in English "semiosis" and "semiotics" refer 
to the science of signs, Kristeva clearly distinguishes the two terms.
means the analyst has to spot the return of repressed contents (which helps explain why 
Lacan referred to 'repressed' and the 'return of the repressed' as the same thing [e.g., 1993: 
86]). See Freud, 19912:437-42 for mure on negation.
14 See Kristeya *1986:93-98) for a definitive discussion of the Semiotic and, specifically, the 
chorn. Alternatively, see Kristeva, 1984:25-28. The terms semiotic and chora are often used 
interchangeably in literature that makes use of Kristeva and in Kristeva's writings themselves. 
It bears pointing out, however, that chora distinguishes a space -  the receptacle in which 
child and mother are almost indivisible -  while semiotic refers to a quality of that space (its 
lack of Symbolicity but not of all language, as I discuss in the text). I use Semiotic (with an 
upper-case S) to specify the semiotic space us a register equivalent in importance to Lacan's 
Symbolic. I find it useful, even though this is a distinction Kristeva does not make herself, to 
view the chora exclusively as a (preverbal) place in the time of the subject, and to view the 
Semiotic -  given that it is an element of the timeless unconscious -  as the mode of subjectivity 
that has the capacity to irrupt into consciousness at any point in the subject's life. I look at 
this issue of irruption in the text.
P a r t  O n e :  G r o t e s q u e  i n t o  A b j e c t Pa g e  111
On the one hand, the language of the Symbolic is always-already there15; the 
child is immersed in it because it is spoken by its mother and the other people that 
cross its environment. However, prior to the formation of the ego and the Subse­
quent Oedipal relationship, it exists passively within the subject (see Kristeva, 1982: 
62-63). It becomes active only once the child 'separates from his fusion with the 
mother . . .  and transfers semiotic motility on to the symbolic order' (Kristeva, 1986: 
101), so becoming a user of words and a producer of culture1 £.
Yet the Semiotic also has an active "language" of its own: 'an essentially mobile 
and extremely provisional articulation' dependent on drives and '[djiscrete quanti­
ties of energy [that] move through the body of the subject' (Kristeva, 1986:93). This 
"provisional articulation" is regulated from the beginning by 'social organization, 
[which] always already symbolic, imprints its constraint in a mediated form which 
organizes the chora not according to a law (a term we reserve for the symbolic) but 
through an ordering' (94). This ordering is not one the child understands and there­
fore knowingly determines; instead it arises through the adjustments the child makes 
to the mother's actions on the basis of drive reactions. These drives, Kristeva main­
15 As Lacan puts it: 'language and its structure exist prior to the moment at which each 
subject at a certain point in his mental development makes Ms entry into it' (1977:148).
16 The difference is akin to that between active and passive voice: T am using language' vs 
'language is being used'. In the first case, the active one, the subject is present and is the 
fount of the object (language); in the second case, the subject is absent: there is this thing 
(which is not even out there yet, since "out there" depends on differentiation) that is being 
used (by who, the missing subject cannot say). In short, language precedes the formation of 
the ego, but as a passive entity; with the genesis of the ego in the mirror phase, and the sub­
sequent acquiring of language, thus of differentiation, signification becomes active.
This is also the place to note, again, that the Semiotic is itself unknowable without the 
significations permitted by the Symbolic: 'the semiotic that "precedes" symbolization is only 
a theoretical supposition justified by the need for description. It exists in practice only within 
the symbolic and requires the symbolic break to obtain the complex articulation we associ­
ate with it in musical and poetic practices' (Kristeva, 1986:118). Kristeva goes on to qualify 
that the Semiotic is not purely theoretical, that it does exist, but can only manifest through 
the signifying practices of the Symbolic. Elsewhere she writes: 'one can situate the chora and, 
if necessary, lend it a topology, but one can never give it axiomatic form' (1986:94), By "axio­
matic form" I would interpret that Kristeva means a form self-evident; discrete and unchang­
ing to perception -  a visible, empirically and molecularly testable form that nonetheless 
requires no proof of its existence.
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tains, cannot be aimless, but serve a primary act of separation that will later, through 
the transformation of self into sign during the mirror phase17, result in an ego. Within 
the chora, however, the drives do little more than respond and vacillate according to 
the touch, smell, sound, taste of the mother, and posit an early separation experi­
enced as a "seeming" narcissism, for although it is not apparent to the subject at this 
stage where one body (the child's) ends and (an)other(s) (mother's, father's, outside 
objects of the environment) begins, tire ego has begun its process of settling 'as center 
of a solar system of objects' (Kristeva, 1982:14). When true separation occurs through 
the 'thetic break' (see Kristeva, 1986:98-100) and the ego crystallises, the Semiotic 
undergoes repression, is superseded by the Symbolic. But it does not cease to play 
any role whatsoever in the human subject, for Kristeva claims that its repression is 
incomplete, which gives it the potential to surface in the conscious life of the Sym­
bolic subject18. Grosz, in  Wright's Feminism and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dic­
tionary, articulates this situation concisely:
Although it is necessary for the Symbolic, the semiotic . . .  threatens to undermine 
and de-stabitize the rule-govemed operations of the Symbolic, resisting its rules 
and norms. Governed by the primary processes, which seek immediate gratifica­
tion of what may be anti-social impulses, the semiotic is the raw data of cor­
poreal forces and energies organized by the law-abiding and rule-governed 
secondary-process activities of the Symbolic. The maternally defined semiotic is 
the prop or support of, as well as the site for, the disruptive transgression of the 
paternal, patriarchally regulated Symbolic. It remains incompletely contained by 
the Symbolic, and is manifested in the "physical!ty" or "materiality" of textual 
production: it is a materiality that, like the primary processes or the repressed, 
threatens to return, disrupting signifying conventions. The semiotic must be re­
nounced and transcended in order for the pre-oedipal child to acquire a stable 
social or Symbolic position as a unified (masculine or feminine) subject. But this 
subsumption of the semiotic in the Symbolic is never complete or finalized. 
(1992:195-96)
In short, the Semiotic is a constant threat to the uniformity and sovereignty of 
the Symbolic. Although it is normally repressed in tire unconscious, there is always
17 I discuss this term a little later in the chapter.
18 For Kris leva's discussion of the oscillating and potentially revolutionary nature of the 
Semiotic, see 1986:103-123,
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the possibility that an event, a change in psychic condition, or even creative prac­
tices will re-activate the Semiotic and, if only for a time, reinstate a preverbal state 
of subjectivity. Kristeva stresses the role of creative activity in this reinstmition:
Though absolutely necessary, the [Symbolic] is not exclusive: the semiotic, which 
also precedes it, constantly tears it open, and this transgression brings about all 
the various transformations of Hie signifying practice that are called "creation". 
Whether in the realm of metalanguage (mathematics, for example) or literature, 
what remodels the symbolic order is always the influx of the semiotic . . . [FJor 
there to be a transgression of the symbolic, there must be an irruption of the 
drives in the universal signifying order. (1986:113)
Kristeva tends to be visual-art-blind in such arguments19, but since she does gen­
eralise in others, for example, when she asks 'isn't art the fetish par excellence . . .?' 
(1986:115), and since she writes of "creation", one must assume that art in general, 
and not only poetic language, has lire power to subsume the Symbolic and uphold 
another signifying system. And if artists have the capacity to remobilize the Semiotic, 
do they not also have the ability to access the unconscious, to utilise the repressed 
as a source for subject matter and compositional strategy -  not necessarily conscious­
ly but, if you like, intuitively? I would argue that it is possible, and will claim fur­
ther that just as the Semiotic may irrupt, so may tire abject. Much that society treats 
as abject originates in the time and tire space of the maternal semiotic chora. Hence, 
the irruption of the Semiotic may cause the coterminous emergence of the abject. 
After all, the Semiotic becomes abject when it appears in the signifying systems of 
the Symbolic20.
19 The arguments, that is, which I have just presented. Kristeva has, however, written 
about art (see, for example, her discussions of Giotto and Giovanni Bellini in chapters 8 and
9 of her Desire in Language, 1989), and in an art-centred interview with Catherine Francblin 
in Flash Art she has discussed the interface between art and psychoanalysis in a way that 
indicates she attributes to art a potential to reintroduce aspects of the preverbal or Semiotic 
disposition. For instance: '[T]he imagination can permit one to dig up buried archaic prever­
bal representations by socializing them' (1986:45). And of abstract art she says:
I believe that abstraction corresponds, in the individual, to tire psychic economy of a non­
coherent self, it is therefore anterior to narcissistic integration . . . This is a means the 
imaginary has of opening up to an archaic economy and to tire traumatisms that are 
linked to it. (45)
20 And, to relate it to previous points, it also becomes uncanny, unfamiliar, and taboo.
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It is to an exposition of abjection that I now turn.
L Defining the Abject
To give the reader as lucid a comprehension of abjection as possible, I begin by de­
fining the term in some detail, focusing on five primary issues: (1) the non-objective 
or absent nature of the abject, (2) the appearance of the abject within the subject, (3) 
the appearance of abjection at the limit, margin or boundary of the Symbolic order, 
(4) the relation of the abject to the super-ego, and (5) the object's ability to both attract 
and repel. Having defined the term, in Section H I examine three facets of the abject 
that are crucial to my analyses of Goya's images: (1) degradation and the abject 
subject, (2) the mother as abject, and (3) non-differentiation and formlessness.
1. The abject has no intrinsic objecthood
ICristeva associates abjection with "filth":
Loathing an item of food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung. The spasms and vomit­
ing that protect me. The repugnance, the retching that thrusts me to the side and 
turns me away from defilement, sewage, and muck. (1982:2)
However, she does not posit a causative link -  in either direction -  between ab­
jection and filth. As Toril Moi explains, the abject 'can be represented by any kind
• of transgressive, ambiguous or intermediary state' (Kristeva, 1986:239). Dirt and 
putrefaction can image the abject, but they are not the abject. They signify a vaster, 
hidden terrain; they help to constitute the category, but are not innately abject. No­
thing that appears as abjection in Symbolic space is abject in essence, for, as Kristeva 
asserts, '[it] is , . .  not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what dis­
turbs identity, system, order' (1982:4), The transgression of structure is abject, not dirt 
and putrefaction per se. Before Kristeva, Mary Douglas had stressed this point: 
'[djefilement is never an isolated event. It cannot occur except in  view of a system­
atic ordering of ideas' (1984:41). Kristeva elaborates:
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Defilement is what is jettisoned from the "symbolic system." It is what escapes 
that social rationality, that logical order on which a social aggregate is based, 
which then becomes differentiated from a temporary agglomeration of individu­
als and, in short, constitutes a classification system or a structure. (1982:65)
That is, defilement -  one of the faces of the abject -  cannot arise unless order, 
more precisely, the Symbolic order, is contravened. This point must be grasped 
even though I have made it before: a person or a thing is abjected (the operation) to 
the abject (the condition) because s /h e  or it runs counter to society's ideals, norms 
and standards. Togo further: to keep this person or thing from threatening the con­
stitution of society, prohibitions and taboos enforced by general consent make so­
ciety's subjects the very policemen who prevent such interruptions. Hence the mar­
ginalisation from the Symbolic and the socius of a whole range of signs (excrement, 
pus, visible sores, bodily growths, sewerage), and individuals (the infectious, the ill, 
the mentally unsound, the deformed, the overweight, the jobless, beggars, the home­
less, and so on) that represent the objets a21 of abjection. All objects that defile need 
to be excluded. Abjection is based on exclusion. What is excluded is abject. And it is
21 In Lacan the objet a or objet petit a '[symbolises] the central lack of desire' (1994:10r* and 
has the quality of ''something from which the subject, in order to constitute itself, has separ­
ated itself off as organ' (103). To be more clear: 'The subject is an apparatus. This apparatus 
is something lacunary, and it is in the lacuna that the subject establishes the function of a 
certain object, qua lost object. It is the status of the objet a in so far as it is present in the drive' 
(185). It is in the capacity of being the lost object that my use of the?objet a clarifies, and to fix 
the point I will refer once more to Lacan. After a passionate discursus on the libido as 'pure 
life instinct', Lacan goes on to say:
[Libido] is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is 
subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms of the objet a 
that can be enumerated are tire representatives, the equivalents. The objets a are merely its 
representatives, its figures. (198)
Lacan lists 'the breasts, the faeces, the gaze, the voice' as objets a (242). What needs to be 
stressed is the character of objets a as representatives, equivalents or substitutes. The a here 
carries the connotation of something primary (the first letter of the alphabet -  the first lost 
object) and closest to a focal centre (the Other or the abjected [mjother), as well as implying 
the preposition 'to' (A in French), and so establishing a conjunction between the objet and 
whatever it represents. All objects of desire, which the objets a are, stand in relation to an 
Other, 'normatively', the Symbolic Other, although it can, in my putation, also be the radical 
other of the abject. In this sense they are receptacles of desire -  images that cause libido to 
stream -  contingent on the Other, and to desire them is to desire what they substitute for. In 
the case of the abject, since the abject has no objectal form and is not a thing, only its objets a 
can act, by drive and libidinal excitation, to lure the viewer.
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through prohibition, which is a function of the Symbolic, that defilement is excluded
-  '[t]he logic of prohibition. . .  founds the abject', writes Kristeva (1982:64).
But there is a problem. Prohibition cannot control what it founds, and the class 
of the abject, once established, is impossible to destroy. You can exclude it, but you 
cannot erase it. Moreover, the abject does not bend to prohibitions. So claims Kris­
teva: 'The abject is perverse because it neither gives up nor assumes a prohibition, a 
rule, or a law; but turns them aside, misleads, corrupts; uses them, takes advantage 
of them, the better to deny them' (1982:15). This means that prohibited things, ab­
ject things, have a certain revolutionary power, whether real or imagined (here one 
recalls Blake's subversive ores of footnote 53, Chapter One), and as such they chal­
lenge the ordering formation. This challenge comes chiefly from their ambiguity 
and lack of a completely containing classification. Their names do not entirely place 
them, and as a result they do not conform to the aspirations of the social formation. 
They are cast aside, treated as filth and dirt, since this is the only category to con­
tain what falls beneath the watermark of civilised society (for what ascends above 
it there are other categories: the sublime and the divine, chiefly). Dirt is, however, a 
volatile class of matter, and, in the eyes of those who have set themselves apart 
from it, its continued lack of integration into the social formation is expressed as a 
fear that it will spread and introduce contamination, i.e., pollution and disease, into 
previously ordered areas of the socius. For such threats there is no antidote; if the 
process of exclusion fails, nothing can keep the abject back. When the Symbolic 
fails the abject streams in, liberated from repression.
What it brings is an entirely other form of structure: non-structure, the loss of 
identity in a timeless, undelimitable space.
This lack of structure is the second reason -  other than the unreliability of pro­
hibition, that is -  why abject things remain ambiguous and precariously classified, 
forever on the brink of appearing as limitlessness, The representatives, or objets a, 
of the unconscious terrain of abjection always carry this undioristic, unbounded
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territory as, so to speak, their subtext. No-one from the other side of abjection (from 
the Symbolic) who encounters such representatives can overlook the unspoken, un­
mentionable second text below the named, surface one.
This "second text", which is the abject, is impossible to classify or contextualise 
precisely because z't is not an object22. And it is not an object, in short, because (1) it 
is nothing in essence, and only materialises through its objets a: its signifiers, (2) it is 
excluded from the Symbolic on the basis of the threat its objets a, considered taboo 
and 'polluting', pose to the integrity of the socius. In regard to point two I am, of 
course, speaking baldly, since the objecthood of the abject/s representatives cannot 
be questioned, and the exclusion involved is exclusion of objects; however, the in­
huming act of exclusion so marginalises and suppresses many of these objects that 
their objecthood and their presence in discourse is attenuated close to the point of 
annihilation. Actual annihilation is, however, impossible since the Symbolic is 
caught in a double bind where it cannot help but produce and find a fringe place 
for unwanted objects and non-things. It needs its excluded objects to provide an 
antithetical model and to mainfriin the purity of its own limits.
2. The abject xuithin 
There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed
22 In Freudian discourse, an object can be one of at least three things: (1) the object of love 
(e.g., the mother in the Oedipal triangle of the heterosexual male subject), (2) the object 
familiar from theories of perception, that is, an exterior item with its own inherent qualities 
which distinguish it from the perceiving subject, and (3) the object of an instinct, viz., an 
object that can satisfy an instinctual aim -  and in this respec'i the object of an instinct over­
laps with the object of love (I derive this discussion of the three objects from Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 1988:273-76).
All of the above objects are, in the end, concrete physical objects, either inanimate (defini­
tion two) or animate (definitions three arid four). In this sense the abject can decidedly not 
be defined as an object. However, if incorporated imagoes can also be termed objects, that 
means that psychoanalysis allows for the possibility of objects not in themselves concrete, 
although they might only become objects of cathexis once projected onto concrete objects. 
This is the nature, really, of all other objects of the psychic terrain, including the Imaginary 
and Symbolic Other. The difference with the abject is that it only comes into existence as a 
garbage disposal category to the Symbolic, and though it has many objects that represent it, 
both animate and inanimate, it is still in itself no tiling.
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against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected 
beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. (Kristeva, 1982:1)
This is a confusing but important passage. The confusion arises, to my mind, 
because Kristeva combines both the operation to abject and the condition of abjec­
tion in the same sentence. The "abjection" she speaks of is an act of objecting, of 
ejecting, and the thing being abjected is "a threat that seems to emanate from an 
exorbitant outside or inside". This thing is the abject itself, the result of processes of 
ejection. Kristeva writes that its threat can be perceived as arising both from an out­
side and an inside, described in either case as "exorbitant". This is important, for it 
reveals that, in  her conception of it, the abject can be perceived outside of the subject
-  in other subjects and objects, presumably -  and within the subject. The subject 
can find the abject both without and within him/herself; and, without or within, 
for the sake of maintaining both the Law and subjectivity itself, it must be "ejected 
beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable".
At least, this is so for the Symbolically-instituted subject. But what of the bor­
derline patient, for whom the Symbolic has failed? According to Kristeva, such a 
subject goes to the abject within and takes it as his or her source of plenitude. The 
reaction of the borderline patient is not important for this thesis -  unless one 
chooses to see Goya as a borderline psychotic, who really used his art to confirm 
his reliance on the abject23 -  but it holds a significant place in Kristeva's theory and
23 Of course, one could argue that 'borderline' is a more flexible term and can be viewed 
as a position or modality, a desired gravitation to a place of alleged instability in the quest 
for the chalice beyond desire. This is a regression that serves the ego, thatholds out the hope 
of finding unity, or at least a more tolerable state of subjectivity, on the borderline. Such an 
argument could potentially be made for Goya, particularly the Goya of Los Disparates, al­
though in my own analyses I do not go that far. What I do want to acknowledge here is that 
Goya's adoption of the grotesque, monstrous and obscene puts him on a borderline of sorts. 
He wades into mess and anarchy to create an antithesis that will lead others to reject what 
he has portrayed, and, as I have claimed and will claim again, to gain cathartic relief from this 
mess. This is a willing interacficm with the rejected, but it has little or nothing to do with the 
true borderliner who drifts to the border because s/he feels that the Symbolic has failed. I 
would have to argue that, for Goya, while it might be corruptible, the Symbolic is still the 
essential model on which human behaviour must be patterned. Goya goes to the border less 
to find an alternative disposition than to strengthen the Symbolic.
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merits a quick mention.
In Kristeva's analogy of crusted milk (1982:2-3) I find a useful illustration of the 
process whereby the subject loses faith in  the Symbolic and so takes to the abject as 
a more promising source of fullness. In offering milk with a skin on it, Kristeva 
claims that her (textual) parents separate her from them, just as the skin separates 
the dried milk crust above from the fluid milk below and the milk as a whole from 
the outside environment. Although the milk offering signifies the desire of the par­
ents, what Kristeva feels in response is nausea -  a nausea that leads her to reject the 
milk24. In rejecting it, Kristeva rejects her parents, representative, as a unit, of the 
paternal formation, of symbolicity, of the Other25, of the law. By rejecting the signi­
24 Kristeva might have derived her milk analogy from a similar discussion in Lecture 23 of 
Freud's Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis:
What was once a satisfaction to the subject is, indeed, bound to arouse his resistance or his 
disgust today . . . The same child who once eagerly sucked the milk from his mother's 
breast is likely a few years later to display a strong dislike to drinking milk, which his up­
bringing has difficulties in overcoming. This dislike increases to disgust if a skin forms on 
the milk or the drink containing it. We cannot exclude the possibility, perhaps, thal the skin 
conjures up a memoiy of the mother's breast, once so ardently desired. (1976:412-13)
Freud relates the loss of desire for the mother's bieast and her milk to weaning, but in 
the Kristevian model the issue is more complicated. For one thing -  and here I regrettably 
preempt later discussion -  milk represents a flow from the mother's body, and since society, 
to uphold the integrity of the (paternal) Symbolic, requires that the subject turn from the 
mother, the child rejects all that is associated with her body.
25 Lacan ubiquitously discusses the Other in texts such as Merits: A Selection (1977); The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1994); and The Seminar of Tacques Lacan 
(1988, Books I, II, III and VII). John Muller and William Richardson try to make the concept 
more accessible in Lacan and Language: A Reader's Guide to Baits (1994). For a brief out­
line of the topos of the Other, see Marie-Claire Boons-Grafe's entry in Wright's Feminism 
and Psychoanalysis: A Critical Dictionary (1992:296-99). Volumes could be written about 
the Other in Lacan, but at this juncture I will consider only two aspects of it: its locale and its 
relation to the subject. Firstly, its locale. It exists 'outside' or 'elsewhere', but at the same 
time interpenetrates the subject at the level of the Unconscious; Lacan frequently claimed 
that 'the unconscious is the discourse of the Other' (1994:131,1977:312; also compare 'the Other 
is the locus of that memory that [Freud] discovered and called the unconscious' [1977:215]). 
As closely as his own elusiveness allowed him, Lacan lays out the relationship between un­
conscious and Other in this passage: '[I represent the unconscious] to you as that which is 
inside the subject, but which can be realized only outside, that is to say, in that locus of the 
Other in which alone it may assume its status' (1994:147). Here Lacan clearly has the ana­
lytical situation in mind: the operations and contents of the patient's unconscious can only 
emerge and become workable material in the hands, so to speak, of the analyst, who is here 
in the place of the Other -  tine one who speaks and whose speech is the truth. The uncon­
scious can only unfold in the space opened by the analyst -  the space where speech is
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fying realm that, through the "mirror phase", gave rise to her ego, she rejects T , 
herself, her ego. This causes a convulsion in which Kristeva turns inside out, 'guts 
sprawling' (1982:3). In this death of T  a new self arises in the nausea and vomit, 
which is radically other to the parents, a self that emerges within the Symbolic sys­
tem but is nevertheless incapable and unwanting of integration into the Symbolic26. 
Here, the abject impulse of food loathing functions not to repel the abject but to 
make the Symbolic abject. For Kristeva, crusted milk is a sign that the Symbolic is 
corrupt -  abject: it has a wrinkled scabby skin -  so she turns elsewhere to find a 
locale that will function as a container for her sprawling guts. At this moment, the 
subject 'finds the impossible within' (5), and takes the abject as her Other:
Urine, blood, sperm, excrement then show up in order to reassure a subject that is 
lacking its "own and clean self." The abjection of those flows from within suddenly 
become the sole "object" of sexual desire - a true "abject" where man, frightened, 
crosses over the horrors of maternal bowels and, in an immersion that enables hint 
to avoid coming face to face with an other, spares himself the risk of castration, But 
at the same time that immersion gives him the full power of possessing, if not 
being, the bad object that inhabits the maternal body. Abjection then takes the 
place '•'f the other, to the extent of affording him jouissance, often the only one for 
the uurderline patient who, on that account, transforms the abject into the site of 
the Other. (53-54)
This internal space brings the subject who has rejected its Symbolic self face to
expected, heard, weighed and responded to,
Moving to the second aspect of the Other, its relationship to the subject: 'the subject [is] 
determined by language and speech[;] it follows that the subject. . .  begins in the locus of the 
Other, in so far as it is there that the first signifier emerges' (1994:198). In other words: 'in so far 
as we are the subject who thinks, we are implicated...  in as much as we depend on the field of 
the Other, which was there long before we came into the world, and whose circulating struc­
tures determine us as subjects' (246). Lacan sees the Other as the ultimate source of significa­
tion, and since human subjects are themselves only signifiers ('[t]he subject is bom in so far as 
the signifier emerges in the field of the Other...  by this very fact, this subject. . .  solidifies into 
a signifier' [199]), our place in the signifying chain is assured, and our "master", as the point of 
all nominative origination, is the Other.
26 To be perfectly blunt, this new self is shit. What Kristeva is saying is that in expelling 
herself she becomes shit to her parents, for excrement is a marginal object that becomes 
'other' once voided from tile body. Not only has Kristeva expelled herself and so become an 
abject for her parents, but she has also expelled herself from the parental couple, becoming a 
sign of her rejection of their desire. Lastly, she has exceeded the law, and so become matter 
out of place - shit -  within the Symbolic order. While she cannot be handily flushed down a 
toilet, there are potentially other places for her: a mental institution, for example.
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face with the lack of an object/ which makes being itself abject: a gap in significa­
tion that, when asserted as primary (as Other)27, can only stand in opposition to 
the Symbolic (Other) as abject. The realisation of the abject nature of the self is 
a profound confrontation with the otherness, lack and loss at the centre of 
being28. But here the abyss appears as saviour, and for the borderline patient any
27 Can the abject be the Other? Lacan on occasion defined the woman as the Other (e.g., in 
Mitchell and Rose, 1985:94; 141-59). In that the female sex is absolutely other to the male and 
the phallocentric system, it is the Other. Hie following passage from 'Feminine Sexuality in 
Psychoanalytic Doctrine', written by Moustafa Safouan, a pupil of Lacan's, can now take us 
further: 'the question of what she wants is as much the question of the girl herself as it is that of 
the Other, whether this be Freud, ourselves, or again and in the first instance, the Mother' (in 
Mitchell and Rose:131). The Other is, in short, a flexible term that may be embodied by any 
number of people of either gender. In Lacan's thought it is closely associated with a paternal 
figure, but only in so far as society is currently structured along patriarchal lines, and only in 
the sense of a paternal authority -  and women have as much power to wield this authority as 
men do. The Other is essentially 'the locus of speech and, potentially, the locus of truth' 
(Lacan, 1994:129). Anyone may, thus, represent the Other. There is a difference, however, be­
tween the Other one addresses beyond the specular other, which is strictly a relational posi­
tion, and the radical Other that the other sex can represent (which is a fixed rather than mobile 
relation, more oppositional than dialectical). To finally make my point, it is now evident that 
the abject can represent the Other if it stands in the position in which the woman is fixed in the 
phallocentric system. The difference is that, whereas the woman can still also represent the 
relational Other, the abject can only be, as I understand it, the absolute Other of the Other -  the 
thing that Lacan both did (1992:66) and did not (1977:311; Mitchell and Rose, 1985:151) grant a 
place in his thought. One should also bear in mind that in Lacan's system the Other of the 
Other would have to be an Other that stands to the Symbolic Other in the same way that the 
Symbolic Other stands to the human subject, and this is admittedly inconceivable. What is con­
ceivable, however, is the parallel operation of two different systems, where the core principle 
of the one system is radically opposed to the core principle of the other. In such a setup the 
abject can only be Other to the Symbolic Other, and vice versa.
28 The reason for this lack of being lies in the alienation intrinsic to the mirror phase (which 
causes being to be formed in relation to an other), and in the subject's relation to language 
and the eternal slide of signifiers -  a point that Lacan never stated better than in this passage 
from his Sent' look HI:
the signifier is a sign that doesn't refer to any object, not even to one in the form of a 
trace, even though the trace nevertheless heralds the signifier's essential feature. It, too, is 
the sign of an absence . . .  the signifier is a sign which refers to another sign, which is as 
such structured to signify the absence of another sign . . .  (1993:167)
Caught in a system like this, where everything merely refers to (an)other, what chance 
does the subject have of being?
I should point out that all of the above relates to secondary loss -  the lack caused by 
Symbolic castration. On the matter of primary or original loss, Lacan is more vague: '[tjhe 
human object always constitutes itself through the intermediary of a first loss . . .  the subject 
has to reconstitute the [lost] object, he tries to find its totality again starting from I know not 
what unity lost at the origin' (19886:136).
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Other, even one that has no objecthood, either real or hallucinated, is better than 
none. For such a subject, however, the abject as a relation to a border ceases to 
exist, and so, too, does the operation to abject.
3. The abject as exorbitant outside
Considered as an exorbitant outside, however, the abject is defined solely by the 
operation to abject. The abject without is determined in relation to a border or peri­
phery which one can label the limit of the Symbolic system. All that exceeds this 
limit is excluded in the margin beyond it. This margin is so undesirable to the cen­
tral "inside" that it is impossible and unthinkable -  "unmentionable", to use the 
Blooms' term (1979:157). It is everything considered abject, taboo, prohibited, unde­
sirable, unclean, impure, improper within the Symbolic. It is a ready-made category 
for everything that at first appears without category, for all matter out of place. The 
Symbolic is a territory, and the people who exist within it defend it like a territory; 
they guard its frontiers, erect and maintain fences, and they drive off all invaders. 
Only great vigilance -  a vigilance that can only be ingrained to the point of automa­
tion by years of obedience to the law -  keeps the territory safe and intact.
The problem is, the abject is an exorbitant outside that can neither be truly set 
aside from the subject within nor be banished once and for all. It is a toiling, troubled, 
volatile mass of ejected and banned matter, desire and thought that constantly 
threatens and impinges on the subject from its provisionally-excluded outside, and 
'jajn unshakable adherence to Prohibition and Law is necessary if that perverse inter­
space of abjection is to be hemmed in and thrust aside' (Kristeva, 1982:16). The sub­
ject who cannot maintain at least a vestige of the separation outside/inside will fall 
into abjection, lose his or her identity in the no tiling. To control the abject one must 
maintain one's boundaries by holding on to what one wants (keeping it inside) while 
rejecting what one does not want (pushing it outside). This relation between outside 
and inside is governed by the super-ego, to which I now turn.
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4, The abject is opposed to "I"
Kristeva claims that the abject is 'opposed to T (1982:1 Emphasis in original). This 
"I", the subject, self or ego29, is founded during what Lacan calls the mirror phase 
(see 1977:1-7; 1988a:74,79,81-2,115,125,146-47,168-72; 1988b:50,166). Lacan uses 
the mirror as a metaphor for a realisation of difference. The "mirror phase" splits the 
subject. Whereas before, in the preOedipal environment of the Semiotic, the infant 
subject took everything forming its experience as an extension of itself, confronta­
tion with the "mirror" installs awareness of die uniqueness of the individual body 
in the world of objects constituting the space it inhabits. Everything outside the 
body of the subject becomes other, while the limits of die body also set die limits of 
"I". Everything that is "I" ends up related to the ego. Everything not "I" is related 
to the system of otiiers, from which the subject will in its life draw many objects of 
desire through processes of identification and incorporation30. The most radical of
29 For the sake of clarity I want to interject a short but pithy description of the Freudian 
ego, byLaplanche and Pontalis, which will help the reader, among other things, to grasp the 
relationship of the ego to the super-ego and the id:
Topographically, the ego is as much in a dependent relation to the claims of the id as it is to 
the imperatives of the super-ego and the demands of external reality. Although it is allot­
ted the role of mediator, responsible for the interests of the person as a whole, its auton­
omy is strictly relative . . .  [D]ynamically, the ego is above all the expression of the defen­
sive pole of the personality in neurotic conflict; it brings a set of defensive mechanisms 
into play which are motivated by the perception of an unpleasurable affect (signal of 
anxiety) . . . Economically, the ego appears as the "binding" factor in tire psychical pro­
cesses; in defensive operations, however, its attempts to bind instinctual energy are sub­
verted by tendencies characteristic of tire primary process, and these efforts take on a 
compulsive, repetitive and unrealistic aspect. (1988:130)
In Lacan the ego is an Imaginary function, and is patterned on the other the subject 
(mis)recognises in the speculum of the mirror phase. Though Imaginary, it is nevertheless an 
object (Lacan, 1988b:244), and it is subject to the manifesting action of the analytic situation, 
during which the subject's ego appears through tire 'talking cure' and patterns itself on the 
analyst, who stands in the place of the Other (245). One might add tire caveat that for Lacan 
the ego and the I (cf, the text) are not necessarily synonymous terms, but can come into conflict 
with one another (see Ecrits, 1977:55). In his Seminar devoted to the ego Lacan even states 
categorically: 'the ego isn't the f  but 'something else', an 'object which fills . . .  the imaginary 
function' (1988b:44), The ego must, however, be understood as a major constituent of this thing 
called "I", of the subject as a complex compound of agencies, mediators and repositories, part 
conscious, part unconscious.
30 In my thesis I have avoided using the terms incorporation (and introjection) and its op­
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others for the subject are those it classes in the category Kristeva terms abject. 
These are in  opposition to "I", and therefore understandably need to be controlled. 
The super-ego is chiefly responsible for the task of opposing whatever opposes "I" 
and which has emerged as irreconcilable to the ego. Tire super-ego is the subject's 
personal Symbolic representative and it contains the prohibitions that circulate in 
the social formation 31; it is the psychic structure that, to shield tire ego, carries out
posite, projection, because, while useful in elucidating the mechanics whereby the ego takes 
in or spits out intrusions from the external world, they are not strictly necessary to my argu­
ment -  that is, the argument works well enough without them. I should point out, however, 
that incorporation is the process whereby the ego takes into itself, in an Imaginary fashion - 
that is, as images, speculi, reflections, substitutes, others -  objects from the external world 
that it feels are necessary to i ts constitution. (I do, in fact, make a little of this process later in 
relation to oral-sadistic fantasies involving the mouth as an organ of incorporation.) Projec­
tion, on the other hand, is the expulsion of emotions, affects and partly-internalised objects 
from the ego for the purposes of defining the limits of the ego in relation to the outside 
world. Normally the expelled 'objects' are relocated in outside objects or people. There is an 
evident tie between this and the concept of abjection, but one need not understand the psy­
chological process to understand the operation to abject, nor should the reader assume that 
abjection and projection are interchangeable or synonymous terms. Projection is a process 
that services abjection, but not all abjection is projection, and vice versa.
31 Freud introduced the super-ego in his paper on narcissism (1914), under the term "ego 
ideal", which he linked in that instance to an ideal of aspiration (to perfection) instituted to 
counteract the loss of the self as ego ideal after the dissolution of narcissism (1991e:88-9). Later, 
in The Ego and the Id, Freud clarified this issue by converting the ego ideal into a self-critical 
faculty serving to regulate the behaviour of the ego. The super-ego was a radical break­
through for Freud since it enabled him to specify a faculty capable of mediating between the 
external world (itself mediated by tire ego) and the internal world of the drives (mediated by 
the id); furthermore, it was crucial in elucidating the dissolution of tire Oedipus complex. Ac­
cording to Freud (1991/:374), the child incorporates the paternal figure of the Oedipal conflict 
within the super-ego; the prohibitive and judging qualities of the father are thus taken over by 
tire super-ego. As tire child develops, this paternal element within tire psyche is bolstered by 
individuals in positions of authority and judgement; as Freud writes, 'their injunctions and 
prohibitions remain powerful in the ego ideal and continue, in the form of conscience, to exer­
cise the moral censorship' (376-77). It is significant that Freud associates the super-ego func­
tion with all forms of morality and religion, which clearly exercise such a critical agency in the 
extreme. From this one can perceive why Kristeva places the abject on tire otirer side of the 
super-ego, for the abject is that element of the hidden self that has the most potential to offend 
tire ideals instituted in the psyche by the self-judging super-ego.
Lacan views the super-ego as the faculty in the psychic apparatus that enables the sub­
ject to master the order of the signifier, and so become a fully-fledged Symbolic agent: [tjhe 
subject. . .  has to acquire, conquer, tire order of tire signifier, be given his place in a relation­
ship of implication that attains his being, which results in the formation of what in our lan­
guage we call the superego' (1993:189-90). Acting in this capacity, the super-ego is tire exact 
opposite of the abject. The latter only has signification within the Symbolic because lan­
guage needs terms in which to specify and reject its representatives; outside of this, the 
abject is an absolute and terrifying void in which signifiers cannot prosper.
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the operation to abject in the individual subject.
For Kristeva, the super-ego is the abject's exact alter ego: 'To each ego its object, 
to each superego its abject' (1982:2). The super-ego determines and protects the 
limits of one's identity, of the thing called T .
One has to recognise, however, that even though it is not "I", the abject is a fun­
damental component of subjectivity. The abject, as Kristeva puts it, is '[njot me. Not 
that. But not nothing, either' (1982:2). After all, it 'preserves what existed in the ar­
chaism of pre-objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body 
becomes separated from another body in order to be' (10), and is only peeled away 
from the subjectivity of the developing subject as a result of exclusions and prohi­
bitions set in place by others -  the mother and father in particular. Kristeva writes: 
'if I am affected by what does not yet appear to me as a thing, it is because laws, 
connections, and even structures of meaning govern and condition me' (10). If they 
did not, "I" would take the preOedipal forward as subjectivity and would never 
abject it, leave it behind, outside. But as detachment from the preOedipal is part of 
'normal' subject formation, the abject becomes essential to the subject as the cate­
gory that shows him or her what s /h e  must not do and must not be. The abject 
gives the subject a point of reference -  a norm, in fact, but a norm of bad behaviour 
and bad tilings (and in  this regard is like the obscenity of satire and the Grotesque). 
No subject can exist 'sanely' in the Symbolic without this category of unwanted, 
reject matter, this 'Not me. Not that' (Kristeva, 1982:2).
Operating at both the individual and collective level, the super-ego retains 
what Freud terms the 'injunctions and prohibitions' of parents and other authority 
figures, and so continues 'in  the form of conscience, to exercise the moral censor- 
ship' (19911: 376-77). The super-ego is thus a repository of morality, and prohibi­
tions are geared to uphold morality. A most satirical enterprise indeed. Its ideal is 
to permanently disconnect the subject from the abject and to remove the. possibility 
that the subject will be tempted by the otherness of the abject.
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For just about all of us this is an impossible ideal. Tempt us the abject will, for 
even though it 'lies outside, beyond the set, and does not seem to agree to the lat­
ter's rales of the game' (Kristeva, 1982:2) -  the "set" being the signifying chain, the 
Symbolic -  'from its place of banishment, [it] does not cease challenging its master.' 
(2) The master she refers to is the super-ego. As much as it is the little policeman in 
every individual, the conscience-driven, morality-based super-ego is not always 
equal to the challenge. Why? What makes the abject so tempting, and therefore so 
capable of challenging the super-ego? It is to this question that I devote the next 
section.
5. Repression makes the abject both compelling and repelling
[The abject] lies there, quite dose, but it cannot be assimilated. It beseeches, 
worries, and fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. 
Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects. A certainty protects it from 
the shameful -  a certainly of which it is proud holds on to it. But simultaneously, 
just the same, that impetus, that spasm, that leap is drawn toward an elsewhere 
as tempting as it is condemned. Unflaggingly, like an inescapable boomerang, a 
vortex of summons and repulsion places the one haunted by it literally beside him­
self. (Kristeva, 1982:1)
Elsewhere Kristeva writes: 'the abject simultaneously beseeches and pulverizes 
the subjectf (1982:5). Part of the reason for this simultaneous effect has to do with the 
familiar/ unfamiliar complex we experience as uncanny: '[the abject is a] massive 
and sudden emergence of uncanniness, which, familiar as it might have been in an 
opaque and forgotten life, now harries me as radically separate, loathsome' (2). This 
point deserves to be re-established. The abject -  as repressed pre-objectal material 
and the pleasure-giving drives of pure libido -  is among the elements of the uncon­
scious that we experience as uncanny when it emerges in the gaps of recognition, 
and it this repressed material that Kristeva describes as "familiar". The reversing 
action of repression (which I discussed earlier in connection with womb phantasies), 
is here the thing that makes this material and unbridled pleasure from "an opaque 
and forgotten life" -  i.e., an earlier stage of subject development -  "loathsome" and
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in  need of radical relocation to the category of the abject. It stands to reason, then, 
that if the unconscious can extrude such archaic material and formless pleasure 
into consciousness, we as subjects can occasionally be confronted with long-forgot­
ten aspects of our past, whether these be actual memories or currents of feeling and 
experience linked to drives and instincts long since prohibited by the super-ego 
(itself honouring the requirements of the Symbolic). What we once desired and 
loved, we can desire and love again -  or such is the premise of narcissistic regression
-  and so, for that instant before prohibition kicks in, we do desire again32, and we 
feel the familiarity and the promise of that desire, and this accounts for the attrac­
tion we can feel for unconscious or excluded things. The loathing takes over as 
soon as the super-ego realises what this flaring into consciousness is, and denies it.
The trouble is, desire is immensely mobile and nomadic: it constantly journeys 
in search of an object that will satisfy it, even if only provisionally and partially.
32 To put it another, Freudian, way, at this point the pleasure principle begins to usurp 
and replace the reality principle. Freud argued that the subject was split between allegiance 
to, on the one hand, civilisation (the reality principle, rooted in the external world and me­
diated by the ego) and, on the other, sexual life (the pleasure principle, rooted in the primary 
processes of the unconscious). The latter is largely the result of libidinous drives, which prom­
ulgate a search for pleasure, whereas the former is the principle that humanity must follow 
if society is to maintain civilisation. (For more on these principles see Freud, 1991d:36-41, 
1991i:278-79; 1976:402-3; also see 1991«:757-66/ where the pleasure principle, in accordance 
with Freud's early thought, is called the 'unpleasure principle' and the impulses of the real­
ity principle are simply deemed part of the 'secondary process' of mental functioning.) These 
principles are not, in fact, opposed, but it is Freud's view that, if civilisation is to succeed, 
humanity must find satisfaction in pursuits other than those of the libido, which offers the 
rawest, most direct and immediate means of pleasure. These pursuits, which also give plea­
sure, but not of the drives, are those regulated by the reality principle. Regardless of Freud's 
phrasing of the relation between the two principles, the following passage from Civilization 
and its Discontents indicates that he viewed the reality principle's mediation and sublimation
-  that is, readers must note, repression -  of the pleasure principle as a supreme frustration:
what decides the purpose of life is simply the programme of the pleasure principle. This 
principle dominates the operation of the mental apparatus from the start. There can be no 
doubt about its efficacy, and yet its programme is at loggerheads with the whole world, 
with the macrocosm as much os with the microcosm. There is no possibility at all of its 
being carried through; all the regulations of the universe run counter to it. One feels in­
clined to say that the intention that man should be 'happy' is not included in the plan of 
"Creation". (1991m:263-64)
The abject falls within the precinct of the pleasure principle. To move it from the outskirts 
to the centre of psychic life would be to install the pleasure principle over the reality principle, 
a shift of focus that would select drives and the libido over civilisation.
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and this means that desire will persistently venture within, into the excluded (re­
pressed) parts of subjectivity, and reach out for the excluded objects and unquali­
fied pleasures jumbled into the category of the abject. In this sense we are all like 
Kristeva's borderline subject, the one for whom the Symbolic Other has collapsed, 
the one she calls a "deject", who, she argues (1982:7-18), must constantly stray in 
search of an object that will stabilise his or her world (8)33.
The quest for the object is futile, as Kristeva implies: z[the deject] has a sense of 
the danger, of the loss that the pseudo-object attracting him represents for him, but 
he cannot help taking the risk' (8). And, indeed, sometimes the risk is rewarded, for it 
is only by questing that the deject can experience, in a flash of ungrasped realisation 
that cracks like thunder (8-9), thejbmssflnoe34 which is the sole means of accessing the 
place into which the Other has 'parachuted' (9) the pseudo-object?5. '[J]ouissance 
alone/ writes Kristeva, 'causes the abject to exist.' (9) This existence, as I understand 
it, is not to be confused with the abject as created by classification and prohibition, 
but is one apart from signification, a  'passion' (9) which appears to be associated with 
the safe haven of primary narcissism36 -  one of the original, most 'archaic' stages of
33 Kristeva's notion of straying echoes Lacan's thoughts on the human subject's need to 
(re)find the object of primary loss: '[t]o the extent that what appears to him corresponds 
only partially with what has already gained him satisfaction, the subject engages in a quest, 
and repeats his quest indefinitely until he rediscovers this object' (19886:100). In both pri­
mary and secondary loss there is probably only one object in question: the breast or the 
mother in general, and since the mother, as will emerge shortly, is the definitive abject, the 
lost object is abject by definition. The quest for the lost object becomes a quest for the abject.
34 The easiest way to understand this complex term -  other than as orgasm (see Lacan in 
Heath, Difference. 1978:51) -  is as an eruption of pleasure unlike any known pleasure, which 
can only happen when the subject somehow achieves the impossible: when s/he refinds the 
object of all desire. Where this object exists -  in the abject, in the Real -  is immaterial; the 
issue is that it is the site of the original unity of which Lacan knows nothing (cf. footnote 28); 
it is the true object of being which we assume exists somewhere.
35 Ultimately it is a case of 'the more [the deject] strays, the more he is saved. . .  For it is 
out of such straying on excluded ground that he draws his jouissance' (1982:8).
36 Narcissism is, strictly speaking, not vital to my approach in this thesis, but just by virtue 
of the fact that Kristeva defines abjection as a "narcissistic crisis" (1982:14) it merits brief com­
ment. Primary narcissism is a somewhat murky term in psychoanalytic literature. Freud him­
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subject formation, and among the first to undergo repression. Jouissance can recreate 
what the subject has repressed, cause it to exist again. It is this dream of jouissance 
that compels the subject to continue a quest that, according to all available evidence, 
will never achieve primary objecthood. And this quest will always be undertaken 
with a sense of fear, anxiety, even guilt, for its route runs counter to that of the Sym­
bolic, and is constantly plagued by prohibitions. It is this friction between the Sym­
bolic and a desire whose goal is to re-instate everything the Symbolic has repressed 
and denied that causes the fundamental ambivalence characteristic of our response 
to the abject. Kristeva puts it thus:
And, as in jouissance where the object of desire, known as object a (in Lacan's 
terminology), bursts with the shattered mirror where the ego gives up its image 
in order to contemplate itself in the Other, there is nothing either objective or ob- 
jectal to the abject. It is simply a frontier, a repulsive gift that the Other, having 
become alter ego, drops so that "I" does not disappear in it but finds, in that sub­
lime alienation, a forfeited existence. Hence a jouissance in which the subject is 
swallowed up but in which the Other, in return, keeps the subject from founder­
ing by making it repugnant. One thus understands why so many victims of the 
abject are its fascinated victims -  if not its submissive and willing ones. (1982:9)
The mirror is the active metaphor in the primary separation between self and
self never used it consistently. In The Language of Psychoanalysis (1988:337-38), Laplanche 
and Pontalis provide an excellent overview of Freud's various meanings of the term, and 
also offer more general understandings of it. before criticising its viability. Particularly rele­
vant here is their observation: 'the term is invariably taken to mean a strictly "objectless" -  
or at any rate "undifferentiated" -  state, implying no split between subject and external world' 
(338). This state is, however, regarded as a fantasy which the subject indulges in during what 
is known as secondary narcissism -  narcissism after differentiation, where desire is ordinarily 
focused on the self, not on the undifferentiated preOedipal environment and the child/ 
mother unify that characterises primary narcissism. The object of primary narcissism is unde­
cided. It only assumes a 'reality' after the ego has formed, at which point it appears as 'a re­
gression to a position set back from the other, a return to a self-contemplative, conservative, 
self-sufficient haven' (Kristeva, 1982:14). It thus becomes a fantasy of plenitude, fullness and 
being - of undivided existence and absolute pleasure. According to Kristeva, indulgence in 
such a fantasy 'takes the ego back to its source on the abominable limits from which, in or­
der to be, the ego has broken away -  it assigns it a source in the non-ego, drive, and death.' 
(15). When abjection erupts in the subject it produces a "narcissistic crisis" that compels the 
subject away from the Other, and takes the ego which, through the super-ego, is regulated 
by the Other, back to the alternative self, the not-one/not-two former "I" that never was an 
"I" but which is represented as such in the fantasy of primary narcissism. Desire thus shifts 
from the realm of others to the realm of the self, from the outside to the inside, where the 
only relationship is with a self that, while partially separated at the level of drive, was never 
set apart from the predominant term in its preOedipal environment, the mother.
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other, between ego and other -  the separation that provides the n odel for the rela­
tionship with the fount of language, the ultimate Other of the subject. The Other, at 
least for the subject secure in the Symbolic, is, as axle of the collective signifying field 
and source of all Symbolic Law, the external super-ego, which, installed as the ulti­
mate signifier of unity and plenitude, is an object of desire and the object from 
which desire is most wantecP7. The ego is prepared to surrender its boundaries in 
return for the love desired from the Other, i.e., to accept the limits of the Other as the 
limits of the ego. This is the subject’s sign of obedience to the Other. The Other's re­
sponse is to do away with the danger of the subject7s slippage to the other side of 
the boundary, into the jouissance of abjection, by rejecting abjection as if it was 
some kind of repulsive gift. 'I don't want this part of you/ the Other says, and ab- 
jects it from its system, making it radically other to the subject. 'This is not the part 
of you that will make me desire you/ the Other says. And "drops" it like faeces. Tire 
obedient subject then continues to treat it as ordure.
Despite its debasement, the abject remains fascinating because (1) it is other, (2) it 
is invested with an abundance the Symbolic subject feels s/he has lost, (3) it promises 
libidinal pleasures that society has curtailed within strict regulations of desire, as well 
as jouissance: the supreme triumph, of the pleasure principle, (4) it is the locale of the 
incipient object of desire, the (abject[edj) mother, (5) it is the place where unity iu 
assured, for the subject can "disappear" into it: it has the potential to "swallow" the 
subject, to engulf him or her in its own essential identity. But, as much as the subject 
may want it, the Oilier does not, and prohibits the subject from abandoning his or 
her super-ego for the sake of losing the ego in the abject. But prohibition, repression,
37 Lacan frequently claims that "the desire of man is the desire of the Other" (see, for 
example, 1977:263-64, 312; 1988a:177; 1994:38). I interpret this in three ways: (1) that sub­
jects desire what the Other desires, (2) that, in accordance with the mirror stage, which fixes 
the Other as the site of unity, subjects desire (and want to possess) the Other's desire be­
cause it must be better than theirs if the Other, as they assume, is unified whereas they are 
fragmented, (3) that they desire to be the tiling the Other desires: the object of its desire. (See 
also 1988n:176-77, for the response Lacan made to a member of his seminar audience when 
, disked to define the axiomatic man's desire is the desire of the Other.)
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cannot stop desire, and the subject's relationship to the Other and the abject remains 
in a tense and potentially psychotic ambivalence38.
Earlier I asked w hat the link between obscenity and the unconscious was. Some 
answers lie here. The tilings that are obscene are generally things that society re­
presses and whose appearance it tries to limit. What is repressed in the social field is 
pushed into the unconscious in  the psychological field, becoming the abject. But 
these things are not a priori obscene or bad: they are things (e.g., excrement, genitals, 
mucous) that the subject in Ms or her earlier years, when s /h e  was still learning the 
social ropes, accepted openly, even took a great deal of pleasure in. As things once 
considered to be extensions or even characteristics of subjectivity, they continue to 
exert a powerful influence on the subject and, as tire outside within -  the unmention­
able w ithin the accepted -  they fascinate desire by virtue of their uncanny ambiva­
lence. TM'Ough the gaps in  repression and prohibition, one continues to feel draw n to 
them, even desires to experience them, w ith the senses and to invest them with the 
libidinal energy of the drives that first mapped them. It is because they are the famil­
iar-yet-unwanted that one almost transcendentalises them  into objects promising 
jouissance. Their plenitude -  the impression that they would reward the subject's 
quest for the object if only society was reformed so that every subject was once again 
allowed to openly fraternise with, and extract pleasure from;, the rejected -  is, how­
ever, itself an illusion. It is only because it is abject that slut produces laughter when
38 Which engenders a number of dialectical relationships, for example; order/disorder, 
Semiotic/Symbolic (in Kristeva), abject/Other, unfamiliar/familiar (re the uncanny), non- 
differentiation/ nomination, formlessness/form, unclean/clean, impure/pure, improper/ 
proper, dirt/system, non-separation/identity, fragmentation/unity, flow/containment, open 
form/closed form, grotesque body/classical body, abject/super-ego, space/place, ignoble/ 
noble, mocked/mocking, terror/indifference, pleasure/reality. None of these (op)positions 
is securely and consistently binary; each is capable of collapse. To take one example, that 
between fragmentation and unity; as much as there is unity of sorts in the Symbolic, the sub­
ject remains fragmented, for s/he locates identity, hence unity, in the alienating image of the 
other. Unity comes secondhand to tire subject, via the assumed unity of the other. At least in 
the primal relationship with tire mother fragmentation only exists because the drives begin to 
map the body of the child in parts, zones and extremities: this is fragmentation because the 
body has not been reconnoitred yet; but in tire postmirror-phase subject fragmentation stenrs 
from a castrating misrecognition that leaves the subject forever lacking before the other.
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it is spoken of in certain societies or circles, only because it is refuse(d) that it seems a 
symbol of rebellion. It gives pleasure to write about excretion or to frolic in mud, but 
such practices are merely sad gestures toward the ultimate unknowable jouissance 
associated with the mother, the lost object that can never be (re)found.
*  *  *
The above defining features of the abject present a general picture of this essential 
part of subjectivity, but before I  can proceed to look at methods an individual 
might employ to maintain the abject in repression, I need to raise a few issues that 
are directly pertinent to my interpretation of Goya's work, These issues are three: 
(1) the question of how the social formation categorises tire human subject -  how, 
for example, deformity, ugliness or illness, on the one hand, and inappropriate or 
maladjusted behaviour, on the other, can function to make the body grotesque, and 
thereby mark it for rejection and alienation (i.e., abjection); (2) the consequences of 
the interpolation of the subject into the Symbolic for the figure of the mother, who 
is devalued in signification to the supreme, earliest objet a of the repressed abject -  
this has obvious bearing on my interpretation of, for example, Goya's images of 
women as witches; Motion of non-differentiation, and the limitless, unclacsifi-
able substance this if vS ■ , substance in which subjects whose desire for the ab­
ject leads them to sth frmu the Symbolic might lose their ego-centred selves; or,
alternatively, a substance which might represent a pre-eminent threat to the subject, 
against which s/he will do just about anything to affirm the limits of Iris or her sub­
jectivity -  both of which possibilities have a bearing on my reading of Goya's Des- 
astres de la Gilena and, as it pertains to the mindless mass. Iris Disparates.
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II. The Abject as it pertains to Goya
2. 77ie subject made abject
Order is contravened by crossing limits, borders, margins. Regulations shape 
experience into precincts39, where jurisdiction is carefully n . ii by both self­
surveillance and the tissue of exhortations transmitted to the human subject via all 
forms of representation, from verbal to visual. The subject is moulded into a crea­
ture of habit, for habit, routine, is the surest way to automate the subject -  an auto­
mation that will uphold the boundaries erected by social ordering. It is liberating to 
break out of routine and habit because this can entail a rupture of both individual 
restrictions and wider social prohibitions. Subjects who rupture such prohibitions, 
e.g., criminals, bohemians, activists, mavericks, are viewed as dangerous because 
they not only challenge law and order but on a more suppressed level issue the 
threat of reinstating a form of existence radically antithetical to the life lived in sig­
nifying chains. Such individuals are as abject as dirt and putrefaction because they 
disturb the social plan. They must be separated from the more ideal citizens 
(often through incarceration) if society is to maintain its ideal purity.
Many subjects, of course, do not need to be openly, physically rebellious to be 
marked for abjection, but are degraded to the level of filth by virtue of social sta­
tion, occupation and physical appearance. In his graphic work such individuals 
form Goya's leading targets. He does, extremely rarely, explore the domain of 
absolute outsiders, who exist on the fringes of society and prey on that society to 
maintain their separate existence (the best example being Boys at the Ready [Mucha- 
chos al avia] [Fig.2], a depiction of highwaymen preparing to stage a robbery).
39 Cf. Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies. I: 'Certain parte of our bodies and certain bodily 
effluvia are colonial territories, colonized phenomena (defined by the authority of the state, 
our parents, the gods, the CIA of our muscular contractions). They are occupied territories 
that we drag around with us' (1987:416).
P a r t  O n e :  G r o t e s q u e  i n t o  A b j e c t Pa g e  134
Otherwise, his satirical subjects fall into three categories: (1) individuals who make 
a living through unlawful but covertly sanctioned practices (prostitutes, whom Gnya 
depicts frequently, being the foremost example); (2) individuals expected to be the 
shining lights of the society, but who fail dismally to fulfil such expectations (the 
nobility and the clergy are exemplary here -  Goya degrades them by revealing how 
idle and parasitical (in the case of the nobility] and how hypocritical [in the case of 
the clergy] they are); (3) individuals who neglect morality to practice highly skilled 
occupations falsely (the quack doctor of To the Count Palatine [Al Conde Palatino] [Fig. 
3] springs to mind), contract loveless marriages of convenience (e.g.. Is tltere None 
Who can untie Us? [Fig.4]), or promulgate superstition (Hunt for Teeth [A cazu de 
Dientes] [Fig.5]) -  individuals, in short, who advocate actions and conviction: that, 
in Goya's eyes, can only be taken on with a consequent relaxation of social respon­
sibility and ethical standard.
All of the above individuals fall short, in Goya's estimation, of society's expec-
f Z C s p o u s e  he requires of them, Goya fre-
Fig.6 What a Sacrifice! QQue Sacri/iciof) quently  turns h is subjects into
tations of the citizen, and for this rea­
son deserve to be exposed, ridiculed 
and cast out. In many instances Goya 
uses deformity -  the grotesque body
-  to mark individuals as unsavoury 
and thereby set them up as objects for 
mocking laughter, The humpbacked, 
bow-legged man in What a Sacrifice! 
[Fig.6] and the obese mother in Where 
is Mama going ! [Fig.12 and Fig,54] are 
obvious examples of this. To leave his 
viewers in no doubt as to the re-
I l l u s t r a t i o n s Pa g e  i
Fig.4 Is there None Who can untie Us? (iNo Hay Quien nos desate?) Fig,5 Hunt for Teeth (A caia de Dientes)
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Witches, many of whom he pushes to the limits of physical repulsiveness. Here the 
body is a transparent indicator of character, and the anti-social practice of witch­
craft is a brace to the satirical message. In such works Goya degrades (his subject) 
to uplift (his audience). His procedure is consistently satirical, but not always shot 
from the same bow; using his moralistic super-ego as his measure, he is as willing 
to censure the law, when it falls into corruption, as he is take up society's prohibi­
tions, taboos and judgements, when these accord with his own ideals, to ridicule 
(the operation to abject) Ms subject into a debased, downcast level (the condition to 
be abject). Thus, when interpreting Goya's use of satire and the Grotesque to de­
grade (chiefly a feature of the artist's procedure in Los Caprichos), I am most con­
cerned. to demonstrate how his subjects are transfoimed into abjects that the viewer 
can more easily and effectively deal with, by abjecting them.
2. The mother as abject
In Kristeva's system the mother is abject both as fragment and whole. As fragment it 
is her body, more particularly, its exudations, that make her undesirable within the 
Symbolic. As whole she is dangerous because of her potentially limitless 'femininity'.
2.1 The mother's abject fragments
As we have seen, society sets aside certain objects for consensual exclusion from the 
Symbolic order, among tiiem the products of the body, everytiting from nail parings 
to breast milk to excrement. Some ere considered unsightly but otherwise harmless 
(loose hairs, say) or only contrary to social norms when their production exceeds re­
quirements (e.g., overabundant lactation); others are viewed as polluting and bio­
hazardous. Few more so than blood -  menstrual blood, in particular.
Kristeva identifies excremental and menstrual wastes as prohibited objects (1982: 
71-2) and contends that society links both 'pollutions' to the maternal body. Men­
strual blood for obvious reasons; excremental waste because, in her view, it is the
Author  Herbst, Michael. 
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